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ABSTRACT 
The rise of capitalism and the emergence of working classes in the countries of the 
so-called 'Third World' is now the subject of increasing academic research. This 
study seeks to make a contribution to this research by providing an introductory 
analysis into the historical development of the industrial working class in Thailand. 
The period covered by this study extends from the mid-nineteenth century up to 
1957. Some initial and largely exploratory attempts are made to trace the processes of 
formation of this class fraction with particular emphasis being given to an 
examination of the role played by the state in the process. 
Drawing on both secondary sources and hitherto unused primary documents, 
this study seeks to demonstrate that, during the period under review, an industrial 
working class emerged as an important social force within Thai society and that 
members of this class were making significant contributions to Thai economic, 
political and social life. In arguing for this position the study directly challenges the 
widespread view that Thai society lacked a 'true' working class movement during the 
pre-1957 period. This thesis demonstrates that this view is both theoretically and 
empirically mistaken. 
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 
Although this thesis is the product of my own work it would not have been completed 
without the assistance, support and encouragement of many institutions and 
individuals. I would like to thank the Australian National University, and in particular 
the Department of Political Science, for providing me with financial assistance. Thanks 
are also extended to the staff at the National Research Council of Thailand, the Thai 
National Archives, the National Library of Thailand, Thailand Information Centre, 
Chulalongkom University and the Economics Library at Thammasat University. In 
Australia the librarians at the Australian National Library and at the Menzies Library, 
Australian National University also provided me with assistance. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to a number of individuals most 
particularly, Mae and Noi Leksomrit for their kindness and hospitality during my 
period of fieldwork in Thailand and to Richard Brown, Russell Lain and Kerstin 
Wijeyewardene for their criticism and advice. Special thanks must also go to Kevin 
Hewison for his academic assistance and constant encouragement. Finally, hugs and 
kisses go to my wife and baby daughter for all their love and support. 
11 
CONTENTS 
Abstract 
Acknowledgements ii 
Contents iii 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 General Introduction 1 
1.2 The STV and Empirical Research 2 
1.3 The STV and Theory 4 
1.3.1 Class Structure and Class Formation 5 
1.4 Structure of the Study 10 
Chapter 2 Class Structure: Wage-Labour and Capital to 1957 12 
2.1 Litroduction 12 
2.2 The Emergence of Thai CapitaUsm 14 
2.3 Thai Capitalism 1855-1957 17 
2.4 Industry and Wage-Labour to 1957 20 
2.5 The State and Capitalist Development to 1957 24 
2.6 Summary 28 
Chapter 3 Class Formation: The 1923 Tramway Strike 30 
3.1 Introduction 30 
3.2 The 1923 Tramwaymen's Strike 30 
3.3 Analysis 46 
3.3.1 Struggles Over the Working Day 46 
3.3.2 Capitalist Control 50 
3.3.3 The State and Struggles Over the Working Day 55 
3.3.4 Wage-Labour and Politics 59 
3.3.5 Organised Labour 64 
3.3.6 Ideology 65 
3.4 Summary 71 
Chapter 4 Class Formation 1923-1944 74 
4.1 Introduction 74 
111 
Period One: 1923-1932 
4.1.1 The Thai Labour Movement 1923-1932 74 
4.1.2 The Chinese Labour Movement 80 
4.1.3 The State and Labour 1923-1932 83 
4.1.4 The 1932 Coup 86 
Period Two: 1932-1934 
4.2.1 The Labour Movement 1932-1934 88 
4.2.2 The State and Labour 1932-1934 95 
Period Three: 1934-1944 
4.3.1 Labour Under MHitary Rule 98 
4.3.2 The State and Industrial Relations 98 
4.3.3 Labour and Hypemationalism 101 
4.4. Summary 104 
Chapter 5 Class Formation 1944-1957 106 
5.1 Introduction 106 
Period One: 1944-1947 
5.1.1 The Labour Movement 1944-1947 106 
Period Two: 1947-1955 
5.2.1 Labour Under MiUtary Rule 1947-1955 114 
Period Three: 1955-1957 
5.3.1 Labour Reorganizes 121 
5.3.2 Labour Legislation 123 
5.4 Summary 129 
Chapter 6 Conclus ion 130 
Bibl iography 136 
1 v 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an introductory analysis into the historical 
development of the industrial working class in Thailand. The period covered by the 
study extends from the mid-nineteenth century up to 1957. Some preliminary steps 
will be taken toward tracing the process of formation of the industrial working class 
during this period, with particular emphasis being given to an examination of the role 
played by the state in this process. The principle substantive aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate empirically that, during the period under review, an industrial working 
class had emerged as an important social force within Thai society and that members of 
this class were making significant contributions to Thai economic, political and social 
life. 
The arguments presented in this study stand in marked contrast to a view which 
has long been associated with previous academic perceptions of the contributions 
which Thai industrial workers made to the development of their society prior to 1957. 
This view which, to borrow a term from Vickery [1984:36], I will call the Standard 
Total View (STV), has its social scientific origins in Virginia Thompson's work 
[1947], is contained in studies written in the 1950's and 1960's [Fogg,1953; 
Nikhom,1955; Shurcliffe,1959; Pasuknirunt,1959; Thian,1969] and finds its clearest 
expression in Mabry [1977:931] as follows: 
Although Thailand earlier (1932-1958) had organisations that 
called themselves labor unions, it is questionable whether 
Thailand, in fact, has until recently ever had a true labor 
movement [My emphasis]. 
Although this idea that the various historical actions of Thai workers prior to 
1957 did not represent the makings of a 'true', 'real' or 'proper' working class 
movement is, first and foremost, a product of the work carried out by scholars 
associated with modernisation perspectives, it is also a notion which to varying extents 
can be found in the studies of writers who have been influenced by radical theory 
[Pichit, (ed.) 1975; Anon,1980; Petprasert,1982; Somkiat, 1982a; Sangsit,1986]. Of 
course, there exists a vast difference between these writers with regard to what they 
feel a 'true' working class should or should not be and, as will be discussed below, 
there is an equally vast difference in the explanations which have been invoked to 
account for this purported absence of a 'proper' working class. Nevertheless, for all 
their substantive differences, it is remarkable that both groups of scholars have arrived 
at a similar conclusion with respect to the overall historical significance of the 
contributions which industrial workers made to Thai history during the pre-1957 
period. 
It is a central contention of this study that the STV in both its modernisation 
( S T V M ) and radical ( S T V R ) variants, is both theoredcally and empirically mistaken. 
On a theoretical level, this thesis will show that the endre search for a 'true' working 
class is misplaced. It will be argued that there is no fo rm of working class 
development and struggle which can a priori be considered to be superior to any other 
and therefore what is required is a theoretically informed discussion of the actual forms 
which the development of an industrial working class assumed in the Thai context. In 
applying this approach to the analysis of the pre-1957 period, the intention is to 
demonstrate empirically that: first, Thailand's incorporation into the world capitalist 
social order combined with a domestic based process of capital accumulation was 
accompanied by the emergence of a new class of producers who, for their social 
survival, were dependent on the receipt of a regular wage; second it will be 
demonstrated that dependence on a wage served to generate certain shared experiences 
and interests among industrial workers and that, on the basis of these shared interests. 
Thai workers began to launch struggles which not only brought them into conflict with 
their employers but also brought them into direct confrontation with the power of the 
Thai state; finally it will be argued that even though industrial workers were unable to 
free themselves from dependence on a wage, their overall response to this dependence 
altered and redirected the flow of socio-historical change in Thailand in ways which 
were indeed significant. 
The aim of the remaining secdons of this chapter is threefold: first, to make 
some brief remarks on the empirical underpinnings of the STV; second, to examine 
and provide a critique of its theoretical foundations and finally, to outUne in more detail 
the structure of the present study. 
1.2 The STV and Empirical Research 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the various academic studies which have denied 
industrial workers any significant place in Thai history prior to 1957 is the extent to 
which the authors of these works have been prepared to arrive at their conclusions on 
the basis of minimal amounts of empirical research. Indeed, when compared to the 
truly massive amount of research which has been brought to bear on the analysis of the 
development of wage-labour and working classes in both the advanced capitalist 
societies of the West and increasingly in areas such as Latin America, Africa, Asia and 
other parts of Southeast Asia, the entire field of labour studies in Thailand must, 
empirically at least, be considered to be very much in its infancy. Although the first 
social scientific study to focus on Thai labour was completed in the late 1940's, 
research into wage-labour and the working class has, however, not figured 
prominently within the field of Thai studies generally [cf.Reynolds,1984:2], In fact it 
has only been since the early to mid 1970's, during which time workers combined 
with students and peasants to help overthrow a despotic military regime and usher in a 
period of open democratic politics, that both Thai and Western scholars have 
recognised the need for a more critical and thoroughgoing analysis of the historical 
development and current position of the working class within contemporary Thai 
society. However, while the intervening years have witnessed the steady production of 
journal articles, data papers, unpublished essays, conference reports, postgraduate 
theses and monographs, much of this work has tended to remain focused on more 
recent problems and issues and is decidedly lacking in a firm historical grounding. In 
more recent times, however, there has been a growing recognition that contemporary 
prob lems must be analysed and placed within an historical perspect ive 
[Phaisan,1986:9-11]. Nevertheless, apart f rom a few schematic and provisional 
analyses, studies of the historical development of the Thai working class have 
continued to remain infrequent [Anon,1980; Somkiat,1982a and 1982b]. It is 
important to note that the studies which have concentrated on the historical 
development of labour have, with some recent exceptions [Sangsit,1986; Damri & 
Carun,1986; Brown,1987; Poonpanich,1988], been almost wholly based on 
secondary sources. Virginia Thompson's work of the late 1940's continues to be used 
as the point of departure for studies of the pre-war and immediate post-war period, 
while Mabry [1979], who relies on Thompson for much of his historical background, 
continues to be cited as the main source of information for our understanding of the 
1950's. It is symptomatic of the as yet underdeveloped nature of primary empirical 
research that even basic historical questions, such as the dating of the establishment of 
the first legally recognised labour organisation in Thailand, continue to be the subject 
of some confusion.i 
To some extent the general lack of primary research and the problem this poses 
for our understanding of the historical development of the Thai working class has been 
due to the difficulty in gaining access to relevant material. As Anderson [1978:195] 
has indicated, the absence of a colonial period in Thailand has meant that researchers 
have been deprived of the rich body of colonial scholarship which has formed such an 
It has generally been thought that the first legally registered trade union in Thailand was 
established in 1897. This is empirically innaccurate. In fact, it was to lake Thai workers 
another thirty five years of struggle after this date before they won the right to legally establish 
their own organisation. For more details sec Chapter Three, Section 3.3.5. 
important empirical basis for the socio-historical analysis of development and change 
in those countries which did experience a period of colonial rule. To complicate 
matters even further, Thai workers have left little in the way of written records of their 
experiences, nor are trade union and archival documents easily obtainable, a situation 
which makes the investigation of problems such as the early development and growth 
of class organisations and class consciousness exceedingly difficult to investigate. 
Nevertheless, while it must be accepted that the lack of such material places definite 
constraints on our ability to investigate and understand the past, past writers have been 
reluctant to make use of the primary materials which are available. One of the principal 
tasks of this study will be, therefore, to make a contribution to our basic empirical 
knowledge of the historical development of labour in Thailand. While not wishing to 
impugn the important contributions which have been made by past writers, it is hoped 
that a more rigorous employment of secondary sources, together with the use of 
hitherto unused primary documents, will permit us to begin to recognise the fact that 
industrial workers were making more significant contributions to the development of 
their society than proponents of the STV would suggest. It is the intention of this 
study, however, not only to show that the STV cannot be sustained on empirical 
grounds, but also to demonstrate that it is the product of an approach which is 
theoretically unacceptable. It is to a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
STV to which I now turn. 
13 The STV and Theory 
On a substantive theoretical level studies of the historical development of the Thai 
working class have been and, to a large extent, continue to be informed by the 
concerns of either modernisation or radical theory.^ Over recent years both of these 
theoretical orientations have been subjected to rigorous theoretical critiques 
[Hewison,1989:5-30; Higgott & Robison,1985:16-61; Evans & Stephens,1988:713-
745]. The purpose here is not simply to repeat the many criticisms which have been 
directed against these approaches. In the present context it will be sufficient to draw 
attention to the fact that, despite the intellectual gulf which serves to separate these 
particular perspectives, they have nevertheless displayed, at least within the context of 
Thai labour studies, certain similarities. The most notable of these is that scholars from 
both theoretical camps have built their analyses around the search for a real, pure or 
By the terms modernisation and radical theory I refer simply to two broad positions within 
development theory both of which have exercised an enormous influence over both Thai and 
Southeast Asian studies. For a very useful discussion which treats both the historical genesis 
of these approaches and the way they have changed over time see. Chapter 1 in Higgott and 
Robison [1985:16-61]. 
proper form of working class development. This search has, however, not been 
limited to analyses of the Thai working class for it has also served to exercise a 
considerable influence over studies of the historical development of wage-labour and 
working classes in the Third World generally [Lloyd,1982; Munck,1988; 
Gutkind,1988]. Although no attempt will be made to canvass all of the relevant 
debates, it will be argued that this widespread concern for an exemplary form of 
working class development is the product of a specific approach which, albeit 
implicitly, is underpinned by certain assumptions which are theoretically unacceptable. 
It will be appropriate to discuss this criticism further in the light of some recent debates 
which have centred around the nature of the relationship between class structure and 
class formation. 
13.1 Class Structure and Class Formation 
As Isaacs [1987:134] observes, the concept of class in Marxist theory is 
'paradigmatically ambiguous' denoting as it does both a 'structural relation between 
economic positions and the collectivities that occupy these positions and reproduce 
them in the course of their acdvity'. Given this ambiguity it is therefore important to 
make a clear distinction between two dimensions of class theory; first, theories of class 
structure where the emphasis is placed on developing abstract models of the structure 
and dynamics of social relations 'into which individuals...enter which determine their 
class interests' [Wright, 1985:9] and second, theories of class formation where 
attention is directed away from structure in order to provide a theoretical account of the 
process 'whereby class collectivities develop group solidarities and act collecdvely to 
negotiate and transform class relations' [Isaacs,1987:134]. 
Wright [1985:123] has argued that in 'classical' Marxist theory the nature of 
the relationship between class structure and class formation was 'generally treated as 
relatively unproblematic'. He states that: 
...in the analysis of the working class it was usually assumed 
that there was a one-to-one relationship between the 
proletariat as structurally defined and the proletariat as a 
collective actor engaged in struggle. The transformation of 
the working class from a class-in-itself (a class determined 
structurally) into a class-for-itself (a class consciously 
engaged in collective struggle over its class interests) may not 
have been understood as a smooth and untroubled process, 
but it was seen as inevitable. 
Metcalfe [1988:13-14] has pointed to the important implications which this 
classical understanding of the relationship between class structure and class formation 
has had with regard to the conducting of concrete historical analysis. He argues that, if 
the proletariat's historical actions are assumed to be defined by a 'fixed essence' 
(i.e.merely by the position they occupy within the class structure) and if individual 
workers are perceived to be the mere bearers of this essence then: 
...the characteristics of class struggle and the course of 
history can be 'read-off the essential qualities which classes 
possess because of their place in society...Historical change 
is thus seen as progress, or the unfolding of an immanent 
social order, and historical analyses have 'explained' 
phenomena when they have situated them in the pre-
classificatory model or historical projection. 
Although neither modernisation nor radical writers work within the substantive 
propositions of Marxist theory, their studies of the historical development of the Thai 
working class have been informed by a type of historical analysis which is strikingly 
similar to the one identified by Metcalfe. That is, both groups of scholars have 
approached the study of Thai working class history through the imposition of a pre-
classificatory model which carries with it images of what the Thai working class 
should do or should be [cf. Zeeponsekul,1987:2]. When brought to bear on the 
analysis of pre-1957 Thai society, the major consequence of this approach is as 
follows: first, it has taken scholars only minimal amounts of empirical research to 
establish the fact that Thai workers seemingly failed to reproduce what have been held 
to be the proper forms of struggle, thought and organisation; second, the gap which is 
therefore opened between what their historical projections suggest should be the case 
and what empirical research has shown to have actually happened has led both groups 
of writers to the conclusion that no true working class emerged in Thailand, with the 
bulk of the research effort being directed toward explaining why Thai workers 
appeared to have failed to fulfill their historical destiny. 
According to writers influenced by modernisation theory, this failure is due to 
the persistence of traditional Thai culture. Thai workers, it has been argued, were 
innately passive, accepting of their subordinate role and position in society, deferential 
to authority and possessed with an inbuilt reluctance to become involved in the affairs 
of others. Apparendy perplexed by the ostensible lack of the development of a strong 
trade union movement during the pre-1957 period, Mabry [1979:32] has argued that 
while the individual cultural traits of innate passiveness, deference to authority etc. do 
'not exclude the formation of voluntary organisations...[they dol...explain the paucity 
of them [My emphasis]. More forcefully the same author claims that as the Thai were 
'culturally pre-conditioned to be non-involved in the affairs of others...the American 
rallying cry of 'an injury to one is an injury to all' had no corollary among the Thais, 
and there was almost no recognition of the principle "in union there is strength'". 
Mabry [1979:48] further argues that the innate reluctance to challenge authority meant 
that the 'grievance machinery' established under the 1956 Labour Act proved 
unworkable and therefore 'there were few union victories or accomplishments to bind 
workers to a continuing organisation and for which they were willing to make unusual 
sacrifices'. 
While modernisation writers have attempted to explain the Thai proletariat's 
failure to fulfill its historical destiny by reifving culture, radical writers have attempted 
to explain this failure by reifying consciousness. In an argument which has pervaded 
historical studies of working classes the world over, the revolutionary maturity of the 
Thai working class is thought to have been checked by its inability to escape from the 
confines of dominant ideology. According to Petprasert [1982:4], labour 'internalised' 
the 'hegemonic' ideology of the Thai ruling classes, a situation which 'undermined the 
possibility for the progressive labour movement to develop...and transform the social 
and political consciousness of the working class.' Sangsit [cited in Somkiat,1982a:40] 
adopts a similar type of explanation arguing that 'free-labour' is freed not only from 
the means of production but also from the confines of 'feudal' consciousness. As 
elements of this consciousness remained within the minds of Thai workers then '...it 
cannot be concluded that a class of free workers [i.e. a working class] has emerged 
within Thai society'. 
This study will show that the explanations proffered by both modernisation and 
radical writers cannot be sustained on empirical grounds. Rather than being culturally 
reluctant to challenge authority and become involved in the affairs of others, it wiU be 
shown that Thai industrial workers continually displayed both a willingness and ability 
to organise and struggle in defence of their class interests. Moreover it will be shown 
that, while elements of what may be termed 'feudal' consciousness did remain within 
labour discourse, these elements were subjected to a process of critical transformation 
and rather than simply 'internalising' dominant ideologies industrial workers and their 
leaders were able, during the course of their struggles, to map out radically different 
ideological conceptions of what exists and what was good and possible for the future 
development of their society. Nevertheless, while it is important to demonstrate the 
empirical weaknesses of previous studies, it is equally important to show that the 
entire attempt to assess the historical significance of the actions of Thai workers in 
terms of a pre-classificatory model or historical projection emerges from an approach 
which is theoretically unacceptable. With this latter aim in mind I now return to a 
discussion of the debates over the nature of the relationship between class structure 
and class formation. 
In recent years there has emerged an increasingly influential body of argument 
which suggests that rather than being unproblematic and inevitable, the transformation 
of the working class from a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself is both complex and 
contingent. As Przeworski,[ 1977:367] observes: 
Classes as historical actors are not given uniquely by any 
objective positions...the very relations between classes as 
historical actors (classes-in-struggle) and places within the 
relations of production must become problematic. Classes are 
not given uniquely by any objective positions because they 
constitute the effect of struggles, and these struggles are not 
determined uniquely by the relations of production. 
In other words, while the class structure may serve to generate certain socio-
historical conditions and establish definite parameters of struggle, social identity, 
interests and power [cf Isaacs,1987:135], the various ways in which people who 
occupy positions within the class structure respond to these conditions, the various 
forms of struggle, organisation and thought which are developed as part of this 
response and, most crucially, the success or otherwise of these responses cannot be 
simply 'read-off a knowledge of the class structure itself. Thus with regard to the 
working class: 
It is always problematic whether workers will be formed into 
a class or into some other collectivity based on religion, 
ethnicity, region, language, nationality, trade, etc. The class 
structure may define the terrain of material interests upon 
which attempts at class formation occur, but it does not 
uniquely determine the outcome of those attempts 
[Wright,1985:123]. 
On a more fundamental methodological level, the rejection of the classical 
understanding of the relationship between class structure and class formation emerges 
out of a wider dissatisfaction with any approach to social theory which fails to pay 
sufficient attention to the role played by human agency in history. In the context of 
labour studies the most vociferous critics of those who have sought to deny both the 
moral and historical significance of the role of human agency are the social historians 
such as Eric Hobsbawn and E.P. Thompson [see, Kaye,1984]. Through their writing 
of 'history from below', these scholars have gone to enormous lengths to demonstrate 
that workers do not simply 'live out' their lives in accordance with some pre-
determined or fixed pattern of development but rather are actively involved in the 
process of making history albeit 'under circumstances transmitted from the past and 
within social structures beyond their control' [Metcalfe,1988:10]. The virtual total 
eclipse of human agency has arguably been one of the outstanding features of Thai 
labour studies. Both in the assumption that they were, and by implication still are, 
destined to act in certain ways and in the explanations which have been invoked to 
account for why they failed to act in prescribed ways, industrial workers in Thailand 
8 
have, more often than not, been portrayed as the mere products of independently 
existing social structures and forces which are seemingly unaffected by the historical 
actions of Thai workers themselves. 
In opposition to those who have portrayed human agents in general and 
workers in particular as the mere creations of history rather than the makers of their 
own history, writers such as Metcalfe [1988] have argued for the need to adopt an 
historical understanding of the relationship between social structure and human 
agency. According to this approach: 
... social structures are more like the banks and sandbars of a 
river than a building's foundations or a body's skeleton. 
Built up and cut out by the river's daily f low, they 
nonetheless shape and divert the flow. At any one moment 
the river must contend with the fixed obstacles (though it is 
not necessarily forced by them into one channel), but the 
structures are simultaneously altered by the river's flow. At 
any time the flow and structure have certain characterisdcs 
which can be described or analysed, but the river can only be 
understood if the flow and the structure are considered 
historically and dialectically [Metcalfe, 1988:13]. 
In short, historical understandings of society pave the way toward the 
recognition that within the socio-historical sciences, the concept of determination does 
not and indeed cannot refer to the predictability of particular outcomes but rather refers 
to the defining of conditions of possibility [cf. Hall, 1983:84]. Social structures set 
limits on the possible forms which social life can take. They serve to constrain, limit 
and shape a range of possible social forms which, for their ultimate realisation, are 
dependent on the conscious and purposeful activities of human agents who are 
engaged in a continual process of forming, reforming and (occasionally) transforming 
the socio-historical conditions of their existence [Bhaskar,1986:122-125]. The 
purpose here is not to pursue these abstract methodological matters further. Rather in 
the present context it will be appropriate to simply spell out the implications which the 
above comments have with regard to the conducting of concrete historical analyses. 
In terms of historical studies of wage-labour and working classes, the adoption 
of an historical understanding of society necessarily leads to a rejection of any 
approach which attempts to assess the historical significance of working class 
development in terms of a pre-classificatory model or historical projection, for there is 
no form of working class development and struggle which is theoretically superior to 
any other. What is necessary therefore is the adoption of a more complex notion of 
applied research whereby the concepts derived from the theories of class structure and 
class formation are applied to the analysis of concrete historical sociedes in order to 
help explain and understand the specific forms which working class development and 
struggle actually take, a task which can only be conducted on the basis of rigorous and 
sustained empirical research. It is this notion of applied research which informs the 
present study. 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
In Chapter Two the purpose is to draw on some recent work in Thai economic 
history in order to show that an industrial working class actually emerged during the 
pre-1957 period. Although small in number, it will be argued that this class 
nevertheless came to occupy a strategically important position within the Thai 
economy. Having demonstrated that an industrial working class emerged at a structural 
level, the aim of subsequent chapters is to trace the history of the processes of 
formation of this new social class. Chapter Three is, in some senses, the most 
important chapter of the study for it is here that many of the myths which surround the 
way in which Thai industrial workers did or did not struggle are dispelled. The chapter 
focuses on a strike by Thai tramway workers which erupted in the early months of 
1923. Through a careful consideration of both contemporary newspaper and archival 
reports some insight is afforded into one important moment in the process through 
which workers were beginning to struggle to form themselves into a class on the basis 
of interests determined by their position within the class structure. Chapters Four and 
Five build on the analysis presented in Chapter Three. Given the as yet 
underdeveloped nature of research the discussion, however, must be both selecdve 
and exploratory. Two major themes are pursued. First, an attempt is made to trace the 
continued growth and development of the labour movement and second, special 
consideration is given toward an examination of the various ways in which the form of 
this development was shaped by the actions of the Thai state. In Chapter Six the main 
conclusions of the study are summarised and some suggestions are made with regard 
to possible directions for future research. 
The present study is based on research carried out during a period of fieldwork 
in Thailand between September 1985 to September 1986. Extensive research was 
carried out in the Thai National Archives, The Thai National Library and the libraries at 
Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities. Subsequent research was carried out in 
Canberra at the Australian National Library and the Menzies Library at the Australian 
National University. 
Given the fact that much of the material presented in this study is based on Thai 
language sources it has been necessary to romanise the names of certain authors, tities 
of works and other technical terms. In general, the method of transcription is based on 
10 
the Library of Congress system, however, because of technical reasons all diacritical 
marks have been omitted. This means, for example, that distinctions between long and 
short vowels are not indicated nor are distinctions made between the back rounded 
vowels 'oo' and 'or'. Finally, Thai statistics have enjoyed a reputation for being 
notoriously inaccurate. While every effort has been made to check the figures 
employed in this study the reader should be aware of this point. 
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Chapter Two 
CLASS STRUCTURE: 
WAGE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL TO 1957 
2.1 Introduction 
It has often been argued that there was no fundamental structural transformation within 
the Thai economy prior to 1957. Although they accept that some important changes did 
take place, particularly with regard to the growth in trade, writers influenced by 
modernisation theory have claimed that, on the whole, the Thai economy remained 
largely 'traditional' in character, with the changes which did occur being depicted as 
pertaining more to 'volume' rather than 'kind' [Ingram, 1971:216]. The absence of 
genuine structural change, it is argued, is most clearly evinced by the apparent lack of 
large scale industrial development. According to Tritasavit [1978:16], industrial 
development was 'almost non-existent' prior to 1932 and is held to have been 
'insignificant' as late as the 1950's [Hongladarom,1982:65], a situation which meant 
that for the entire pre-1957 period the vast majority of the Thai workforce continued to 
be engaged in 'traditional' agricultural activities. In sum, while the expansion of trade 
is considered to have been important, the overall underdevelopment of industry and the 
continuing dominance of agriculture seem to suggest that very little 'real' change 
occurred and it is therefore not surprising that as late as 1960 Wilson [cited in 
Walker, 1983:1] was able to reach the conclusion that ' [0 ]n balance the economic 
system has much the same shape today that it had a century ago...'. 
At the other end of the theoretical spectrum radical scholars have also tended to 
dismiss the notion that the Thai economy experienced structural shifts prior to 1957. 
While they concede that some important changes did occur these writers argue, 
however, that no 'real' capitalism was able to develop during this period but rather 
what emerged was a capitalism of a 'dependent', 'peripheral' [Somkiat,1982a:39] or 
'underdeveloped' type [Narong,1982:13]. Similarly these scholars have tended to 
simply accept the 'fact' that there was little industrial development. Indeed, it has been 
claimed that the development of industrial capital was, in fact, 'bound to be precluded' 
a situation which arose because local capitalists '...could not become the leading class 
which would have brought about fundamental changes in the [sic] Thai society 
' [Suthy,1980:11]. 
When these underlying notions of limited industrial development , the 
continuing dominance of agriculture and an absence of genuine structural change are 
brought to bear on studies of the Thai industrial working class the image which 
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emerges is one of a numerically small class, the existence of which was of only 
marginal importance for the overall growth and functioning of what remained an 
essentially agrarian based economy. Moreover, in what amounts to a further 
diminution of its economic significance, considerable emphasis has been placed on the 
ethnic character of this class. Although never stated explicitly the implicit suggestion 
has been that, as the majority of industrial workers were Chinese, their economic 
contributions were somehow of less benefit to the growth of the domestic Thai 
economy than they would have been had the majority of workers been Thai 
[Sungsidh,1985:75-76]. 
Over recent years both modernisation and radical analyses of twentieth century 
Thai economic development have been subjected to a considerable degree of empirical 
scrutiny. The most important work to have been carried out in this regard is that of 
Hewison [1983,1986c,1989]. Eschewing the search for a pure form of capitalist 
development, Hewison's principle aim has been to empirically demonstrate that the 
capitalist mode of production has, in fact, emerged in Thailand. He argues that: 
It is not possible to achieve an understanding of the political 
economy of modern Thailand without an adequate 
conceptualisation of the emergence of capitalism and a 
domestic capitalist class. The transition from a pre-capitalist 
mode of production to a capitalist one, and the further 
development of capitalism, has been crucial in shaping Thai 
society, politics and economics.. .the emergence of 
capitalism...[has]...brought fundamental changes in people's 
lives, accompanied as it was by transformations in social 
relations and the economic structure of society which in turn 
affected political structures [Hewison,1986c:25]. 
Hewison makes a distinction between two phases or periods of capitalist 
development in Thailand prior to 1957, the period of the absolute monarchy up to June 
1932 and that of the constitutional regime after 1932 [Hewison,1989:129]. It should 
be noted that for each of these periods Hewison's principal concern has been to trace 
the emergence and development of a domestic capitalist class and to examine the nature 
of the relationship between this class and the Thai state. The central purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a brief summary of some of the central findings which Hewison 
and other writers have made with regard to the general structure of capitalist 
development prior to 1957. Given the specific focus of the present study particular 
emphasis will be given to teasing out the implications which this development was to 
have with respect to the emergence and growth of an industrial working class and to 
show that by 1957, rather than being of only marginal importance, this class had come 
to occupy a strategically important position within the Thai political economy. 
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2.2 The Emergence of Thai Capitalism 
In the Thai case, capitalist relations of production emerged out of a particular historical 
conjuncture which was shaped by both external and internal economic, political and 
social forces. The importance of the external forces have been stressed by both 
modernisation and radical authors. The important date for these scholars is 1855, the 
year in which Thailand negotiated the Bowring Treaty with Great Britain. It is argued 
that this treaty, and similar treaties negotiated with other Western nations over the 
following decades, proved to be the catalyst which facilitated the opening up of 
Thai land 's economic, political and social life to Western inf luence 
[Thompson,1947:217; Narong,1982:8], More often than not this view has, however, 
carried with it the implicit assumption that, prior to 1855, Thai society was essentially 
static and possessed little or no internal dynamic of its own. While acknowledging the 
importance of the impact of those forces which led to the linking of Thailand's pre-
existing mode(s) of production into an international system of production and 
exchange dominated by the West, a number of recent writers have drawn attention to 
the ways in which economic, political and social transformations which were taking 
place within Thailand served to shape the impact of Western imperialism 
[Hewison,1986c:70-76; Wilson,1987 Hong Lysa, 1983:39-109; Nithi,1984:75-146; 
Somkiat,1982b:146-147; Terweil,1983:71-209;]. As Nithi [cited in Charoensin-o-
1am,1985:153] has emphasised: 
...external pressures per se cannot really determine the 
direction of change in any society. To understand changes in 
any society, attention should be given to the seeds of change 
that have already existed in that very society. Without these 
seeds, external forces will never develop intemally. Thus, to 
understand changes in Thai society in the mid-nineteenth 
century, we need to search for and then analyse these seeds 
of change, notably the structure of interest groups and their 
struggle to enhance their interests in the process of change. 
Therefore, the dominant static picture of the 'Old Siam' must 
be replaced by the more dynamic one, and more attention 
should be devoted to the study of the continuity of change 
from the Old Siam to the New Siam. 
In the context of the present study some of the most important 'seeds of 
change' relate first to changes which were taking place with regard to the system of 
corvee and second to developments which led to the importation of Chinese labour. 
Both these aspects of change merit brief discussion. 
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In pre-capitalist or sakdina Thai society the class of direct producers, phrai, 
were exploited by a class of non-producers, nai.} The dominant form in which this 
unpaid surplus was expressed was that of labour-rent and the mechanism through 
which rent was appropriated was the corvee, a mechanism so basic that 'society and 
state could hardly been conceived without it' [Battye, 1974:25], However, as the phrai 
were able to secure their means of subsistence quite independently of outside direction 
or control, the actual securing of surplus through the corvee was dependent on the 
effective functioning of extra-economic elements which, in the Thai case, consisted of 
a specific combination of political, administrative, legal and ideological structures of 
control within which the exploitation of the phrai was decreed as a 'natural' payment 
for the right to exist within the domain of the absolutist state. 
Following the Burmese destruction of Ayuthaya in 1767, the system of corvee 
lay in ruins. The complete breakdown of the basic cycle of production and 
reproduction and the decimation of the population not only meant that litde or no 
surplus was available for appropriation but also all central authority and the complex 
network of political and ideological relationships which were essential for the actual 
securing of surplus had disintegrated. Over subsequent decades the Thai kings initiated 
numerous attempts to re-establish the corvee. However, by the time Mongkut [r.l851-
1868] ascended the throne the entire system had been seriously undermined 
[Terweil,1983a:84; Hewison,1986c:70]. 
The breakdown of the corvee system which had for centuries provided the 
ruling sakdina class with its basic source of wealth proved not to be as dramatic as one 
might have expected. This was due to the fact that, during the period leading up to the 
mid-nineteenth century, the state was able to secure large amounts of revenue, first, 
through an increasing interest in trading ventures which in turn led to a partial 
monetisation of the economy which permitted some phrai to commute their dues either 
in the form of rent-in-kind or money-rent, and second, through the expansion of the 
tax-farming system which, by the fourth reign, had become the principal means of 
raising revenue [Hong Lysa,1983:385]. Moreover, the losses incurred by the 
breakdown of the corvee were further offset by the benefits which the state was able 
to gain through the encouragement it gave to the immigration of Chinese. 
Literally ihe term sakdina means power, rank or honour over irrigated rice fields. As Turton 
[1984:25] notes the term 'refers in the first place to the legal system of allocation of social 
rank in a numerical-hierarchical order, to the entire population in most traditional Thai slates, 
especially in the Ayuthaya (1350-1767) and early Bangkok (1782-late nineteenth century) 
periods'. For a fuller description of the structure of sakdina society see, for example, Hong 
Lysa [1984:parlicu]arly Chapter Two], Terweil, [1983a: Chapter One], Wyatt, [1984: Chapter 
Five], and various essays in Chatthip and Somphop (eds.),[1984]. Chatthip [1985] provides an 
excellent description of the labour process in the pre-capitalist period. 
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The Chinese played a crucial role in the processes of reconstruction of state and 
social classes which followed in the wake of the fall of the Thai capital. As Hong Lysa 
[1984:45] has observed, the encouragement which the Thai state gave to the 
immigration of the Chinese was closely linked to the the growth of trade during this 
period, as the immigrants not only increased the size of the population but also 
provided '...manpower and expertise for trading, shipping and navigation functions, 
as well as the development of commercial agriculture'. It has been estimated that as 
early as the latter half of the 1820's six to eight thousand Chinese immigrants were 
entering Thailand annually [Skinner, 1957:21]. Notably, the position of these 
immigrants was: 
...in marked contrast to that of the Thai masses. Chinese 
alone of the Asian foreigners were exempt from corvee and 
from the requirement to attach themselves to a patron or 
government master. They almost entirely escaped slavery, 
for no Chinese was ever brought to Siam as a war prisoner, 
and voluntary sale into slavery was utterly repugnant to the 
Chinese. The Chinese were allowed to travel and settle 
anywhere in the k ingdom without res t r ic t ions 
[Skinner, 1957:97]. 
While some of the Chinese immigrants were to forge close links with members 
of the sakdina class and act as entrepreneurs, tax-farmers and merchants, the vast 
majority were employed as both skilled and unskilled wage-labourers. Apart from 
working on state projects such as canal and temple construction, the immigrants also 
laboured in the southern tin mines and on agricultural plantations which produced 
crops such as pepper and sugar. By the end of the third reign [1824-1851] sugar 
exports had reached 300,000-540,000 kgs. annually with exports in 1850 being worth 
700,000 baht [Wanawipha,1983:10].2 This growing industry employed large 
numbers of wage-labourers with the biggest mills providing work for 100 to 300 men. 
By the 1850's it was reported that there were more than thirty of these mills in 
operation [Bowring, 1969:203]. 
The Chinese also provided the Thai monarchs with a source of much needed 
revenue. Thus, while they were 'free' to travel and work anywhere within Thailand, 
this freedom came at a price. All Chinese were subject to a head-tax which was set at 
two baht and one-and-a-half fuang per annum. By 1822 it is claimed that 31,500 
immigrants were paying this tax in the capital district [Terweil, 1983a: 116]. Indirect 
The basic unit of currency in Thailand is the baht. Between 1850 and 1893 one pound sterling 
was worth between 8 and 13 baht. From 1894 to 1906, this figure rose to approximately 16 to 
19 baht and stood at 9.5 to 14 baht between 1907 and 1941. From World War T w o until the 
mid 1980's, the exchange rate stood at roughly 20 baht to one US dollar. [Figures cited in 
Hewison,1989b:xiii] . 
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taxes on opium, gambling and liquor also served swelled state coffers as the Chinese 
were the main consumers of these vices. Somkiat [19825:147] has pointed to an 
additional advantage gained by the state through its employment of Chinese labour. In 
1822 wages for unskilled labour were one-and-a-half satang per day which represents 
a yearly cost of 4 baht 50 satang for the hire of a single labourer. At the same time 
the cost for a phrai to commute his annual labour services stood at 18 baht.. Thus, 
four Chinese labourers could be hired for a year (i.e. 48 months labour) at the cost of 
three months labour of a single phrai which therefore offered the state a sixteenfold 
advantage in hiring Chinese workers. 
From the preceding brief discussion it is clear that important changes were 
taking place within the Thai political economy prior to 1855. Insofar as the present 
study is concerned, the most important developments relate to the breakdown in the 
system of traditional labour practices as well as the creation of a pool of 'free' labour-
power within an essentially pre-capitalist economy. Crucially, the collapse of the 
corvee system combined with the increasingly widespread use of wage-labour had led 
to the growing realisation that this latter form of labour was more productive, and it is 
in this context that Mongkut's comments that the labour restrictions of the sakdina 
system constituted an impediment to economic development carry a great deal of 
historical significance [See, Chatthip & Suthy, 1981:317-320]. 
2.3 Thai Capitalism 1855-1957 
The most immediate effect of the Bowring Treaty was to lock Thailand into an 
International Division of Labour (DDL) within which, for the next hundred years, it 
fulfilled the role of an exporter of four main primary products rice, tin, teak and rubber 
and an importer of Western manufactured goods [Narong, 1982; Suthy,1985; 
Zeeponsekul,1987:30]. Although these external structural constraints certainly place 
limits on the 'form' which capitalism could take in Thailand they did not prevent the 
capitalist mode of production (CMP) from emerging [Hewison,1986c:76-99]. Before 
examining the implications which the growth of the CMP was to have with regard to 
the development of industry and the employment of wage-labour it will be appropriate 
to note briefly two major effects which capitalist development was to have during this 
period, the first relating to the fate of rural producers and the second concerning the 
emergence of a domestic capitalist class. 
As noted briefly in the introductory section of this chapter, for the entire pre-
1957 period the vast majority of the economically active population continued to work 
in the area of agriculture with increasing emphasis being given to the production of rice 
for both domestic consumption and for export. Between 1870/74 and 1930/34, for 
17 
example, the volume of rice exports increased twenty-fivefold. This growth was made 
possible not so much through technological innovation but rather by the enormous 
expansion in the amount of land which was devoted to rice cultivation 
[Ingram,1971:36-52], While it appears that this increasing specialisation in rice 
production seems to have necessitated no radical break from the traditional or pre-
capitalist socio-economic structure, significant changes did in fact occur with the rise 
of a system of peasant commodity production. As Hewison [1986c:77] explains: 
Peasant commodi ty production became increasingly 
subordinated to the interests of merchant capital. Capital did 
not control labour, but international circuits of capital, 
represented by foreign demand for rice determined, to a large 
extent, peasant production. This was the practical effect of 
the new organisation of production and exchange in post-
1855 Thailand, where peasants produced rice as a cash crop, 
sold it to the middlemen, who then transported it to 
provincial centres or Bangkok, where it was milled and sold 
to Chinese and Western merchants who exported the paddy 
to China and Europe. 
Thus, although rural producers were not totally separated from the means of 
production, their labour processes were gradually becoming 'formally' subsumed 
under capitalist relations of production. Instead of production being primarily 
orientated toward producing use-values which would meet basic subsistence needs, it 
was becoming increasingly directed toward the production of exchange-values in order 
to satisfy market demands. In turn this led to a decline in rural industries as cheap 
imported goods were replacing handicrafts [Hewison,!986c:77]. This growing need 
to produce for the market became further entrenched as traditional forms of bondage 
were phased out and replaced by the imposition of a general capitation tax which meant 
that rural producers developed an increasing need for cash. This reorientation from 
subsistence production to production for the market, a process which had already 
begun prior to 1855 and which continues to the present day [Turton, 1984,1987], 
affected traditional cycles of reproduction, land ownership, relations of production and 
furthered the circulation of commodities [Hewison, 1986c:79]. 
The second major implication which the growth of capitalist relations of 
production was to have during the post 1855 period relates to the emergence of a 
domestic capitalist class. While the thrust of radical analyses has been directed toward 
attempting to explain why a strong domestic class of capitalists has failed to develop in 
Thailand [Anon.1980:12; Narong,1982; Suthy,1985], Hewison [1989:30] has 
convincingly argued that a domestic bourgeoisie has, in fact, emerged. The origins of 
this new social class can be traced back to the changes which were taking place within 
the economy prior to 1855. Members of the sakdina class who together with their 
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Chinese clients had obtained considerable experience in trading ventures and, as noted 
above, in other activities such as sugar production, were presented with further 
opportunities to accumulate wealth following the opening of the economy to the world 
market. It is notable, therefore, that rather than emerging as an openly antagonistic 
class, this initial process of accumulation was achieved through co-operation with the 
ruling sakdina class in activities such as tax-farming, provincial administration and 
business as well as acting as compradores for Western firms which were operating in 
Thailand [Hewison,1986c:86-92]. Thus it was from the upper ranks of the sakdina 
class, together with Chinese merchants and compradores '...brought together in a 
symbiotic relationship investing in land, industry, commerce and banking that the Thai 
bourgeoisie emerged' [Hewison,1985:271]. It should be remembered, however, that 
this domestic capitalist class could not have developed without the simultaneous 
emergence of a class of wage-labourers. Before moving on to examine the 
development of this latter class some brief terminological clarifications need to be 
made. 
Initially, a definition of the working class is relatively straightforward. The 
working class may be defined as that class or group of people who neither own nor 
control the means of production and are therefore compelled to sell their labour-power 
in return for a wage. From this purely categorical definition previous writers have 
attempted to make certain distinctions between various divisions within the Thai 
working class. Depending on the particular theoretical bent of the author, these 
divisions have been made in terms of the concrete form of the labour process, i.e., 
factory workers as opposed to white collar and clerical workers, or on the basis of 
economic sector, i.e., formal or informal, or on the basis of geographial location, i.e., 
rural as opposed to urban. While these divisons hold important implications for the 
process of class formation, they do not represent the structural basis for divisions 
within the working class. In this context it is important to introduce the concept of 
class fractions. 
The term class fraction refers to a sub-section or group within a given class. As 
Zeitlan, Neuman and Ratcliff [cited in Hewison,1983:63-65] point out, a class fraction 
[they use the term class segment] has a: 
...relatively distinct location in the social process of 
production and consequently its own specific political 
economic requirements and concrete interests which may be 
contradictory to those of other class segments with which, 
nonetheless, it shares essentially the same relationship to 
ownership of productive property. As such, a class segment 
has the inherent potential for developing a specific variant of 
'intra-class consciousness' and common action in relation to 
other sections of the class. 
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As Hewison [1983:65] observes, class fractions should be defined according 
to the circuits of capital, i.e., industrial, banking, commercial and merchant. As the 
wage- labour /capi ta l relat ion is a mutual ly condi t ioning re la t ionship [cf. 
Marx,1932:32], each fraction of capital therefore creates a corresponding fraction 
within the working class. Therefore, the industrial working class is simply that 
fraction employed by industrial capital. Industrial workers are, however, of crucial 
importance for the entire capitalist class, for it is the industrial worker who is 
employed specifically to produce both use-values and exchange-values. From these 
brief comments it follows logically that, in order to trace the emergence of an industrial 
working class it is necessary to simultaneously examine the development of industrial 
capital. It will, therefore, be appropriate to move on to a discussion of the development 
of Thai industi-y during the pre-1957 period. 
2.4 Industry and Wage-Labourr to 1957 
As noted briefly above, both modemisation and radical writers have tended to dismiss 
the idea that any significant level of industrialisation occurred in Thailand prior to 
1957. To be sure, there were definite limits placed on the potential for industry to 
develop during this period. Initially, this was due to the fact that, with cheap imports, 
a limited domestic market and the provisions of the 1855 treaty which prevented the 
government from imposing significant tariff barriers, the development of industrial 
capital was certainly impeded. Yet despite these constraints, movement into industrial 
production did take place, and on a more significant level than has hitherto been 
generally recognised [Hewison,1989; Anon,1985a, 1985b; Akiro,1985]. Basing his 
studies on previously neglected sources, Hewison [1989:129] has been able to provide 
a more accurate characterisation of the nature of early Thai industrialisation as foUows: 
What is all too briefly indicated in this study is not a rampant 
capitalist revolution, cutting through the forces and relations 
of production of a pre-industrialised society, and creating an 
industr ial ised Thai land. The process was far more 
incremental in nature. But nor are we faced with a picture of 
a stagnant, dependent, compradore-based society which 
'developed' only under the impact of external forces. The 
process of industrial development. . .was an essentially 
continuous process, albeit made up of a series of virtually 
singular attempts to develop in various sectors. 
In the initial stages this 'incremental' yet 'essentially continuous process' of 
industrialisation was marked by the emergence of industries which served to 
compliment the growth in trade and the commercialisation of agriculture. For example, 
with the rapid growth in rice exports, milling quickly became a major area of industrial 
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activity. The first steam mill was established in 1858 by American capital and 
thereafter the number of mills expanded rapidly [Somkiat,1982b:25]. By 1912, 
10,000 workers were employed in 50 mills which were operating in and around 
Bangkok [Skinner,1957:104-115]. With the introduction of petrol motors the industry 
became decentralised and by 1928 there were an estimated 300 mills operating in the 
provinces [Hewison,1986b:5]. Timber milling was another area of industrial activity 
which was to require an increasing number of wage-labourers. The first mills were 
built by Cantonese engineers and by 1908 there were 7 European and 4 Chinese mills 
in operation. By 1930 there were 70 mills in Bangkok, 60 of which were owned by 
Chinese [Akiro,1985:2-25]. Tin production was also to expand, at least until the 
1880's. Some of the larger mines employed as many as 900 workers each, and by 
1884 Phuket, the area with the richest deposits, had a Chinese population of over 
40,000, most of whom worked in the mines [Skinner,1957:110]. By the end of the 
1880's the tin industry began to experience a decline. This was due to falling prices 
and an increased demand for labour in other parts of Thailand. Plantation agriculture 
also continued to absorb large numbers of workers throughout the nineteenth century 
with pepper, cotton, tobacco, seri leaf and fruits and vegetables being produced for 
both the domestic market and for export. 
Apart from these industries, the development of infrastructural projects also led 
to a growth in demand for wage-labour. Railway construction began in 1892 and over 
the following twenty five years the numbers of workers employed 'must be numbered 
in the tens of thousands', building lines from Bangkok to the North, Northeast, 
Southeast and South [Skinner,1957:115]. By 1925 the railways were employing a 
total of 14,652 workers [Chotmaihet Khong Sapha Phoephephanit, No 19, Jan.1925]. 
Other infrastructural projects included the construction of ports and dockyards, 
electricity generating plants, gas works, tramway systems as well as the more general 
construction of buildings, shops, houses, and roads and bridges 
etc.[Hewison,1986b:6-8]. All of these developments were vital for further expansion 
of the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of commodities. 
Medium and smaller scale industrial activities were also to require the services 
of an increasing number of wage-labourers. Examples of such industries included the 
production of aerated water, the provision of ice and cold storage facilities, the 
manufacture of bricks and tiles, soap, matches (an industry which by 1932 was 
employing 3,000 workers [Kammakara 19/6/1932]), biscuits, fish sauces, furniture 
carriages, textiles, animal feeds, cement, automobile and truck bodies and cinema 
films. In addinon, a pineapple canning factory had been established with numerous 
tanneries also reported to have been in operation [Hewison, 1989:123]. 
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From the preceding brief discussion it is clear that, rather than being 'almost 
non-existent' [Tritasavit,1978:16], a considerable degree of industrial development 
was taking place prior to 1932 and it is perhaps symptomatic of the vigorous nature of 
this development that, for the whole of the pre-1932 period, the demand for labour 
continued to outstrip supply despite the fact that between 1870 and the 1920's there 
had been a net addition of almost one million Chinese immigrants to the Thai 
workforce. [Skinner, 1954:3 8,215]. 
These initial forays into industrial production received additional boosts during 
the post-1932 period with the rise of a state which was determined to pursue a policy 
of state-led industrialisation (Hewison,1986c:l 16-166). For discussion purposes the 
continued growth in industry during the years 1932-1957 may be examined in terms of 
three sub-periods: 1932-1938, 1938-1947 and 1947-1957. In the first of these periods 
a number of factors were involved in shaping the movement of the state into industry. 
First, trade treaties with Western countries were revised in 1927. This allowed some 
protection to be given to local manufaturers. A decade later Pridi Phanomyong 
negotiated further treaty revisions which gave the state a much freer hand in 
formulating its own economic policies [Hewison,1986c:131]. Second, the effects of 
the depression which were to last until 1935 had served to underline the dangers 
inherent in an economy which was largely dependent on the sale of rice. However, 
while these factors served to suggest that greater attention should be given to the 
development of industry, capital funds were in short supply and it was the state which 
was to take the lead in this area. As early as 1933 an announcement was made that any 
industry which was deemed desirable by the government but proved to be too big for 
private capital would be started by the government [Bangkok Times Weekly Mail 
(hereafter B T W M ) 21/9/1933]. 
State involvement in industry began in 1933 with the establishment, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Defence, of the Fuel Division which aimed to import 
petroleum from overseas. In 1935 the same Ministry established a spinning and 
weaving factory (The Siam Cotton Mill) which produced cloth for the military as well 
as a paper mill (Siam Paper Mill). In 1936 The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
established a silk factory and over subsequent years became involved in sugar milling 
(1937 & 1941) [Akiro,1985:38-39]. Private industry also expanded in the immediate 
post-1932 period, manufacturing products such as cigarettes and tobacco, matches, 
mosquito repellents, shoes, sacks, rope, glass, dry cell batteries, rubber goods, toys, 
neon lighting and weaving machinery [Hewison, 1986b: 14]. While precise figures are 
difficult to obtain, a survey carried out in the Bangkok-Thonburi region by the 
Ministry of Commerce in 1939 shows that a wide range of industrial activity was 
occurring. Such activity included rice and saw mills (27), ice factories (12), tanneries 
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(32), textile factories (26), coconut oil factories (5), food canning and bottling plants 
(21), toothpaste and toothbrush factories (4), soap factories (30), cigarette and tobacco 
factories (2), a cement plant (1), a brewery (1), engine works (20), metal shops (78), 
machine shops (150), and iron foundries (57) [Anon.,1985:77]. 
Industry developed further during the 1938-1944 period. As part of its overall 
plan to Thai-ify ' the economy, the state became involved in the rice milling industry 
and in commercial banking, insurance and shipping [Akiro,1985:39-45]. In the 
manufacturing sector the state provided both capital and management for a number of 
enterprises which by the late 1940's embraced the areas of salt trading, cement 
production , transport, water works, tapioca production, pharmaceuticals, rubber 
goods, gunny bags, smelting, electricity generation, chemicals, tobacco and cigarettes, 
sh ipp ing , t ann ing , f i sh s torage , r a i lways , lo t te r ies and abat to i rs 
[Hewison,1986c: 132]. Private industrialists also expanded and diversified their 
activities. Once again, precise figures are difficult to obtain. But data, suggests that by 
1949 there was a total of 134, 891 workers employed in private industries producing 
paper, print, chemicals, machines, beverages, garments, food, electricity, batteries, 
cloth, baskets, oil, rubber goods, tobacco, and tanned hides [Pasuknirunt, 1959:40-
41]. Further indications of the extent to which industry had developed by the end of 
the 1940's can be seen from the percentage contribution of manufacturing to Gross 
Domestic Product which rose from 9.9% in 1938/39 to 11.1% in 1946 and 12.6% by 
1950 [Hewison,1986c:139]. 
Industry continued to expand during the 1947-1957 period, attaining an 
average growth rate of between 7%-8% per annum. As Table One illustrates, structural 
changes were taking place within the economy as the importance of agriculture was 
declining with manufacturing, finances, services and transport becoming more 
significant. Although figures on employment must be treated with care, these structural 
changes are also reflected in the fact that between 1937 and 1957 those employed in 
the areas of mining, manufacturing, construction and transport and communications 
increased at an average of 3.25% per annum. By 1957 almost 350,000 people were 
employed in these sectors of the economy [Pasuknirunt ,1959:24-25; 
Shurcliffe, 1959:4]. 
Table One: Percentage of G.N.P by Industrial Origin, Selected Years 1951-1958 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Mining and Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
1951 1955 1958 
50.1 42.0 40.7 
1.9 1.6 1.2 
10.3 11.8 11.2 
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Construction 2.9 4.0 3.3 
Electricity and Water Supply 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Transport and Communications 3.1 5.1 5.2 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18.0 19.6 17.5 
Banking, Insurance and Real Estate 0.4 1.4 1.8 
Ownership of Dwellings 3.7 3.0 5.1 
Public Administration and Defence 2.8 4.8 5.1 
Services 6.7 6.5 8.7 
Totals 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Hewison [1986c: 147] 
I have shown that, in contradistinction to received views, a considerable degree 
of industrial development did, in fact, take place in Thailand prior to 1957. Although 
this development may not have been significant in international terms it was, however, 
extremely important for the overall growth of the domestic political economy. Before 
moving on to describe in more concrete terms the implications which the growth of 
industry was to have with regard to the emergence of an industrial working class it will 
be first appropriate to examine briefly the nature of the role played by the Thai state 
during the pre-1957 period. 
2.5 The State and Capitalist Development to 1957 
Building on a basic defintion of the state as an institution, or perhaps more accurately a 
set of institutions, where social power is concentrated and organised, class theorists 
have formulated a number of substantive propositions with respect to the way in which 
state power will be exercised in societies where the capitalist mode of production is 
dominant [Isaacs,1987:150-191]. Although it is recognised that state power cannot be 
simply reduced to the power of social classes and therefore possesses a degree of 
'relative autonomy' from class forces, it is argued that the form and exercise of state 
power will nevertheless be constrained by the system of class relationships. At a most 
general level it is argued that in societies where the capitalist mode of production is, or 
is becoming, dominant the state will be forced to secure and maintain the essential 
conditions for capitalist accumulation [Jessop, 1982:221]. One of the most significant 
aspects of Hewison's work lies in the emphasis which he has given to tracing the 
ways in which the Thai state has come to play an absolutely crucial role in securing 
and maintaining the conditions for the rise of a specific form of Thai capitalism. 
Hewison has argued that, during the pre-1957 period, the role of the state in 
securing the conditions for capital accumulation can be divided into two phases. In the 
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first of these phases, that is, the period of the absolute monarchy up to 1932, he has 
argued that the state 'took a largely laissez-faire attitude toward business and industrial 
development', whereas during the post-1932 period the state became 'far more 
involved in economic policy making and production' [Hewison,1989:129]. In general 
terms it is possible, therefore, to discern a trend whereby as the process of social 
production and reproduction was becoming increasingly structured along capitalist 
lines, state managers were being forced to become progressively more involved in 
ensuring that the conditions for the expansion of capital continued to be met. Although 
I will have more to say on this subject in latter chapters, it is appropriate at this point to 
indicate briefly how this growing intervention in regulating the capitalist economy is 
reflected in state policies concemed with the development of an internal labour-market. 
A basic condition for the existence of capitalist relations of production in any 
given historical society is the presence of a class of producers who neither own nor 
control the means of production and are therefore compelled to sell their labour-power 
in return for a wage. For this class of producers to appear on the market it is essential 
that the seller of labour-power be a free person, the 'free-proprietor of his own labour 
capacity' [Marx, 1976:271]. In a society where virtually all the population was subject 
to various forms of bondage, the absence of free labour, in the sense defined above, 
represented a major barrier to the development of capitalist relations of production in 
Thailand. It is therefore significant to recognise that, in the Thai context, it was the 
state which was to play a leading role in ensuring that a source of free labour-power 
actually became available within Thai society. The state secured this basic condition for 
capitalist accumulation in two main ways: first; through the continued encouragement it 
gave to the immigration of Chinese, and second; through its dismantling of the system 
of corvee. 
In the preceeding sections its has been shown that during the pre-1957 period a 
new class of producers had emerged within Thai society. This new class was 
comprised of diverse ethnic groups such as Thais, Malays, Javanese, Burmese, 
Shans, Singhalese, Indians, Bengalis, Tamils, Vietnamese and Laotians 
[Thompson,1941:602]. By far the greatest number of wage-labourers, however, were 
Chinese and as late as the 1940's it is claimed that they provided between 60% and 
75% of all skilled and unskilled non-agricultural labour [Skinner,1957:217-218]. 
Significantly the absolutist state played a leading role in encouraging the immigration 
of Chinese workers into Thailand. 
Essentially the policy of promoting Chinese immigration into Thailand 
represented a continuation of a process which had begun prior to 1855. As Wiyada 
[1984:25] has observed: 
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Immigration into Siam was made as convenient as possible. 
They [the Thai monarchs] wanted the labour and there was a 
general relaxation of payment of the head tax. New arrivals, 
for instance were given up to forty five days grace to fmd 
work and a place to live before they had to pay the 
government taxes. 
Apart from giving the immigrants time to pay, the taxes imposed were kept at a 
much lower rate than those which were levelled on indigenous Thai, an 'inequity' 
which, as Skinner [1957:162] notes, was due to the urgent demand for labour. 
Chinese immigration provided the Thai monarchs with two notable advantages. First, 
as Anderson [1978:221] suggests, the immigrants presented the Thai rulers with an 
exploitable source of labour which could be used for a greater variety of tasks than that 
which could be achieved through the use of traditional conscripted labour. Moreover, 
as the immigrants lay outside the Thai political system, the problems associated with 
the slippage of phrai luang to phrai som could be avoided.^ Second, the Chinese 
provided the state with vast amounts of revenue: 
...for a period of at least fifty years, during which Siam 
achieved a modern government, and entered the world 
economy and family of nations, almost half of the 
government revenue was derived directly or indirectly from 
the c o m p a r a t i v e l y smal l Ch inese m i n o r i t y 
[Skinner,1957:125]. 
Although some of the revenue was derived from the imposition of a head tax, 
by far the greatest amount was gleaned through the indirect taxes on opium, liquor, 
gambling and prostitution. Taxes on opium in particular, were significant. A survey 
carried out in the 1920's showed that the average Chinese coolie spent half of his 
earnings on opium despite the fact that less than one in fifty had smoked the drug 
before arriving in Thailand [Thompson,1941:609]. In 1905/6 revenue from the opium 
tax was 10 million baht which represented between 15% to 20% of total state revenue 
for that year. After the opium farm became a state monopoly it provided the 
government with an average of 14.9 million baht per annum during the 1910-1938 
period. 
The revenue derived from the Chinese proved also to be an important factor 
which allowed the state to finally abolish the system of corvee.. As noted previously 
the system had been seriously undermined prior to 1855 and during the fourth and 
The terms phrai luang and phra som refer to two categories of phrai.., the former were directly 
supervised by their nai when performing their services for ihe king while the latter were under 
the personal control of nobles and princes. [Terweil,1984:28]. Traditionally, the Thai kings 
faced a continual bailie to ensure that a sufficient number of phrai remained within the phrai 
luang category and did not become phrai som. 
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early in Chulalongkorn's reign [r. 1868-1910] it has been claimed that the system 
'hovered between one of forced labour and one of a poll tax' [Terweil,1984:31]. In 
1874 Chulalongkorn initiated moves toward a complete abandonment of the corvee 
when he declared that children of absolute slaves would become worth less every year 
until they reached the age of twenty-one, at which time they would be automatically 
emancipated [Terweil,1984:31]. This initial reform was followed a decade later with a 
proclamation which ordered nai to set free the children of slaves. The proclamation 
also sought to prevent liberated slaves and freeman from selling themselves into 
bondage [Terweil,1984:32]. In 1899 the system of corvee was officially abolished 
and all Thai and other Asian residents in Thailand, except the Chinese, had to pay a 
head-tax of between four and six baht per annum [Skinner,1957:162]. The corvee 
was replaced with universal conscription which began in 1902 and was formally 
encoded in the 1905 Conscription Edict. It is claimed that this document is one of the 
most important documents in Thai social history for it proved to be the 'decisive step 
in the liberation of the commoner' [Battye,1974:448]. 
Thus, through the adoption of policies which were designed to encourage the 
immigration of Chinese into Thailand and through the abolition of the system of corvee 
the absolutist state played a leading role in ensuring that a pool of free labour-power 
became available within Thai society and in doing so created one of the indispensable 
conditions for the rise of the capitalist mode of production. 
Although the absolute monarchy and its supporters were able to reap enormous 
benefits from the growth of capitalism, the rise of this new set of productive 
relationships was, nevertheless, to bring with it numerous economic, political and 
social contradictions [Hewison,1989b:57-60]. In the present context it will be 
sufficient to focus on just one of the problems associated with capitalist development, 
that of promoting skill formation among industrial workers. 
As industry continued to develop, there was pressure on state officials to 
ensure that, not only should regular and stable supplies be maintained, but that greater 
attention should also be given toward developing the skills of industrial workers. It 
was argued that this could be achieved by providing training facilities not only for 
industrial workers but also for other workers who were needed to fill positions within 
the increasingly complex social division of labour [BTWM, 29/9/1919; 28/6/1920], 
However, reflecting its overall laissez-faire stance toward the economy and 
production, it was argued that the problem of skill formation among the industrial 
workforce was primarily the responsibility of individual employers [National Archives 
(hereafter N.A.) R. 7. 13/1]. During the post-1932 period this position was to change. 
In a 1936 radio broadcast. Prime Minister Pahol explicitly recognised the need for the 
development of skills among the working population and he stated that schools had 
27 
been established whcih would offer training in agriculture, gardening, farming, 
housekeeping, tailoring, carpentry and 'other engineering branches have been 
established to promote the industry of the country' [BTWM 12/12.1936]. While state 
involvement in the training of workers was to remain rather haphazard, further 
developments were to take place over the following decades and by 1954 vocational 
training had been established in forty three provinces. Instruction was given in 
subjects such as motor mechanics, electrical trades, tailoring, barbering, bricklaying, 
accountancy and various crafts [Rowley, 1954:25]. By 1956 it was estimated that there 
were 49,000 students enrolled in vocational courses nationwide [Shurcliffe,1959:ll]. 
In this section some brief comments have been made with regard to the role 
played by the state during the pre-1957 period. Drawing on Hewison's observations 
concerning the way in which the state became increasingly involved in securing the 
conditions for the rise of capital, the aim of this section has been to describe briefly 
how this growing involvment is reflected in state policy toward the development of an 
intemal labour-market. During the pre-1932 period the state played a crucial role in 
ensuring that a supply of free labour became available within Thai society. However, 
as the growth of industry became more important for the development of the economy 
the state was required to become more involved in providing facilities for skill 
formation. While the absolute monarchs failed to achieve anything substantial in this 
area, the regimes after 1932 did take some important steps toward providing training 
for workers and by doing so also further contributed to the continued rise of the 
capitalist mode of production. 
2.6 Summary 
Drawing on some recent work in Thai economic history, I have shown that 
fundamental transformations did take place within the structure of the production 
process prior to 1957. Thailand's integration into the world capitalist economic order 
combined with the growth of a domestic based process of accumulation represented a 
profound shift in the way Thai society was to be produced and reproduced. Integral to 
this process of change was the emergence of a new class of industrial workers whose 
social survival was dependent on the successful sale of their labour-power to the 
capitalist class. Certainly this class remained small. However, as Brown [1988:35] has 
stressed the economic significance of the working class is 'more influenced by its 
economic position than its relative size'. This is a point which has been overlooked by 
previous writers. By focusing purely on the numerical dimension, these writers have 
failed to appreciate how industrial workers came to occupy a strategically important, 
indeed crucial, position within the domestic Thai political economy prior to 1957. In 
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the rice and saw mills, in the tin mines, on the railways and tramways, on the ports 
and docks, in the electricity generating plants, in the cement and tobacco factories and 
in the hundreds of smaller industrial establishments industrial workers played a role 
which was of fundamental importance for the development of the Thai economy 
during this period. Moreover, the age, sex and, in particular, the ethnicity of this class 
of producers is, at least at a structural level, largely unimportant for it is their role as 
producers of both use-values and exchange-values within an emerging capitalist 
economy that their contributions to pre-1957 Thai economic development must be 
assessed. 
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Chapter Three 
CLASS FORMATION: 
THE 1923 TRAMWAY STRIKE 
3.1 Introduction 
Having examined the development of the structural relationship between wage-labour 
and capital prior to 1957, the principal aim of the remaining chapters of this study is to 
take some initial steps toward tracing the processes of class formation which occurred 
among industrial workers. As indicated in the introduction of this study, the extent to 
which industrial workers actually began to organise and struggle in pursuit of interests 
determined by their position within the capitalist class structure has been the subject of 
considerable debate within Thai labour studies. Indeed the vast majority of writers 
have concluded that very little in the way of class formation actually occurred, with 
traditional culture and dominant ideologies seen as representing barriers to the 
emergence of a 'real' working class. These views suffer from a fundamental weakness 
in that they have been premised on a meagre amount of empirical research. In fact, it 
has only been in very recent years that we have the empirical evidence, drawn from 
archival and newspaper accounts of a strike by Thai tramway workers, which allows 
us to examine the beginnings of the process of class formation as it occurred in the 
Thai context. As the vast majority of past writers have either ignored or, in some 
cases, even denied that this strike actually occurred [Chandravithun,1982:12], my aim 
in the first part of this chapter is to provide what is the first detailed historical account 
of the tramwaymen's struggle. In part two I will move on to offer an analysis of the 
dispute. Employing concepts derived from theories of class formation the aim is to 
provide an informed discussion of the strike and demonstrate why this strike was 
indeed a highly significant historical event. 
3.2 The 1923 Tramwaymen's Strike 
On 31 December 1922, 122 tramway workers employed by the Siam Electric 
Company (SEC) stopped work and gathered in front of the Bangkok municipal offices 
where, in line with established practice, they were met by members of the local 
constabulary.1 Undaunted by this reception, the men presented a list of grievances to 
The Siam Electric Company (SEC) is one example of the many capitalist enterprises which 
emerged in Thailand prior to 1932. Financed jointly by both European and Thai capital, the 
company was established in 1885 with a working capital of 53,000 pounds and was originally 
commissioned to produce electricity for the lighting of the royal palace [BTWM, 12/1/1920], 
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the police claiming that they were being 'unjustly oppressed' {kotkhimaichoptham ) by 
the company [NA R.6.N 13/4]. In a strictly 'economic' sense, the feeling of 
oppression experienced by the men was held to have been the product of the 
company's attempt to introduce a number of work practices which effectively reduced 
their monthly pay. Previously, bonuses had been paid as a percentage of the 
company's income over and above 55 thousand baht. However, in 1918 the company 
had raised this base amount to 60 thousand baht and later, to 62 thousand baht . 
These changes had consequently led to a reduction in the bonuses. Other economic 
claims concemed the payment of food allowances, more equitable payments for trips 
on the different routes, and payment for extra duties which the company had been 
asking the men to perform after the completion of their normal shifts [NA R.6 N 
13/4]. The men objected to all of these practices and called for changes to be made so 
that they would receive what they considered to be fair and equitable monetary return 
for the hours they worked. 
Apart from these 'economic' claims the men also objected to the 'system of 
rules' which govemed and regulated their day to day work activities. In all there were 
85 work regulations, 74 of which dealt with breaches of working rules which would 
result in monetary penalties and the remaining 11 concemed with offences which led to 
dismissal [Yamato Newspaper (hereafter YM) 15/1/1923]. It was argued that these 
rules were 'too severe for the men to follow' (pen runraeng...thi khao phraphruttham 
dai ) [YM 15/1/1923], 'beyond their strength to withstand' {lua kamlang thi ca 
thonthan dai) [Daily Mail (hereafter DM) 14/1/1923], and represented the imposition 
of 'petty and trifling penalties' {khobangkhap thi capphitlongthot yumyim ) [Phim Thai 
(hereafter PT) 13/1/1923]. Apparently these penalties were being imposed to such an 
extent that some of the men had been left with virtually nothing out of the previous 
month's wage [Siam Ratsadon (hereafter SR) 19/1/1923]. The men argued that the 
company had never clearly stated which rules would be enforced and they demanded 
that the regulations be posted in writing so that they would be understood by all [NA 
R. 6 4 13/4]. 
Finally, the men insisted that those individuals who had previously been in 
charge of enforcing these work rules, the foreman Nai H u i , his assistant Nai Phin 
In 1900 it entered into partnership with the Bangkok Tramway Company (BTC) and was 
granted a concession to run tram services within Bangkok. Apart from a few lean years around 
1912-13 the SEC was a very successful commercial enterprise and was able to continually 
reward its shareholders with annual dividends and share bonuses [NA. R. 6 N 13 1-6; BTWM 
14/3/1921; 12/6/1922; 26/3/ 1923], In 1916 it reported a gross profit of over one and a half 
million baht and by 1924 it reportedly had 16,000 customers [BTWM 28/3/1917; Bangkok 
Post (hereafter BP) 27/2/1948]. The running of the U-amways was a particularly successful 
branch of the company's operations and by 1923 this new form of public transportation had 
become an important component in the daily business and social life of the Thai capital. 
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and the European traffic manager, Mr Ericson, be dismissed from their positions. It 
was claimed that these three were 'extremely cruel' {mi namcai hotrai ) [NA R. 6 N 
13/4], that they acted in 'evil, uncompassionate and inhuman ways' {mi khwam 
phraphrut meta citto phmnmaniit ), that the men were more afraid of these three than 
they were of 'ferocious tigers' (phuak khongnan klua yingkwa suathidudusiaik ), and 
they no longer wanted to work under their control {maiyak taibangkhapbancha khong 
khon thangsam ) [YN 17/1/1923]. It was asserted that these three had sought ways to 
impose fines arbitrarily and had also attempted to secure the dismissal of 'troublesome' 
workers through the circulation of 'poison letters' {batssonte ) The men demanded 
that in the future clear guide-lines be established to govern the process of hiring and 
firing workers [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. 
While the men were presenting their grievances to the police Mr. Herbert 
Elsoe, the SEC's vice-manager, arrived on the scene. After the Police Commissioner, 
Major General Athikon Prakat (hereafter Prakat), had translated the worker's petition 
into English, Mr. Elsoe replied to each point. He argued that workers had never been 
arbitrarily dismissed, nor had fines been imposed without due consideration being 
given to the worker's past record. Moreover, he saw no reason why the three 
company officials should be dismissed as he believed that they always carried out their 
work without bias and were honest in reporting matters to senior management. 
However, he did undertake to discuss the matter of bonuses at a board meeting to be 
held on the 11th of January and he also promised that the regulations which governed 
the hiring and firing of workers would be posted in writing. Not satisfied with these 
responses the men persisted with their arguments, but by the end of the afternoon 
neither side had been able to reach a satisfactory agreement [N.A R. 6 N 13/4]. 
Having received no promise by the company to alleviate their oppression the 
men struck again on the following day and this time they requested a meeting with the 
Minister of the Interior, Chaophraya Yomarat.^ The request must have proved 
something of an embarrassment to the Minister for only a few weeks previously, in 
Bom Pan Suckum in Suphunburi province, Chao Phraya Yomarat was one of the most 
powerful figures of the Sixth Reign. As Batson [1984: fn.35:23] notes he 'was a rare example 
of extreme social mobility in the semi-heridetary bureaucracy, having risen from obscure 
origins to the highest rank of the appointed nobility'. He was originally sent to Europe as a 
tutor to the sons of Rama 5 and was later attached to the legation in London where he became 
Charge 'de Affaires. After nine years in Europe, he returned to Thailand, was appointed to the 
Ministry of the Interior and 'soon bccame known as one of Prince Damrong's rising young 
men'. Under the name oi Phraya Suckum Nayavanit he was High Commissioner to Nackon 
Sri Thammarat for eleven years. In 1906 he was appointed a Minister of State, as acting 
Minister of Public Works. He became Minister of the Interior in August 1922 and retired in 
1926 amongst what was reported to be a 'storm of criticism from the Thai press' [Bangkok 
Times 11/3/1926]. It was said that '...throughout the greater part of his career he had more than 
most Ministers the confidence and the ear of his sovereign' [BTWM 31/12/1938]. Chao Phraya 
Yomarat died in December 1938 [BTWM 31/12/1938], 
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response to an invitation by the League of Nations to initiate measures to protect 
labour, his government had replied: 
The present state of industrial organisation in Siam does not 
require extensive legislation, for Siam being pre-eminendy an 
agricultural country, has yet to become industrialised. In 
addition to agriculture, trade, chiefly retail, occupies most of 
the inhabitants. Factories have not yet developed to an 
appreciable degree...[T]he standard of living among 
workmen in Siam differs greatly from that to which 
workmen in Western countries are accustomed. Living is 
cheap in Siam...their [the workers] wants are sadsfied with a 
minimum of labour, and they have not yet raised any 
demands for a material change in their working conditions. 
[T]o one accustomed to the unrest of workers in Western 
countries, it is very difficult to realise that workers in Siam 
are not in a state of discontent, but are sadsfied with the 
conditions of employment, hours of work, etc., to which 
they are accustomed...There are no trade unions or 
organisations of workpeople. The result is co-operation 
rather than struggle between employer and worker. There are 
no strikes or lockouts among the Siamese. Their favourable 
conditions form one of the greatest sources of happiness of 
the country, and the Government should go slowly in the 
introducdon of proposals which...might serve to upset Thai 
habits and customs without advantage to anyone [BT 
27/11/1922]. 
However much the government may have wished for such an idyllic situation, 
the events which were beginning to unfold were to contradict such views. 
A meeting between the tramwaymen and the Minister was arranged to take 
place at 2pm on the afternoon of 1 January 1923. The men repeated their demands and 
asked that the Minister speak to the company on their behalf (phutcakap borisat lae 
catkantamkhwamsomkhuan ) [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. This he did, and suggested that the 
company should post up its rules and regulations. However, the Minister asked that he 
be allowed to examine the reguladons before they were made public, a proposal which 
the company agreed to follow [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. 
On 10 January what were supposedly a new set of work rules were posted 
outside the company's offices at Sam Yaek . The next day 30 tramwaymen returned to 
see the Minister but were instead met by the Commissioner of Police. They asked the 
Commissioner to read out the regulations which, in accordance with agreements made 
on 31 December and 1 January, should have first been sent to the Minister for his 
consideration. It was reported that: 
When Chaokhiin Athikon [the Police Commissioner] had 
finished reading out the reguladons, all the tramwaymen 
cried out that these were the old rules which had long been in 
use and were considered to be petty and trifling to the 
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extreme. [The men] asked the Minister to once again 
intervene and help to ensure the relaxation of the rules 
because if the regulations were maintained they would all go 
on strike again [PT 13/1/1923]. 
The Police Commissioner attempted to placate the men, declaring that he would 
report their complaints to the Minister so that the dispute could be finally settled. He 
then asked the workers to return to their normal activities and to wait for a final 
decision. In response the tramwaymen insisted that the Commissioner's report should 
include the fact that, despite its promises, the company had failed to send copies of the 
rules to the Minister. The Commissioner stated once again that he would fully report 
the matter and that the men would be informed as soon as a decision was made. At this 
point, '...all the men cried out and urged the Commissioner to present his report 
without fail' [PT 13/1/1923]. 
On the 12 January Mr. Elsoe went to see the Minister in order to inform him of 
the company's decision concerning the worker's complaints as well as to finally 
supply a copy of the 85 work regulations [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. With regard to the issue 
of bonuses, Mr. Elsoe said that the company had been forced to raise the base sum 
because of increased operating costs and a fall in income. However, in 
acknowledgment of the Minister's effort to resolve the dispute, the company had 
agreed to reduce the base sum to the 1918 figure of 60 thousand baht. In addition, the 
company had decided that a food allowance of 25 satang per shift would be paid to all 
employees. Finally, the company pledged that those who had pardcipated in strike 
action would only be fined 2 baht for every day they did not work and that there 
would be no further penalty [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. After examining the company's 
responses the Minister suggested that the bonuses should only apply to those who 
were fully qualified to drive the trams and that the company should re-examine similar 
claims for the other workers at a later date. Moreover, while noting that the company 
had in fact failed to issue a new set of work rules, he felt that some of the regulations 
which governed the dismissal of workers were overly harsh. However, he emphasised 
that ultimately any decision concerning the hiring, firing and disciplining of workers 
rested with the company. He emphasised that these matters being were not part of the 
government's responsibility [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. 
Later that evening word filtered through to the Yomarat that another strike was 
being planned for the following day. The Minister immediately instructed his Police 
Commissioner to inform as many workers as possible that: 
...on your behalf, I am studying the regulations concerning 
fines. For this reason, carry on with [your] work as usual 
and wait for a final decision. If [you] persist with [your] 
decision to strike I will wash my hands of the whole matter 
[ N A R 6 N 13/4], 
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The following morning, however, the tramwaymen defied the Minister's 
warning and went out on strike. The decision to strike could not have been an easy one 
to make for, as this was the third strike within a month, all those who participated 
were liable, under company rules, to be dismissed immediately. The fact that some of 
the men were reluctant to strike became apparent when fighting between workers 
broke out early on the morning of 13 January with further scuffles reported to have 
taken place later in the day [PT 13/1/1923; SR 16/1/1923]. Nevertheless, despite these 
internal rifts, it was estimated that only 1 in 10 workers had reported for normal duties 
and that on each of the three occasions the number of those willing to strike had 
increased [PT 13/1/1923; DM 14/1/1923]. The growing unity among the men was 
evident when, during the afternoon of the 13th, over 300 workers, together with 
members of their families, gathered in front of the offices of the Minister of the 
Interior. A deputation of five workers went up to see the Minister and once again 
asked him to act on their behalf so that the dispute could be settled [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. 
The ensuing meeting must have become very heated with later reports suggesting that 
the men had been very offended with some of the forms of address to which they had 
been subjected [YM 17/1/1923]. Nevertheless, a decision was made to establish a 
committee, made up of the three parties involved in the dispute, which was given a 
deadline of seven days to negotiate a final settlement [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. Following the 
meeting, the five tramwaymen together with the Minister's assistant Phraya 
Phetphani, returned to the crowd waiting below. A journalist f rom the Yamato 
newspaper described the scene: 
...after he had seated himself and the men had gathered 
around, Phraya Phetphani told them that he had been 
appointed as the Minister's representative. 'The Minister 
wishes it to be known that he is a real Thai, as are [you] 
workers. Therefore the Minister fully intends to help you to 
the best of his ability and he will not show any favouritism to 
foreigners'. (At this the men cheered heartily). 'The Minister 
wants it to be known that the strike stems from a complete 
misunderstanding ...because the regulations posted outside 
the company's offices were the old regulations and were 
displayed in accordance with the wishes of the workers...' 
At this point one of the men shouted out 'not true! the 
regulations put up by the company were the new rules'. The 
Phraya continued saying, that as the workers had not been 
prepared to listen to the Minister and once again had gone out 
on strike, the fault now lay with them. Immediately one of 
the men leapt to his feet and sang out 'we are not at fault for 
the rules are hanging outside the company's offices for all to 
see'.Phraya Phetphani continued by declaring that 'the 
Minister did wish to help and that another proposal would be 
considered, however, there will be a delay until the 20th of 
the month at which time the committee will make its final 
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decision known...in the meantime will all of you agree to 
return to work?' The men replied immediately as if with one 
voice 'No!' At this point one of the men, who from his 
manner, appeared to be one of the leaders, stood up and 
addressed Phraya Phetphani asking 'Why do we refuse to 
return to work?... because within the next seven days the 
company is likely to try and find replacement workers and 
force us all out ...why should we agree to keep working for 
the company for nothing?' He went on to say that he would 
remain on strike until the 20th and wait to hear the Minister's 
decision. If the demands were not met all the men would 
resign, and they asked the Minister to speak to the company 
to ensure that the 50 baht bond, together with outstanding 
wages, be paid in full [YN 15/1/1923]. 
While the discussion was in progress the Minister emerged from his office and 
stopped to listen. He reiterated his earlier views stating that he lacked the power to 
force the company to accept the workers back, nor was he able to ensure that the 
company would meet all of their demands. However, he did hope that the dispute 
would fmally be settled and that both sides would be able to recapture their lost unity 
and begin to work together once again [YM 15/1/1923]. 
Despite the Minister's wish to see the matter settled, the men refused to return 
to work. On the following day the ranks of the striking workers were swelled even 
further as the inspectors, who had worked the previous day, also went out in support 
of the drivers, conductors and part-time workers [SR 16/1/1923]. The continuation of 
the strike meant that tram services were brought to a virtual halt, causing considerable 
inconvenience to the travelling public and severly effecting local businesses [SR 
16/1/1923]. Moreover, further outbreaks of violence added tension to the rapidly 
worsening situation. On the morning of the 14th, two striking drivers were arrested 
and charged with threatening a driver who had continued to work and later in the day 
another driver was stabbed in the neck [NA R 6 4 13/4]. 
Amidst this growing conflict the company was making bold attempts to get the 
trams rolling again by recruiting replacement workers who were drawn from the ranks 
of the unemployed, newspaperboys, former employees, mechanics and 'boatmen' 
who had been hired to collect the tickets. By the 16th the company felt compelled to 
place a notice in the press. It argued that, as the strike was generating a great deal of 
'public interest' {mahachon aw caisai khoiang hufangkan penanmak ), it was 
necessary that the company clearly state its position. After providing a brief 
background to the events, the company expressed the view that, apart from the 
dismissal of the three employees, it had met all of the worker's demands. The 
company claimed that it was always ready to consider the worker's complaints. 
However, it argued that there were procedures which must be followed and that the 
workers should have made their intentions clear before initiating strike action; their 
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failure to do this had resulted in 'the travelling public being inconvenienced, the 
company suffering losses and the reputation of the workers being damaged'. The 
company stated that prior to the 3rd strike, on 13 January, the men had been fully 
informed that a strike would not be tolerated and that all those who participated would 
not be reinstated. Despite this warning the men, due to their 'insolence' iphuak 
khongnan yanguatdi ), had stopped work. The company went on to argue that 'with 
the interest of the company and the public in mind' such practices would 'no longer be 
tolerated'. Furthermore, the company sought to defend the need to maintain rules and 
regulations and to impose finds, arguing that such procedures were necessary in order 
to ensure public safety. Finally, the company thanked the Minister for his help in 
attempting to setde the dispute and it was hoped that the public would not be angry as 
every effort was being made to maintain normal services and that, in fact, the whole 
dispute was the work of a few dishonest leaders who were forcing the majority to 
strike [YM16/1/1923]. The following day the SEC began laying off the men and 
advertised for replacements who wished to be trained as tram drivers. By 20 January 
all the men had been dismissed [BT 17/1/1923; 20/1/1923]. 
The recruimient of replacement workers and the attacks on the tramwaymen in 
the press provoked further acts of violence. At Banglamphu it was reported that: 
...a member of the public punched a tramway worker who 
was selling tickets. It was stated that the citizen was incensed 
by the ticket seller's actions. He was of the opinion that, as 
the tramwaymen had struck because of no longer being able 
to tolerate the company's regulations, then those who were 
Thai should help their fellow countrymen. But in full view of 
everyone this person [the ticket seller] was working as a 
replacement. It was thought that this was not the action of 
someone who loved his nation, and for this reason the citizen 
had been moved to exact his own form of punishment [SR 
16/1/1923]. 
In another incident a worker was arrested after being involved in an altercation 
with a company official [SR 16/1/23]. In yet another attack of which we have more 
information: 
...Inspector JBMH was driving a tram on the Dusit Line when 
he had to stop at the interchange in front of Wat 
Maharananop. Also on the tram at the time was Nai Thiang, 
whom the men...call the 'underboss'. One of the striking 
workers asked Nai Thiang, 'How are you feeling? Well, I 
hope? You are a Thai, aren't you?' Nai Thiang immediately 
leapt from the tram and punched the worker four or five 
times. Unable to ward off the blows, the tramwayman fled 
out of harm's way. On seeing this Nai Bun, the driver, left 
his seat and flayed into another of the striking men. The latter 
made no attempt to fight back...A'ai Bun then told the 
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policeman who was riding on the tram that one of the striking 
men was carrying a concealed weapon and without further 
ado the man was arrested and escorted to the Samranrat 
police station [SR 17/1/23] 
Later that afternoon Nai Thiang was again involved in some trouble when he 
was reported to have: 
...assembled together a group of ten professional boxers 
from Banglamphu.. They met in front of the offices at 
Pratumai with Nai Lek, a very capable boxer, as their leader. 
It was reported that Nai Thiang had hired the boxers to attack 
the striking men...the pugilists were offered ten baht for 
every head they cracked open (the point here is whose money 
is being used, Nai Thiang's or somebody elses?) it was said 
that some of the boxers were dressed as beggars, some as 
Chinese and some were attired in shorts and were riding 
bicycles. Looking at them they seemed to be acting like 
undercover detectives, not ordinary detectives but detectives 
looking for the blood of heads [SR 17/1/1923]. 
The presence of a policeman on the tram in the second incident described above 
had not been due to chance but was the result of a meeting which the SEC had had 
with the Minister of the Interior. Fearing for the safety of those employees who 
continued to work, the company had asked that a policeman be allowed to ride on 
every tram, for which they would be paid 1 baht per day. The Minister not only 
instructed Commissioner Prakat to make these police available, he also issued 
instructions that additional police be mobilised to carry out surveillance at the various 
tram stations around the city. In addition, as many of the replacement drivers did not 
possess the appropriate licences, the Commissioner was also asked to relax the rules 
which governed the licensing of drivers [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. Although these measures 
were a clear reflection of the Minister's attempt to ensure a resumption of the status 
quo, his role in the dispute was becoming the topic of some debate. While working 
behind the scenes the Minister, had, however, made no official statement and it 
seemed that for all of his activity no end to the strike seemed to be in sight. The Sayam 
Sakkhi, [18/1/1923] for example, argued: 
We now believe this is a matter for the Minister. He cannot 
just sit idly by but must move quickly to settle the matter as it 
is causing considerable trouble to the people. He must ensure 
that the company relax its rules and have the men return to 
work quickly and that there will be no more trouble. 
With such views in circulation the government was being increasingly 
compelled to clarify its position. This it did through its newspaper the Phim Thai 
[16/1/1923]. In an article titled 'Thai Labour' it was stated: 
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There is nothing in a country which poses greater trouble for 
government than a strike by labourers. There is nothing more 
dangerous than groups or sections of workers acting together 
in evil ways. Such problems are now having to be faced by 
all countries in today's world...[T]here have been enormous 
numbers of strikes in various countries...but we have yet to 
have experienced them in our own country [sic.]. We had all 
hoped such things would not be repeated here, but alas! just 
the opposite has happened...[It must be asked]...will other 
groups of labourers in the hundreds of other places in Siam 
follow the example [of the tramway workers]? And if this 
does happen and becomes endemic to our country as it has in 
other places, who will be the most grievously troubled? It 
will be the government won't it?...Thais have a very 
different disposition from Westerners, Indians and Chinese. 
Everybody is probably already aware of this. I simply wish 
to point out that when Western, Indian or Chinese workers 
strike there is likely to be some bodily injury. However, 
when Thais strike the situation is likely to become more 
serious and could reach the point where people are killed. I 
believe the government is already aware of this, for, if not, 
why would there be policemen riding on every tram? Now 
the situation has arisen and Thai labourers have shown that 
they wish to copy from other countries, how should we cure 
such occurrences? It is my opinion that we must begin 
immediately...[0]ther companies or places who employ large 
numbers of workers should learn from the example of the 
Tramway Company and should realise that from now on, 
strikes as a part of 'civilisation' have now reached our own 
workers. What are you going to do? You must think of a 
solution now for 'prevention is better than cure'. 
While the publication of the above would have done little to encourage the 
striking workers, it is likely that it would, however, have contributed further to the 
atmosphere of fear which was then circulating among the public, particularly as there 
was already some concern as to whether the 'coolie class' would rise up given that 
they, like the tramwaymen. lived 'from hand to mouth'. [Siam Observer 16/1/1923]. 
On 17 January 1923, Chaophraya Yomarat submitted a report to the King. 
Clearly exasperated at having been unable to resolve the dispute the Minister concluded 
his report by stating: 
The company has performed well. The workers' refusal to 
agree stems from the fact that they lack a sense of 
responsibility. They think only of their own viewpoint. I 
accepted the burden of speaking to the company on their 
behalf, and to instruct them as to what is 'rational' [singthi 
chop ] and appopriate. However, they have failed to listen to 
my advice [NA R. 6 N 13/4], 
The King's short reply was given on the same day. He concluded that: 
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The attempts at conciliation made by the Minister and other 
officials have been wholly appropriate. It is therefore a 
shame that the workers have refused to agree. The actions 
taken to guard the situation are good. It is hoped that the 
workers will soon come to their 'senses' (daisati) [NA R. 6 
N 13/4]. 
Recognising that events were now beginning to run against them, the 
tramwaymen sought to place their position in front of the public '...so that everyone 
could see who was right and who was wrong'. In a letter sent to the Siam Ratsadon 
newspaper the men claimed that they felt disgusted with the lies being circulated by the 
SEC and anyone who was not informed of the facts would be apt to believe that they 
had 'unjustly mutineered and that they didn't know their place' {kokan kamroep 
doiphitkhloitham lae midai ciamconnamansai ). The men argued that it was necessary 
for the public to know their true feelings so that everyone would be aware of the fact 
that the company had lied and was taking advantage of the workers {awpriap 
khongnan ) [SR 19/1/1923]. In explaining their stoppage the workers stated: 
...that we stopped work not because someone had incited us. 
It was a decision taken by our group on payday last month, a 
month in which the company had squeezed us (ritkhaen ) so 
harshly that we finally reached the end of our tether (thung 
khitthisut). They had doled out fines and deducted money 
from our wages and bonuses to such an extent that one man 
was left with not enough to buy food. Some men were 
reduced to tears as they looked at the money in their hands 
and thought of all the hours they had sweated for the 
company. The company had heard that some of the men were 
complaining, but had simply assumed the face of a monster 
(suamnayak ) and replied in an extremely inhuman and 
vulgar way {top yangphasasat maidai mi khwam rusuk 
yangtuamanut ) 'If you are not satisfied you can simply piss 
off...' The company claims that the men are not easily taught 
(maipenkhon nonsonngai ), that is, we don't simply follow 
all the company's rules. This is because they are barbaric and 
beyond the ability of humans to follow (pen kobangkhap 
yangpathuan sutwisai thimanut cathamtamdai ) [SR 
19/1/1923]. 
The men also pointed to other forms of oppression to which they were being 
subjected: 
...we wish to make it known that the company is vile hearted 
{caihiamhot) and is eating the flesh and sucking the blood 
(kinlnualaesupluad ) of workers through the use of other 
methods which have almost become compulsory. Whenever 
a worker has no money or is experiencing some other 
problem and is forced to borrow from the company, the latter 
charges a rate of interest of 5 satang for every baht 
borrowed. However, the person in charge of lending the 
money pretends that it is difficult to secure the funds so that 
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the person who needs the money is forced to wait until his 
hardship has become even more pressing, then they [the 
company] exact [an interest rate of] 20 or 25 satang per baht 
and if the worker complains the company will not lend the 
money at all...This is in fact, a secret truth held within the 
company, if you please! [SR 19/1/1923]. 
Finally, in an attempt to have their oppression relieved the men claimed that 
they: 
...went to see the Minister and the Police Commissioner in 
the hope of receiving justice {khwamthiangtham ) from those 
who are the leaders of all Thai workers. But, alas! for 
unknown reasons they have 'ummed and ahhed' and as yet 
absolutely no assistance has been forthcoming [SR 
19/1/1923]. 
While the publication of their views represented an attempt to rally public 
support for their actions, the position of the men was becoming increasingly tenuous. 
While it was said that some 'old and trusted' employees had been reinstated [BTWM 
22/1/23], the majority of workers now found themselves unemployed. With police 
guarding all the trams it was becoming increasingly difficult to exert an influence over 
those who continued to work. While tram services were still interrupted, the company 
had managed to get some services running, although it was not until the end of 
January that operations were said to be returning to normal [BTWM 5/2/23]. 
Moreover, it appeared that the Minister had no intendon of becoming further involved 
in the dispute, and as far as he was concerned the dismissal of the workers consdtuted 
an end to the matter. While the majority of newspapers conrinued to express support 
for the striking workers, coverage of the strike was beginning to decrease and defeat 
seemed to be staring the men in the face. However, in a dramatic development, the 
strike was given a renewed impetus with the emergence of a new newspaper, 
Kammakon [The Labourer], the first issue of which was published on 27 January, 
1923. 
The paper had been established by a group of journalists who had recently left 
the Sayam Sakkhi newspaper after a dispute with its owner over a pay issue. Calling 
themselves the Labour Group [Khana Kammakon ], these journalists included Thawat 
Rittidet [1894-1950] (hereafter Thawat), Wat Sunthoracam [1892-1954] (hereafter 
Wat ), and Sun Kitcamnong [1898-1965] (hereafter Sun )? Their reasons for 
establishing the newspaper were explained as follows: 
Thawat Rittidet [1894-1950] was born into a well to do family in the province of 
Samuisongkhram. He received a 'classic' education in a local Buddhist Temple school where he 
later taught novice monks. He became attached to the household of a member of the Thai 
nobility and was a civil sevant for four years in the Depariment of the Navy. In 1922 he became 
editor of the Sayam Sakkhi newspaper. One of Thawat's relations had been involved in the 
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Today those who think that there are no more slaves {that) 
are mistaken. If someone was to investigate the lives of the 
two groups, that is, the employers (naicang ) and employees 
{lukcang ) they would cry out 'Oh! slavery still exists 
concealed within the bodies of the employees'. That is the 
truth. One does not have to look far, it is enough merely to 
look at the situation as it now stands. It is true that the 
employee is given the option of either agreeing to work or 
not. But this is not a sufficient reason from which to measure 
the evils encountered by the employee as he falls into the 
great pit of slavery {toklummahathat ). One must also 
consider what percentage of people who become employees 
are sufficiently wealthy enough to stand on their own two 
feet and what percentage are people who live from hand to 
mouth (hachawkinkham )...Under such conditions the 
making of a contract will necessarily lead [the employees] to 
be disadvantaged (siapriap ). For whatever happens the poor 
must eat. No matter how much they might be disadvantaged, 
poverty forces them to accept. Is it just (tham ) or equal 
{sameor ) to make a contract when one is suffering in times 
of hardship? Ah! but the employer, the bloody face (nahiat ) 
does not limit himself to this one advantage, but in addition 
he seeks further advantages. He includes in the contract, if 
you do this your wages will be cut by this much, if you do 
that your wages will be cut by that much. In next to no time 
the employee...will be in the little court of the master [where 
he will be] accused of error and be fined. If the employee 
leaves, it would represent the breaking of the contract and 
therefore all outstanding wages will not be paid. Thus the 
employee must simply bear it (campentongthon ) and allow 
the employer to suck his blood to the tune of this 
song...Apart from such methods, there are hundreds of other 
tricks by which the employer is able to take advantage of the 
employee...the examples we have provided thus far should, 
however, serve to bear witness to our claim that slave 
abortive 1912 coup attempt against Rama 6 (Wachirawut). Influenced by the writings of such 
well known Thai authors as Thienwan and K.S.R. Kulap, Thawat was the leading figure within 
the Thai labour movement from the time of the tramway strike up until the mid-1930's. His 
devotion to advancing the interests of workers and other disadvantaged groups within Thai 
society led to his eventual impoversihment. He died in 1950 after contracting malaria in 
Petchabun province. Wat Suntharacam [1892-1954] was born in Ratburi province. He, like 
Thawat, completed his primary education in a temple school and later continued his studies at 
the Police Training Academy in Nahon Pathom. He worked for four years in Utaradit province 
where he clashed with local power interests which led to his eventual dismissal from the force. 
He returned to Bangkok in 1921 and began studying law. Along with Thawat, Wat spent almost 
all his adult life in the services of the Thai labour movement. After World War Two, he acted as 
legal advisor to the Central Labour Union. He was arrested during the course of the 1948 rice 
mill strike and was subsequently imprisoned..In 1949 he travelled to China as the Thai 
representative to the conference of the World Confederation of Trade Unions. After the 
confercnce he requested political asylum and died in Peking in 1954. Sun Kitcamnong [1898-
1965] was one of the few early Thai labour leaders to have travelled outside Thailand. He was a 
member of the Thai expeditionary force which had been sent to France during the dying stages 
of World War One. After the war he remained in France for about six months. A trained 
mechanic, Sun also spent most of his adult life within the Thai labour movement. In 1952 he 
was arrested for his participation in the Peace Movement and spent five years in prison. For a 
fuller biographical account of these three 'organic intellectuals' see, Sangsit [1986], 
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c o n d i t i o n s (saphaphaengthat ) have not yet 
disappeared.. .Who will lend a hand to these suffering 
workers?...we must look to ourselves...we raise our voices, 
we speak up like workers from other countries but we are 
ridiculed with the reply 'you are only an employee, you don't 
need to have a voice' (maitongmisiang ). With the suffering 
of our friends in mind we, a group of workers, have 
collected together a small sum of money, left over from the 
unjust exploitation of evil employers, to establish a 
newspaper, called the labour newspaper. Our major aim is to 
destroy slavery among workers...and to replace it with 
freedom {isarapimp ). [Kammakon 12/1/1923]. 
Having asserted that the aim of the group was to 'free' workers from their 
'slavery', Thawat and his fellow organisers went on to outline a strategy through 
which this aim could be realised. In an article titled 'The Freedom of Labour', and 
using the example of the tramway strike, the author argues that freedom is something 
which must be won and this can only be achieved through unified and collective action 
by workers themselves. After outlining the circumstances surrounding the strike and 
pointing to the fact that the Yomarat was unable to ensure that the demands of the 
tramwaymen were met, the author continues: 
The actions pursued by the tramwaymen must be considered 
correct because they were no longer able to follow the rules 
and regulations laid down by the employers. It is right that 
they stopped work, and their actions are wholly appropriate 
for the times because our country has set itself on the path 
toward civilisation (khwamcivili )...We must ask why the 
tramwaymen took such action. Wasn't it to find freedom for 
us all? If we workers are not united, where will freedom 
come from?...We are members of the labouring class (pen 
khon chanphuak kammakon ) we must look to our own 
group rather than to others...We should all realise that we are 
workers. Poverty forces us to become employees. But 
material wealth is not the issue for we can still survive and 
feed ourselves. But the important point is not to allow our 
freedom to slip away as well. If we lack both wealth and 
freedom, we will not be able to raise our heads in the future 
because the employer will oppress us. For this reason, we 
workers must help each other to recapture our freedom so 
that it remains stable and fixed. Our freedom rests on 
unity...If the tramwaymen are united and really act 
together...they will secure their freedom. The men should all 
strike on the same day. If this is done, the company will have 
to give them their freedom immediately. Workers! remember, 
freedom does not lie with others, it lies within our own 
group. We should follow the correct method, that is, when 
we are dissatisfied with the regulations or oppression of the 
employers, we should all stop work. Having ceased 
working, we should all vote one of our members, who we 
think capable of discussing the issue with the employer, to be 
our leader. We should work out an agreement with the 
employer to the satisfaction of all concerned. When the 
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employer has agreed and we think the proposal is 
acceptable...our leader should make the contract by which 
we accept to work. The contract should be made so that both 
sides have a solid and stable base [Kammakon 27/1/1923]. 
Although encouraged by the actions of the tramwaymen, the author argued that 
workers throughout the country must join in the struggle and that together they should 
be allowed to have a leader who would represent them in industrial disputes: 
We direct these matters to the Minister of the Interior who is 
charged with the administration of the realm...We, as the 
representatives of labour, are fully agreed that Siam has now 
entered into a civil ised era {khao khun sukhit 
haengkhwamcivili) and it is appropriate that we be allowed 
to have a labour leader. At the moment the Minister has the 
task of representing the labourers'. We think that this is a 
great honour for we labourers that the Minister has tried to 
help us and we wish to show our deepest appreciation 
toward the Minister for the benevolent attitude he has shown 
toward us. However, we believe that it does not befit the 
honour of the Minister, for his position demands that he 
administer the entire realm. If the Minister is unable to settle 
the matter in accordance with the labourers wishes, as is 
already the case, we feel this will reflect badly on the honour 
of the Minister. If the Minister feels kindness toward the 
workers and wishes to help them secure their freedom or the 
freedom {khwampenthai ) of Thailand and not allow 
employers to oppress the labourers, then he will give his 
permission so that Siam can have its own labour 
leader...[Kammakon 27/1/1923]. 
Despite the emergence of Kammakon and the appeals made to the Minister to 
ensure an equitable solution to the conflict, the struggle was to end in eventual defeat. 
With the tram services resumed and the presence of police on every tramcar thwarting 
any attempt to encourage those who worked to join the strikers, the power of the men 
to continue their struggle was gradually being undermined. Nevertheless, the 
bitterness and violence which had been such a characteristic feature of the conflict was 
to continue. It was reported that trams had been disabled through bomb attacks with 
some tram lines also reported to have been damaged. In another incident a passenger 
had apparently been shot, while barricades had been erected across one of the 
tramlines [BT 31/1/1923]. 
Although the men refused to yield and continued to protest throughout 
February, by the first week of March 1923 the struggle could no longer be sustained 
and it was reported that most of the men and their families had been forced to return to 
their former homes in the provinces in the hope of eking out a living [Kammakon 
3/3/1923]. In April the SEC established a new set of work rules and reduced wages 
from 70 to 50 haht per month [BTWM 16/4/1923]. Interestingly, the Bangkok Times, 
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which had supported the company throughout the dispute, was to admit that the 
previous system was 'vicious' and suggested that the strike grew out of 'poor work 
practices' [BTWM 16/4/1923], The defeat of the workers and the hardships they now 
faced no doubt proved to be a bitter lesson for all those involved. In particular, the role 
played by the Minister of the Interior was to come in for special criticism. In a dramatic 
turnabout from its previous admiration of the Minister's attempt to mediate the dispute, 
Kammakon [3/3/1923] was to sum up his role as follows: 
The Yomarat has been unable to settle the strike involving the 
t ramway workers and he has now left on government 
business to Monthon Phayap thus abandoning the striking 
workers who, unable to find work, are being left to lead an 
itinerant life. Some have already been tragically forced to 
leave for the countryside. We feel great sorrow for these 
striking workers but we are unable to help...The Yomarat 
has refused to help despite all the outcry; in the final analysis, 
nothing had eventuated. We have not seen one official who 
has offered to help this group of Thai workers. The company 
has organised police protection. Why is this? Because the 
company is rich isn't it? And, people of noble rank hold 
many shares in the company and have therefore helped each 
other to resolve the matter. This is true isn't it? As for the 
labourers, they can grumble all they like, just forget about 
them...The King has granted to you [Yomarat ] the position 
of Minister of the Interior with the task of governing all the 
people throughout the kingdom...But Minister, do you think 
it is fitting to have simply abandoned the workers, who are 
poor, to suffer hardship and be left to lead an itinerant life? 
Or do you simply think 'Ah! just forget them, what use is 
there in helping the poor?' Would you claim that you have 
tried to help them to the best of your ability? By leaving now 
on a tour of inspection do you realise you are being accused 
of simply fleeing?. . .You said you would help the poor 
workers and you have not done this. We would like to ask 
you, as a person of senior status, as the Minister of the 
Interior charged with governing all the people, do you not 
feel just a little embarrassed?.. .Minister you should think 
very carefully about just how poor the people are. When the 
people are poor, how will the country flourish and develop? 
A country depends on its people doesn't it? You are the 
King's Minister and therefore you should know better than 
most. But how do you feel now? Is it because of your old 
age that you declare yourself unable to help? If this is the 
case, perhaps you should hand over office to people with 
more vitality and see how they handle things. You have been 
a public servant for a long time and perhaps you have done 
enough for the Nation, Religion and King. We apologise if 
what we have said does not please you Minister. 
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3.3 Analysis 
The massive body of social scientific literature which deals with the historical 
development of wage-labour and working classes is filled with literally thousands of 
descriptions of strikes which are, in many respects, similar to that of the 1923 events. 
The historical significance of the tramwaymen's protests cannot, however, be simply 
assessed in terms of the extent to which the men are perceived to have produced a 
proper or correct form of struggle. In the following sections the aim is to provide an 
informed theoretical analysis of this dispute and show why the strike, long ignored by 
past writers, was indeed a significant historical event representing as it did one 
important moment in the process of formation of the Thai industrial working class. 
3.3.1 Struggles Over the Working Day 
According to Marx the contradictory nature of the relationship which exists between 
wage-labour and capital becomes expressed, at the point of production itself, in the 
form of a struggle over the establishment of a 'norm' for the working day. Under 
capitalism a normal working day is not a fixed but a fluid quantity. On one side stands 
the capitalist whose interests are determined by the need to produce and secure 
surplus-value. On the other side stands labour, whose interests are determined by the 
need to both preserve and secure the value of its labour power [Marx, 1976:342-344]. 
We see then that, leaving aside certain extremely elastic 
restrictions, the nature of the commodity exchange itself 
imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to surplus 
labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser 
when he tries to make the working day as long as possible, 
and, where possible, to make two working days out of one. 
On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold 
implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the 
worker maintains his rights as a seller when he wishes to 
reduce the working day to a particular normal length. There 
is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both 
equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between 
equal rights, force decides. Hence, in the history of capitalist 
production, the establishment of a norm for the working day 
presents itself as a struggle over the limits of that day, a 
struggle between...the class of capitalists and...the working 
class [Marx,1976:344]. 
For many writers the emergence of struggles over the working day in Thailand 
are thought to have been blocked by the fact that Thai workers possessed the innate 
cultural characteristics of submissiveness, passivity and individualism. Such views 
are, however, difficult to sustain on empirical grounds. Although unprecedented in 
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terms of both its duration and the extent of its violence, the 1923 tramwayworker's 
strike was certainly not an isolated incident which provided an exception to a norm of 
industrial passivity. In fact, the events of 1923 represented the culmination of a series 
of struggles by the tramwaymen, the earliest of which dates back to 1896. Litde is 
known of the actual events but one English language newspaper reported that in March 
of that year: 
The Bangkok Tramway Company during the last week has 
gone through a trying crisis of the nature of a labour dispute. 
For some reason the drivers and collectors were dissadsfied 
and agreed to strike work upon a given day. The directors 
fortunately heard what was afoot, and now a large number of 
new faces meet one on the trams [Report f rom Bangkok 
Times (hereafter BT) cited in BTWM 21/3/1932]. 
Late in 1897 the same newspaper reported that: 
The employees in the tramway company have formed 
themselves into a secret society."^ The management have not 
got an easy task in coping with the tendency of the workmen, 
clothed with little authority, to run a society for their own 
benefit, but they seem to be doing their best, and if they do 
not weary in well-doing no society within the ranks of their 
employees can become a serious menace to the peace [Report 
in BT cited in BTWM 25/12/1933]. 
Little is known about the organisation or industrial militancy of the 
tramwaymen between 1897 and 1923 except for a report of another strike which 
erupted in 1921, when it was claimed that 78 workers had gone out in protest over the 
disciplinary rules which were then being enforced by the company. Objections were 
also lodged against the severity of fines which had been levied on some of the men. 
All those involved in the strike were arrested for holding an illegal meeting and, 
following a warning from the police, they were only reinstated after admitting that they 
had been wrong for striking without giving the company prior notice [BTWM 
It is important to recognise that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the term 'secret society' 
was no longer restricted to refer only to the 'secret ' organisat ions which the Chinese had 
brought to Thailand. As Battye [1974:77] explains 'Angyii, a proper name and generic tenm for 
secret society would creep into Siamese writing as a figure of speech for serious lawlessness 
measured by numbers and organisation' . This is a point which has been overlooked by past 
writers, For example, Mabry [1979:37] argues that the 'secret societies' were not 'true' labour 
organisations. However, as the above passage demonsu-ates workers ' organisations were in fact 
referred to as secret societies and continued to be referred to in this way even after the Second 
World War . It is important also to note that being accused of 'secret society' activity was a very 
serious charge for it suggested that the person so accused was an enemy of the Thai nation. 
Later the term 'communist ' was to fulfil l a similar function. Both terms, tlierefore, were part of 
a discourse of 'excommunication' which was directed against workers and their organisations, a 
discourse within which they were depicted as threatening the peace and stability of the Thai 
social order. [For a discussion of the concept of 'excommunicat ion ' sec, Therbom,1980:82-83]. 
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14/2/1921]. The tramwaymen were not the only ones, however, to have possessed a 
history of industrial militancy for there exist other reports of wage-labourers being 
involved in struggles for better pay and working conditions. The earliest of these 
struggles date back to the 1880's with those involved in these and subsequent disputes 
including; rice mill workers [1880's;1890's], tin miners [1880's], railway 
construction crews [1890's], drivers [1893], port labourers [1900;1901], moulders 
[1905], lightermen [1907], rickshaw pullers, dock workers, cargo and rice mill 
coolies, railway workers [1910] and printers [1921].^ 
In their work on the process of class formation, the social historians have 
pointed to the subject area of personal experience as being fundamental to an 
understanding of the emergence of working class struggles [Thompson,1978:147, 
Metcalfe, 1988:58-60]. Given the deterministic assumptions which have prevaded 
previous studies of the historical development of the Thai working class, it is not 
surprising that the actual experience out of which these early struggles in Thailand 
emerged, is an area of research which has virtually been ignored by previous scholars. 
While recognising that a great deal of further research needs to be conducted in this 
area, some preliminary comments about the nature of the experience encountered by 
the first generation of Thai industrial workers can, however, be made through a 
consideration of an idiomatic expression which was used during the course of the 
1923 events. 
On a number of occasions during the course of the 1923 strike, the 
tramwaymen were described as belonging to that category of people who 'lived from 
hand to mouth' [ha chaw kin kham lit. to search in the morning [in order to] eat in the 
evening]. Within Thai society this commonly used expression is used to refer to 
people whose social experience is marked by a constant battle to survive and eke out a 
daily living. For many workers this constant battle to survive often ended in failure. 
For example, during the construction of the railways, thousands of workers were 
reported to have died from malaria and other jungle fevers [Skinner,1957:l 15]. A 
similar fate also befell many wage-labourers who were employed in the mining areas 
where it was claimed that even 'bars and bolts' could not prevent Chinese workers 
from fleeing some areas where the death rate among new arrivals exceeded 60% and 
5 Concrete data on the specific background to these disputes are very scarce. More often than not 
workers protests went largely unrecorded and it is only those which led to strikes which 
attracted the attention of newspaper reporters and government officials and other contemporary 
observers. The reports which we do have of these strikes only contain minimal amounts of 
information. See, for example various editions of Bangkok Times Weekly Mail 14/10/1919 
21/3/1932; 25/12/1933; 29/8/1925; 30/4/1927; 14/2/1920; 2/5/1921; 12/3/1923; 26/3/1923 
23/7/1928; 6/5/1929; 20/5/1929; 25/11/1929; 9/6/1930. Also see Bangkok Times 28/3/1901 
15/7/1925; 12/7/1925; 14/7/1926; 9/12/1926. Also sec reports cited in Skinner [1957:109-
117] and comments contained in Zeeponsekul [1987:34] and Hewison [1986c:92-95]. 
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where those who did manage to survive suffered from chronic illnesses 
[Skinner,1957:110-111]. 
Although the battle to survive was bleakest outside Bangkok, workers within 
the city faced a daily struggle to reproduce both themselves and their families. It has 
been claimed that, due to the general shortage of labour which existed prior to 1932, 
the wages of urban workers were, in fact, comparatively higher than those in 
neighbouring economies [Skinner, 1957:117]. Evidence suggests, however, that 
wages paid to Bangkok workers only allowed for the securing of a basic level of 
subsistence and, during times of economic crisis, often fell below this level. During 
the economic downturn of 1918/1919, for example, there were numerous reports that 
rises in the prices of basic commodities such as rice, flour, lamp oil and meat were 
having an enormous impact on urban workers [BTWM 6/5/1919]. With price rises of 
between 100% and 300% it was argued that the cost of living was now far beyond 
what the 'poor' were earning, a situation which led one commentator to suggest that 
'perhaps the Bolsheviks would put things right' [BTWM 12/5/1919]. Apart from 
struggling to afford the cost of food, urban workers also faced problems associated 
with housing. As they were only able to afford basic accomodation, urban workers 
were often confronted with overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions in buildings 
which were often structurally unsound and where fire was a constant threat. Under 
such conditions workers and their families were often the first victims of water bome 
diseases such as cholera which often swept through Bangkok claiming hundreds of 
lives [BTWM 21/4/1919; 5/5/1919; 12/5/1919; 16/6/1919]. Children were the most 
badly effected by these conditions. In 1919 it was stated that a third of all infants bom 
in Bangkok died within their first year of life [BTWM 14/7/1919], a situation which 
was hardly surprising given that disease was said to be rampant in the city with one 
doctor concluding his report stating that 'on the whole we find it [Bangkok] to be one 
immense rat's nest' [BTWM 6/3/1922]. 
While the tramway workers were perceived to belong to that category of people 
who lived a hand to mouth existence they were comparatively better off than the vast 
majority of urban industrial workers. Although rates of pay varied, it was claimed that 
the average wage paid to the men was 76 baht 58 satang per month. [YM 
18/1/1923]. Apart from this regular wage, workers were also paid bonuses as well as 
travel and food allowances. The company had also established a 'Workers Reserve 
Fund' which provided the men with a small pension upon retirement. The fund was 
also used to pay workers who were either injured on the job or faced some special 
expense [YM 18/1/1923]. Employees were also provided with relatively low cost 
housing, a benefit which very few urban workers enjoyed at the time [BTWM 
27/9/1920]. Yet despite these advantages the tramwaymen still faced a daily battle to 
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make ends meet with it being reported that most were obliged to work a 16 hour day 
without being given a break for meals [Poonpanich,1988:32]. 
From the above, it is clear that the actual experience of wage dependence was 
one which was marked by a constant battle to survive and make ends meet. However, 
dependence on a regular wage not only carried with it a particular social experience but 
it also entailed confrontation with an unique set of work experiences. Data on the daily 
work experience of wage-labour prior to 1932 is difficult to obtain. For less skilled 
workers it is clear, however, that work was labour intensive. In the rice and saw mills, 
on the docks and in the southern tin mines the daily effort of carrying out routine tasks 
must have posed constant problems and it is not surprising that the consumption of 
opium was considered to have been a 'virtual necessity' among the labouring Chinese 
[Skinner,1957:121]. For skilled workers in the more modern sectors of the economy 
the work experience must also have been difficult for as Poonpanich [1988:33] has 
pointed out these workers were faced with: 
...the collective process of production, with its restrictive 
rules and regulations, and insistence of punctuality and 
steady output with work and rest determined not by task but 
by clock [circumstances which were] in sharp contrast to the 
decentralised system of agricultural production and the 
pattern of peasant time. 
This focus on the experience of work relations has attracted a great deal of 
attention in recent years. Before moving to examine some of the data relevant to 
unders tanding aspects of the tramwaymen's daily work experience it will be 
appropriate to discuss briefly some of the relevant theoretical debates. 
3.3.2 Capitalist Control 
Within Thai labour studies the problems of relations within the workplace have been 
largely analysed in terms of what may be termed 'orthodox industrial relations theory'. 
Inf luenced by Dunlop's [1958] 'system theory' the main thrust of writing on 
workplace relations has been directed toward explaining the causes of industrial 
conflict and how such conflict may be resolved. Stated boldly, it is argued that conflict 
within industry is the result of the absence of a commonly accepted framework or 
system of rules through which disputes between labour and capital can be settled. As 
Mabry [1979:114] observes: 
. . .conflict of interest in all industrial settings between 
employers and employees seem to be a fact of life, and where 
work rules have not been developed delineating the legitimate 
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interests and roles of the respective parties, industrial conflict 
seems to result. 
Two observations need to be made with regard to this view. First, while it may 
be true that industrial conflict is a 'fact of life', such conflict is not the product of 
transhistorical necessity but is rather the product of the historically contingent and 
contradictory nature of the wage-labour/capital relation itself. Second, having accepted 
that industrial conflict is simply a given, writers such as Mabry have proceeded to 
delineate the ways in which conflict can be managed and contained. In other words, 
rather than providing an explanation of the historical genesis of industrial conflict these 
writers simply provide a description of the problem of managerial control [Cf. 
Hyman,1975: l l ] . The problem of control has been at the centre of recent debates over 
the nature of the capitalist labour-process and some brief comments are necessary. 
The way in which the labour-process and the organisadon of work shape the 
development of working class struggles has been the subject of a great deal of 
theoretical attention in recent years [Braverman,1974; Littler,1982; Thompson,1983; 
Burawoy,1985; Cohen,1987; Munck,1988 and Gutkind,1988]. Lying at the core of 
these debates is the attention which has been given to the problem of capitalist control. 
Briefly stated, it is argued that while 'economic compulsion' ensures that the workers 
will turn up at the factory gates each morning, capital still faces the problem of 
ensuring that, during the course of the working day, the worker actually produces a 
surplus. There now exists a rich and plentiful body of literature which contains 
desc r ip t ions of the various forms of control or ' regimes of product ion ' 
[Burawoy,1985], which capital has exercised over wage-labour. One of the most 
important aspects of the tramwaymen's struggle is that, at least as far as scholarship is 
concerned, archival and newspaper accounts of the dispute provide us with some 
important data which allow some comments to be made about the nature of control 
which existed within the SEC and the implications which this control had with regard 
to structuring both the day to day work experience and the development of struggles 
within the company. 
In order to ensure that the tramwaymen produced both product and profit the 
SEC had established a system of control which broadly corresponds to that which 
Burawoy [1985:88] terms 'market despotism'. The general characteristics of this 
particular regime of production were first identified by Marx in his descriptions of the 
nineteenth century English textile industry, then the most advanced capitalist industry 
of the time. 
In the factory code, the capitalist formulates his autocratic 
power over his workers like a private legislator, and purely 
as an emanation of his will, unaccompanied by either that 
division of responsibility otherwise so much approved of by 
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the bourgeoisie, or the still more approved representative 
system. This code is merely the capitalist caricature of the 
social regulation of the labour process which becomes 
necessary in co-operation on a large scale and in the 
employment in common of instruments of labour, and 
especially of machinery. The overseer's book of penalties 
replaces the slave drivers lash. All punishments naturally 
resolve themselves into fines and deductions from wages, 
and the law giving talent of the factory Lycurgus so arranges 
matters that a violation of his laws is, if possible, more 
profitable to him than the keeping of them [Marx, 1976:549-
550], 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of market despotism is, therefore, that 
the actual securing of surplus is achieved through force rather than through the eliciting 
of consent. This certainly seems to have been the case within the SEC where the men 
were subjected to a hazy and ill-defined system of rules and regulations which 
governed the day to day work activities. It appears that the men had little input into 
both the content of these work rules and the manner of their enforcement. In other 
words there was no mutually acceptable framework through which work was to be 
organised and conflicts settled. From the men's point of view the system of rules and 
fines was imposed arbitrarily and they seemed to have never been quite which rules 
would be enforced, or even when they would be enforced. In the absence of 
consensus, control within the SEC was therefore reinforced by fear. Those in charge 
of enforcing the company's rules: Nai Hui , his assistant and the European traffic 
manager were depicted as being heartless, cruel, evil and lacking compassion and the 
men were said to be more afraid of these three than they were of wild tigers. The fear 
which the men experienced as a normal part of their working day was reflected in the 
fear and violence which pervaded the entire strike. This is a significant point for 
received views of the Thai social order depict a society marked by cultural continuity, 
peace and stability and an innate abhorrence of violence. Yet throughout the dispute 
there were continual acts of violence. The tramwaymen fought each other and were 
themselves the victims of attacks carried out by company employees and hired thugs. 
Trams were blown up and passengers were injured. This climate of fear and violence 
also became part of the public consciousness as witnessed by the belief that the 'coolie 
class' may revolt. Moreover, the govemment contributed to this atmosphere of fear by 
suggesting that strikes by Thais were far more serious than strikes by workers of other 
nationahties for when a Thai strikes, it was claimed, people could be killed. Despodsm 
and fear, therefore, did not remain confined within the factory but soon spilled into the 
public domain. 
As Marx and subsequent scholars have recognised, one of the most important 
features of market despotism is its ability to constrain the development of working 
class struggles. It is not difficult to appreciate the various ways in which this regime of 
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production set limits on the ability of the tramwaymen to resist managerial domination. 
Within the SEC dependence on a wage entailed having to cope with the daily 
subordination to company rules. The 85 work regulations noted above closely 
governed routine work practices. The slightest breach of these rules resulted in the 
imposition of fines and possibly dismissal and resultant unemployment. Apart from 
these rules, each worker was forced to lodge the considerable sum of 50 baht with the 
company as a bond which, in the words of the vice-manager, was to 'ensure that the 
men carry out their work as strikes in the past have caused the company to suffer large 
losses' [NA R. 6 N 13/4]. According to company rules, workers could be dismissed 
for arguing with or disobeying a superior. If an employee had been fined more than 10 
baht over two consecutive months he became subject to immediate dismissal [YM 
15/1/1923]. Of course, this system was open to all sorts of abuses and from the 
evidence it appears that the foreman in particular was using company rules to get rid of 
troublesome workers while also supplementing his own wage by fining workers for 
the slightest misdemeanours [Kammakon 10/2/1923]. 
The aim of the preceding discussion has been to illustrate some of the social 
and work experiences encountered by the earliest Thai wage-labourers in general and 
the tramway workers in particular. It has been suggested that the tramwaymen, while 
considerably better off than many, nevertheless faced a daily struggle. An attempt has 
been made to explicate something of the character of their daily work experience, an 
experience marked by the despotic and arbitrary exercise of company rules, the fear of 
fines, arbitrary dismissal and at times outright physical assault [Poonpanich,1988:32]. 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the strike is that for the first time we have the 
data which permit some insight into the way in which the men themselves interpreted 
their experience and here the language which was used to register their protests is 
important . The men described their conditions as 'unjust oppression' 
[kotkhimaichoptham ], 'squeezing and exploitative' [ritkhaen ], 'having their blood 
sucked' [supluad ], and being 'disadvantaged' [siapriap ], with the company being 
described as 'monstrous' [nayak ], 'inhuman and vulgar' [sat maidai mi khwamrusuk 
yangtuamanut ], and those in charge of enforcing the rules held to be 'extremely cruel' 
[mi namcai hotrai ] and 'evil, uncompassionate and inhuman' [mi khwam phraprut 
chuarai meta cit tophiianmanut ]. 
As noted above Marx [1976:340,416] argues that under capitalism struggles 
over the working day inevitably present themselves as 'struggles over the limits of that 
day' and the first historically significant aspect of the 1923 strike is that for the 
tramwaymen a limit had been reached. They had arrived at the 'end of their tether' and 
they were determined to attempt to establish what they considered to be a new and 
more acceptable norm for their working day. Given the fact that previous authors have 
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tended to stress the apparent inability of Thai workers to break free from traditional 
cultural constraints and dominant ideologies it should be stressed that the men's 
struggle was not merely confined to economic matters alone for there was also a clear 
moral dimension to their protests. This is an aspect of the strike which demands 
further comment. 
In his work on the beginnings of collective action among industrial workers in 
Indonesia during the colonial period Ingelson [1986] has drawn on the work of 
Barrington Moore who has argued that: 
...when ordinary people's moral sense of justice is outraged 
by rulers, employers and others whose authority is normally 
accepted, then the legitimacy of that authority is called into 
question, which in turn can lead to collective disobedience or 
revolt. [Barrington Moore, cited in Ingelson, 1986:7]. 
These comments are particularly relevant for understanding the events of 1923. 
By rupturing their normal subordination to capital, by being prepared to risk further 
fines and unemployment and through the struggle to overcome divisions within their 
own ranks the men were not only concerned with securing a higher wage but were 
also protesting against their treatment as mere 'factors of production'. It might even be 
argued that the issue of more money was, in fact, secondary and that the most 
important thing for the men was to ensure that the company began to treat them with 
both justice and dignity. Throughout the strike the men continually attempted to assert 
their value as human beings, an assertion which was directed against the various ways 
the company sought to deny them their own humanity. The petty rules and regulations 
and their arbitrary enforcement by the foreman, were, in the eyes of the men, seen as 
dehumanising symbols through which their value as human beings was being 
denigrated. In the process of resisting their treatment the men were therefore 
challenging a set of relationships which outraged their own specific moral sense of 
justice and self respect. 
The 1923 strike was significant, therefore, not because the men's actions 
corresponded to an ideal-typical or proper form of struggle, but rather because it 
entailed a challenge to the domination of capital. Although this challenge ended in 
defeat, the result of the struggle should not detract from the significance of the attempt 
which was made to change the existing state of affairs. The significance of the strike 
should also been seen in the light of the system of control maintained by the SEC. An 
effort has been made to tease out the implicatons which this despotic form of control 
had with regard to structuring the daily work experience of the tramwaymen. Also 
some comments have been made with regard to the way in which this system served to 
shape the concrete form which the men's struggle actually took on this occasion. 
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Under conditions where control was maintained by fear rather than by consent we may 
appreciate the overall thrust of the men's actions in their attempt to secure some sort of 
voice in the organisation of work - that there be a greater clarification of the rules and 
regulations. The arbitrary imposition of these rules was perceived to provide a direct 
challenge to the men's own sense of justice and self respect.and it was in response to 
this challenge that the men launched their attempt establish a new norm for the working 
day. 
The discussion thus far has been restricted to an analysis of the events as they 
unfolded at the point of production. At this point it will be appropriate to widen the 
analysis and examine the impact which this strike was to have at the level of the state. 
3.3.3 The State and Struggles Over the Working Day 
In the last chapter it was demonstrated that, through its policy of encouraging Chinese 
immigration and through the steps taken toward dismantling the system of corvee , the 
absolutist state had played a leading role in ensuring that a class of 'free' workers 
actually became available within Thai society. By 1923, however, strikes and other 
forms of protest by wage-labourers employed in key sectors of the economy had come 
to pose a real threat to the economic and social stabilty of late sakdina society. As 
early as 1848, for example, riots involving Chinese workers erupted in Nakhon Chaisi 
and Sakhonsi and shortly after further riots ultimately led to the overthrow of the 
officially appointed governor of Chachoensao. Further episodes of rioting and 
violence among Chinese workers took place in 1869, 1883, 1885 and 1889 with a 
number of lesser conflicts also being reported [Skinner,1957:144]. The economic 
dislocation caused by these conflicts became the subject of considerable comment at 
the time. For example, the British Consul [cited in Skinner, 1957:117] stated that a 
strike by dock workers over a pay issue which had taken place in 1888 'lasted for 
several days...causing an entire cessation of business [with some steamers] obliged to 
leave the port for a want of hands to load the cargo'. As demand for labour continued 
to outstrip supply, workers were in a position to press for better pay and conditions. 
Strikes continued to erupt throughout the 1890's and in 1901 it was reported that 
Chinese labourers were in a position 'to impose their terms on employers' 
[Skinner,1957:117]. The most serious strike to have occurred prior to 1923 was the 
general strike of 1910. The strike broke out on 1 June and was reportedly the result of 
changes which had been made to the collection of the head-tax. In 1909 a royal decree 
had been issued which effectively ended the payment of a triennial tax and henceforth 
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all Chinese were to be taxed at the same rate as the rest of the population. While there 
is some doubt whether or not the central issue was in fact the head-tax, it is 
noteworthy that rickshaw pullers, dock workers, cargo and rice mill coolies, 
fisherman and construction workers all took the opportunity to strike [See BTWM 
31/5/1910, 1/6/1910, 4/6/1910, 5/6/1910, 10/6/1910]. Importantly the strike 
underlined the growing importance of wage-labour to the overall functioning of the 
economy. As one observer noted at the time: 
It must be remembered, however, that the strike might have 
lasted longer had the participants been sufficiendy organised, 
for the fact that the Chinese labourer is a commercial factor of 
the utmost importance in the trade of the port has just been 
brought home to the most unthinking [BTWM 6/6/1910]. 
The problems which these strikes posed for officials of the absolutist state were 
not unique. In all societies where capitalist relations are, or are becoming vital for the 
total process of production and reproduction, state officials will become increasingly 
obliged to guard against the economic dislocation and social instability caused by 
strikes. Thus, while officials of the absolutist state had played a major role in securing 
some of the general conditions for the rise of capitalist reladons of production they 
were, as the above discussion suggests, being faced with the problem of maintaining 
relations between wage-labour and capital. It is argued that the task of maintaining and 
defending the reladons of dominadon and exploitation which exist between wage-
labour and capital is achieved through the process of 'mediadon'. This concept refers 
to the myriad ways in which the state acts to ensure that the working class 'both 
submits to the established social order and contributes to its functioning' 
[Therborn, 1979:217]. One way in which the state is able to mediate the relations 
between capital and labour is through repression. 
Although scholars have been aware of the existence of state sponsored 
repression of Thai workers and their organisations, the socio-historical significance of 
repression has never been properly appreciated. To some extent, this failure may be 
due to the fact that, like Mabry and Srisermbhok [1985:625], the exercise of 
'totalitarian power' has been seen as largely 'alien to the benevolent and paternalistic 
rule' of the Thai ruling classes. This thesis will demonstrate that, rather than being an 
exception to the rule, violence and repression were consistently directed against 
industrial workers throughout the pre-1957 period. It will be argued that the historical 
significance of state repression lies in the way in which it was used to limit and 
constrain the forms which working class struggle could take during these years and 
thus ensure that these struggles did not threaten the process of capital accumulation. 
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By 1923, there had already occurred numerous examples of state repression of 
workers struggles. The 1848 riots, for example, had been ruthlessly crushed by the 
Thai military with thousands reported to have been killed [Terweil,1984:150; 
Battye,1974:23-24], Subsequent riots had also been repressed through military 
intervention. Another example of violent repression followed in the wake of the 1889 
rice mill riots. The British Consul reported that 900 workers had been sent to trial with 
punishments ranging from fines and whippings to imprisonment. Deeming such action 
to have been 'highly satisfactory' the Consul continued his report stating that: 
The action of the Siamese government on this occassion has 
certainly given the coolie class a lesson which they will not 
forget; but at the same time, one might expect that 
precautionary measures would have been taken against a 
recurrence of such outbreaks in the future [British Consul 
report cited in Skinner,1957:144]. 
Precautionary measures were not made and the state continued to deal with 
strikes as they arose. In 1892 troops were once again used to 'deal with labouring 
people who were not prepared to respect private property' [report cited in BTWM 
2/12/1936]. 
The first legal measures to control strikes and other forms of protest by 
workers were made with the promulgation of the 1898 Secret Society Act. Under the 
provisions of the Act all organisations had to register with the government and any 
meeting or gathering of five or more people was deemed to be illegal if the purpose of 
the meeting was 'thought to be a source of trouble to the .{Prarachabanyat 
Waduay Ang Yi R.S. 116 in Prakat Phraratchabanyat, ND:120]. With penalties 
ranging from one to five years imprisonment, the Act provided the state with a useful 
weapon which could be used to suppress any form of collective action among 
workers. Further constraints on freedom of association were taken when amendments 
were made to the Civil Code. Under section 232 of the code strikes and lockouts were 
declared to be illegal [Kammakon 17/2/1923]. Yet another way in which the state dealt 
with strikes, particularly among Chinese workers, was through deportadon. Those 
deported had a symbol tattooed on their left wrist, which along with their prison serial 
number prevented them from returning to the country. The leaders of the 1910 strike 
were dealt with in this way and throughout the period of absoludsm numerous Chinese 
'undesirables' were deported [BTWM 14/7/1919; 17/6/1919]. Additionally, the state 
had initiated measures to build up information on those who were considered to be 
potential sources of trouble. In 1907, a special branch within the Bangkok police 
began to fingerprint 'professional Chinese criminals'. The Bangkok police had also 
entered into an agreement with the police in the Straights Settlements to exchange 
57 
informat ion about Chinese who had been deported for 'criminal ' activity' 
[Skinner,1957:145], 
Against this background it is clear that, in coping with the economic dislocation 
caused by strikes, the absolutist state had relied principally on repression. However, 
as Munck [1988:128] has pointed out, while the state can act to repress all signs of 
labour unrest, in the long term, more 'subtle measures are called for'. In this context it 
is important to recognise the way in which of state mediation of the wage-
labour/capital relation may also be effected through 'displacement', that is, 'finding 
safe channels for, the welter of contradictions' amid which rule is exercised 
[Therborn, 1980:224]. One, among a number of displacements processes, is 'the 
provision of intra-systemic altematives'. As Therborn [1979:226] explains: 
Every state offers the ruled a system of institutionalised 
channels for the presentation of grievances. These may 
become blocked as a result of malfunctioning of the state, 
and they may be burst by a rising flood of discontent. 
Nevertheless to the extent to which they are in service, they 
involve petitioners in the existing structures; people who 
present claims, keeping to the established forms, times, and 
spheres of competence, thereby perpetuate the system of 
domination, against aspects of which they themselves are 
protesting. 
Apart from examining the ways in which both the pre-1932 and post-1932 Thai 
state managed to mediate the relationship between wage-labour and capital through 
repression, this study will also trace the various attempts made by state officials to 
displace industrial struggles into a more permanent system of instiuitionalised channels 
within which workers' grievances could be dealt. In adopting aspects of this task, this 
study will focus attention on examining the historical development of industrial and 
labour legislation. It will be argued that, while the development of industrial legislation 
was premised on a recognition of the legitimacy of workers' struggles, its principal 
effect was to displace these struggles, keeping them within acceptable bounds and 
ensure that they did not threaten the process of capital accumulation 
Throughout the course of the 1923 tramway strike the Minister of the Interior 
was continually urged to step in and settle the dispute. It is important to note that it was 
the tramwaymen themselves who first turned to the Minister for assistance. However, 
as the economic dislocations caused by the strike began to be felt, members of the 
public, journalists as well as SEC company officials all agreed that it was the 
responsibility of the Minister to resolve the matter. Crucially, the Yomarat argued that, 
in fact, the government had neither the power nor the responsibility to become directly 
involved in relations between employers and employees. In practice, however, the 
Ministers own actions contradicted this position. In general tenns, the steps which the 
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Minister did take were a reflection of the state's commitment to ensure the continued 
growth and expansion of capitalist relations of production. By allowing police to ride 
on the trams, by relaxing the rules which governed the licensing of drivers and 
through both the public and private support given to the company the effects of the 
Minister's actions promoted the interests of the company above those of the men. 
Nevertheless, publicly at least, the comments of the Minister can be taken as the first 
clear announcement on the government's position toward regulating relations within 
industry. Disputes between labour and capital, it was argued, lay outside govemment 
responsibility. It was up to the two parties involved to settle their own disputes. In 
becoming involved in the strike the Minister constantly repeated he was simply 
bestowing a favour on the workers and that his actions should not be seen as being 
part of his official responsibilities. 
The purpose of this section has been to comment on the way in which state 
officials were becoming obliged to maintain and defend the relations of exploitation 
and domination which existed between wage-labour and capital. By 1923, strikes by 
workers employed in key sectors of the economy had become the source of serious 
concern to the state. It has been shown that the state had relied largely on repression to 
restrict, control and constrain attempts by workers to struggle for better wages and 
conditions. The reliance on repression is reflected in the absence of any attempt to 
establish some sort of institutionalised framework through which conflicts between 
labour and capital could be mediated in a more formal and stable manner. The events 
of 1923 highlighted the entire issue of precisely what role the state should play in 
mediating relations between capital and labour. Reflecting the overall laissez-faire 
stance toward production, it was argued that state officials did not possess the right to 
enter into disputes betwen employers and employees and that such disputes were 
private not public matters and therefore outside the state's official responsibilty. The 
strike not only raised the issue of the role of the state in industrial relations. It also 
raised some issues of wider political significance. It is to a discussion of these issues 
to which I now turn. 
3.3.4 Wage-Labour and Politics 
In her discussion of the relationship between class struggle and politics. Wood 
[1988:183] has drawn attention to the way in which: 
...'merely economic' class struggles, even when their 
objectives are limited have a unique capacity to alter the 
political terrain and to unmask and confront the structure of 
capitalist power, the state, the law, the police, as no other 
social force can do. 
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Although, in the first instance, the 1923 strike was the product of a conflict 
between the tramwaymen and the SEC it also raised issues of wider political 
importance. In order to appreciate some of the wider political implications which 
emerged from the strike it will be appropriate to briefly comment on the political 
debates which were taking place during this period. 
Thailand presents a unique case within Southeast Asian history in that it was 
the only country which managed to avoid direct Eurpoean colonisation. While 
neighbouring traditional political systems were disintegrating under the weight of 
European imperialism, the Thai monarchy, although certainly constrained by external 
pressures, was able to embark on an ambitious program of internal reforms. Some of 
the most important reforms carried out during the last decades of the nineteenth century 
and early years of the twendeth century include: the reorganistion of traditional 
government structure into twelve functionally defined ministries; the restructuring of 
the government financial system; changes to the system of provincial administration 
through the replacement of semi-hereditary elites with officials appointed by Bangkok; 
the introduction of railways and other modern forms of communication; the abolition 
of the corvee ; the establishment of modern armed forces and the beginnings of a 
modern system of education.[Batson,1984:8-9]. Two points need to be made with 
regard to these changes. First, as Hewison [1989:54] notes these reforms, while not 
carried out at the 'behest of the emerging capitalist class...[were however]...all more 
or less important for the development of national capitalism'. Second, and in the 
present context most importantly, this process of reform had led to a massive 
centralisation of political power, with the monarchy, 'traditionally absolutist in formal 
c la ims . . . [becoming] . . . c lose r than ever to being absolut is t in pract ice 
[Anderson, 1985:15]. Nevertheless while leading to a massive increase in the political 
power of the monarchy the basis of legitimacy of absolutism was undergoing subtle 
but important changes. As Batson [1984:9] explains: 
...Chulalongkorn justified absolute monarchy not by 'divine 
rights' but by its suitability to the condidons of Siam and the 
benefits it conferred on the people. In the fifth reign there 
was little objection to these arguments, but they opened the 
door to counter arguments of a later generation that the 
absolute monarchy had become an anachronism no longer 
benefitting the country. 
The earliest proposals to alter the political structure of the country were made in 
1887 when a group of senior princes and officials submitted a petidon to the king 
canvassing the idea of establishing a constitudonal monarchy. The document: 
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...criticized the excessive centralisation of political authority, 
the lack of clear-cut ministerial responsibility, and the 
anachronism of absolute kingship. It argued that only a more 
broadly based political structure could successfully save 
Siam from being colonized by the imperialist West. An 
elected parliament was also proposed, although the 
petitioners felt that parliamentary democracy was not yet an 
immediate issue [Morell & Chai-anan, 1981:13]. 
Although Chulalongkorn rejected the proposals the debate over the political 
future of absolutism continued throughout his reign [See Kullada, 1984]. In fact, just 
prior to his death, Chulalongkom appeared to have also reached the conclusion that the 
time had arrived for the implementation of political reform when he stated that: 
I entrust onto my son Vajiravudh a gift for the people and 
that upon his accession to the throne he will give to them a 
parliament and constitution [cited in Brown,1983:32]. 
However, whatever hopes Chulalongkorn and others may have had for 
political reform were soon to be dashed with the accession of Wajirawut [r.l910-
1925] to the throne. A highly unpopular monarch who not only faced two coup 
attempts during the course of his reign, but who was also confronted with sustained 
criticism over his profligacy and cronyism, Wajirawut seems to have epitomised the 
danger inherent in an absolutist system of rule. In the context of the present discussion 
it is unnecessary to provide a detailed political history of Wajirawut's reign. It is 
appropriate to note briefly how, in the face of continuing political criticism, Wajirawut 
attempted to legitimise the continuation of his rule. 
Central to Wajirawut's attempt to legitimise his rule was his development of 
what Raymond Williams terms a 'selective tradition'.[see, Barme, 1989:26]. As Turton 
[1984:49] explains this is a concept which refers to the: 
...process and the product, of attempts by the agents of the 
'effective and dominant' culture' to select, co-opt, 
reinterpret, dilute, neglect, exclude, subordinate and prohibit, 
historical cultural elements from various regions, traditions 
and classes. Thus there is produced what comes to be 
regarded, and has to be accepted, as the national tradition, 
the significant past [emphasis in original]. 
Barme [1989:26] has recently pointed out that in Wajirawut's case, the 
development of a selective tradition basically 'involved a delineation of the nature of 
'Thai ' identity, together with an explication of the slogan Nation, Relegion, 
King'...'. While I will have more to say on the development of Wajirawut's official 
nationalist discourse [see section 3.2.7 below] it will be particularly important here to 
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briefly coment on the notion of 'duty' [nathi ] which is contained in the king's 
writings. 
In defining what it meant to be a member of the 'Thai' nation, Wachirawut 
placed great emphasis on the notion of duty. In a speech titled 'The Individual Duty of 
Every Person' he stated: 
Anyone born human has a duty to country and nation. One is 
never free from this duty. It lasts from the time one first 
becomes aware until death. Whether male or female, each has 
an individual duty to perform for the benefit of the nation 
[translated in Brown, 1983:77]. 
During the course of the speech Wajirawut went on to outline in considerable 
detail the nature of the duties which he expected each individual to perform [see, 
Brown,1983:71-80]. Barme [1989:29] provides a succinct outline of the king's views 
as follows: 
Vajiravudh emphasized that while he, as king, possessed 
great power and wealth he had a duty to use this for the 
benefit of all his subjects rather than for the purpose of 
indulging himself. He also stressed that all other Thais had 
specific duties, these being determined by their social 
position. Overall, Thai society was described as having two 
classes, the Phuyai and the Phunoi, literally the big people 
and the little people. The former group included royalty, 
noble officials and the leading figures from the business 
class, the latter group comprising the remainder of the 
population. While the duty of the Phuyai was to supervise 
and direct their underlings in a just and fair manner, the 
phunoi had the duty of complying with the demands of their 
superiors. In Vajiravudh's mind, those individuals who 
understoood their place and who carried out their duties were 
deemed to be good citizens... 
In the preceeding pages the aim has been to outline something of the nature of 
the political environment as it existed during the early decades of the twentieth century. 
It has been argued that while there had occurred a massive increase in the political 
power of the throne the basis of the legitimacy of the monarchy had been undergoing 
important changes. In the attempt to shore up his position Wajirawut had began to 
elaborate what has been termed a selective tradition. One aspect of the king's discourse 
has been examined: that of the views he expressed with regard to the duties which all 
'Thais' owed to the nation. Having discussed these matters we will now be in a 
position to appreciate the political ramificatons which flowed from the tramwaymen's 
struggle. 
As described, when they were unable to receive justice from the SEC, the 
tramwaymen approached the Minister of the Interior for assistance. In taking this 
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action the men were acting in accordance with what was then deemed to be an 
appropriate form of behaviour for dealing with a superior. As one contemporary 
observer noted: 
The men had felt proud that Thais are fully united. The 
phuyai shows consideration toward the phunoi ,whilst the 
phunoi is respectful of the phuyai .This is appropriate for 
prospering nations and shows that there is no disadvantage in 
being born a member of the Thai nation...[I]n truth the 
Yomarat has his hands already full. The workers should not 
have depended so entirely upon him. However, their plight 
has led them to momentarily forget their status...but they 
could no longer restrain themselves [SR, 16/1/1923]. 
In acting the way they did the men were simply following the procedures 
which the system of absolutism made available to them. The key issue for the men was 
whether or not the Minister would, in fact, be able ensure the success of their actions. 
Initially, the situation appeared to be hopeful. Once he had been approached the 
Minister made it clear that he would in fact take up the men's case, declaring that he 
would help them to 'the best of his ability'. Yet as the strike wore on it became 
increasingly clear the Minister's actions were not in the men's best interest. By 
allowing police to ride on the trams, through the relaxation of the law which governed 
the licencing of drivers and his general lack of taking any effective action against the 
company, the overall impact of the Ministers actions were directed at the attempt to 
ensure that the SEC was in a position to resume its tram services. In taking these 
actions the Minister clearly put the interests of the company ahead of those of the 
tramwaymen. 
Prior to the 1923 strike the opinions which workers may have held with regard 
to Thailand's political future remain obscure. Yet during the course of the strike it is 
possible to discern evidence of the development of a political consciousness among the 
tramwaymen. By approaching the Minister the men were in effect putting the ideology 
of absolutism to the test. During the course of the strike, however, a contradiction 
arose between the Minister's statement that he would, in accordance with traditional 
practice, provide assistance to the men and the steps which he actually took, actions 
which were clearly inimical to the men's interests. This contradicdon between the 
theory and practice of absolutism was not lost on either the men or their spokesmen. 
The Kammakon launched a scathing attack on the actions of the Minister, accusing 
him of simply 'abandoning the striking workers', of ignoring the plight of the poor 
and of generally putting the interests of the SEC and those who held shares in the 
company ahead of the men. While the attack was lodged in highly personal terms it 
was not only the ability of an individual which was being brought into quesnon. The 
entire system of government which the individual represented was also being 
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questioned. At this point we will leave this discussion of the wider political 
ramifications of the strike and turn to a consideration of another aspect of the struggle: 
that of the call for organisation among workers. 
3.3 J Organised Labour 
If there is one point upon which previous writers have agreed it is the date of the 
establishment of the first legally recognised labour organisation in Thailand. Indeed the 
year 1897, when it is claimed that a group of tramway workers registered their 
association in accordance with the law, has formed the starting point for all subsequent 
analyses of the development of a labour movement in Thailand [Mabry, 1979:38; 
Chaiana, 1982:79; Thanet, 1982:20; Morel and Chai-anan, 1981:182; Sangsit, 1986:59; 
Damri and Carun,1986:25 and Zeponsekul,1987:39]. Apart from being inaccurate this 
view also clouds the fact that it was to take a further 35 years of struggle after 1897 
before workers were able to win the legal right to establish their own organisation.^ 
One of the significant aspects of the 1923 strike is that it affords us an insight into a 
very important moment in the history of this fight by workers to establish their own 
organisation. 
In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels [1986:42-43] outlined some of 
the main stages in the process of working class formation: 
The proletariat goes through various stages of development. 
With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first 
the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by 
workpeople of a factory, then by operatives of one trade, in 
one locality...But with the development of industry the 
proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes 
concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows...the 
workers begin to form combinations. 
^ Bizarre as it may seem, the confusion which surrounds the establishment of the first legally 
recognised labour organisation stems from from a simple misreading of Virginia Thompson's 
1947 study. In this study [p.239], Thompson stales correctly that the first legal labour 
association was established in 1932. She notes, however, that the history of the Tramway 
Association dates back to 1897 and here she is obviously referring to the report carried in the 
Bangkok Times Weekly Mail 125/12/1933] which I cited on page 4 0 above. It is clear, 
however , that while the tramwaymen may have attempted to establish some form of 
organisation at this time this organisation must have been short lived. On the basis of the 
evidence provided by the 1923 su-ike it is clear that there was no formal organisation among 
employees within the SEC. Indeed, one of the main problems which workers faced during the 
su-ike, lay in precisely building up an organised and united front against the company. In 
addition, it should be noted that a check of the relevent archival documents shows clearly that 
no labour organisation had attempted to register in accordance with the law in 1897 [See, NA 
R. 5 N. 20/28]. The confusion which surrounds this entire issue is symptomatic of the scant 
attention which writers have generally paid to the empirical evidence in uacing the development 
of the labour movement in Thailand. 
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As described, isolated struggles by wage-labourers in Thailand date back to the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. The extent to which workers began to establish 
some more or less stable form of organisation at individual workplaces and/or across 
certain trades is difficut to discern at the present stage of research. However, from the 
evidence, it is clear that some attempt to build up an organisation was made by 
tramway workers as early as 1896-7. The system of control which was exercised 
within the SEC placed enormous constraints on the ability of workers to organise and 
certainly at the time of the strike there was no organisation within the SEC [see fn. 4 
below]. In sum, while strikes and other form of protest were taking place there was no 
organisation which might have acted as a co-ordinating point for workers in their 
struggles against their employers. It is in this context that the emergence of the Labour 
Group is of great historical significance. 
While I will have more to say on the importance of the Labour Group in section 
3.3.6 below, it will be appropriate to point out that, as far as we know, the emergence 
of this group represented the first attempt to organise workers along class lines. As 
noted the Labour Group placed great stress on urging workers to come together and 
act in a united fashion, 'we workers must help each other to recapture our freedom so 
that it remains stable and fixed. Our freedom rests on unity...'. For Thawat and his 
fellow organisers the lack of organised and united action was perceived to be the major 
barrier which workers had to overcome if they were to realise their aims. However, as 
Isaacs [1987:136] has indicated, organisations among workers only emerge if 
'workers can develop a sense of collective identity and solidarity'. This point 
immediately brings into question the entire issue of ideology and it is to a discussion of 
the ideological aspects of the tramway strike and the emergence of the Labour Group 
to which I now turn. 
3.3.6 Ideology 
For many scholars it has been the persistence of traditional modes of behaviour and 
forms of thought which impeded the emergence of a proper industrial working class in 
Thailand prior to 1957. For those influenced by modernisation theory, it is the 
traditional behavioural characteristics of deference to a superior and a cultural 
reluctance to become involved in the affairs of others which prevented workers from 
forming themselves into a class. Radical authors, on the other hand, have claimed it 
was the dominance of ideology, a complete subjection of the workers to the ideas of 
the Thai ruling classes that inhibited them from attaining the level of a fully conscious 
proletariat. The claim that workers in Thailand had an innate cultural reluctance to fomi 
themselves along class lines is impossible to sustain on empirical grounds. From the 
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data presented in this chapter it is clear that, even as early as 1923, the tramwaymen 
and many other workers were already engaged in the process of develoing new forms 
of behaviour designed to meet the daily challenges which confonted them. In the 
discussion which follows it will be shown that, along with these new practices, new 
beliefs were also emerging which provided a radical challenge to ideas which were 
dominant at the time. 
Hall [1988:44] provides a succinct statement of the way in which certain ideas 
may be thought to achieve 'dominance': 
Ruling or dominant conceptions of the world do not directly 
prescribe the mental content of the illusions that supposedly 
fill the heads of the dominated classes. But the circle of 
dominant ideas does accumulate the symbolic power to map 
or classify the world for others; its classifications do acquire 
not only the constraining power of dominance over other 
modes of thought but also the inertial authority of habit and 
instinct. It becomes the horizon of the taken-for-granted; 
what the world is and how it works, for all practical 
purposes. Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of 
the social world by setting the limit to what will appear 
rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable, 
within the given vocabularies of motive and action available 
to us. Their dominance lies precisely in the power they have 
to contain within their limits, to frame within their 
cu-cumference of thought, the reasoning and calculation of 
other social groups. 
As noted above the 'circle of dominant ideas' were undergoing significant 
transformations during the period under discussion. It has been shown that as part of 
the attempt to legitimise and justify the continuation of his rule, Wajirawut had taken 
important steps toward the development of a 'selective tradition', a project which 
precisely aimed to establish, or perhaps more correctly, re-establish a dominant 
conception of the Thai social world. At the core of this attempt was the king's 
elaboration of a discourse on the nation. It will be appropriate to discuss further certain 
aspects of Wajirawut's 'official nationalism'. 
In a recent study Barme [1989:12-15] has demonstrated that the idea of nation 
[chat ] which he defines as a 'singular political entity with which the populace at large 
identified' had developed within educated circles by the end of the reign of 
Chulalongkorn. Closely linked with the development of the idea of 'nation' were the 
notions of 'civilisation' [khwam sivilai ] and 'progress' [khwam charoen ]. Initially, 
the idea of 'civilisation' carried with it notions of both 'an achieved state versus 
barbarism and a continuing process of development'. Later, it was particularly the 
latter notion combined with the linear concept of 'progress' which came to form the 
'basis of a reformist ideological discourse which was strongly identified with the 
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monarchy' [Barme,1989:17]. By the time that Wajirawut came to the throne the basis 
of legitimacy of absolute rule was threatened and it was through a reformulation of 
these ideas of 'nation', 'progress' and 'civilisation' that the king was to argue for the 
continuation of absolutist rule. As Barme [1989:30] observes: 
...the discourse of Nation, Religion and King developed by 
Wajirawut was a well-conceived rejoinder to such critics. 
The interrelationship he drew between these three elements 
was based on a simple form of logical argument with the 
emphasis, naturally enough on the centrality and necessity of 
the monarchy. On the one hand the king was identified as the 
embodiment of the nation (as the people's 'representative'), 
and also as 'chief warrior' whose task it was to defend 
'Thainess' or independence, and Buddhism, the moral basis 
of the nation. 
While Wajirawut had managed to forge a combination of ideas on nation, 
progress and civihsation into 'an overarching discourse which became the conceptual 
basis of Thai socio-political reality' he was unable to totally control this discourse as 
'different social groups struggled to control, define, redefine, this discourse in order to 
assert their own particular political/economic interests' [Barme,1989:12]. This 
situation should not be seen as surprising for as Hall [1988:58] stresses: 
...ideological contestation does not take place between fully 
formed, competing world views-theirs and ours. The field of 
ideology is not divided in this way. Its a field in which there 
are many different discourses and social forces in play at the 
same time. Contestation often has to do with the engagement 
around existing ideological symbols and slogans, winning 
them away from the connotative chains of association they 
have acquired, which build them into languages that seem to 
construct topics so that they deliver an answer that favors one 
end of the political spectrum. The language of nationhood, 
for example, is not a language we speak but a language 
which speaks us...People's social identity is going to depend 
on the way they negotiate themselves in relation to the nation. 
Consequently, I think the ideological struggle takes place 
precisely over what the nation means. What are the values 
associated with it and what are the excluded values? And 
what is the way in which those powerful symbols can be 
detached from their entanglement with one set of historical 
associations and rearticulated in a different direction? Now 
this is not only a question about what is happening in the 
field of discourse but also about the way in which social 
groups, social movements or social classes come to locate 
themselves inside one or other ideological configurations-
how they come to see themselves as authored, addressed, 
hailed by those statements. 
Having made these comments we will now be in a position to appreciate the 
historical significance of the views which were expressed by Thawat Rittidet in 
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Kammakon. As noted above, one of the essential ingredients for the emergence of 
working class organisations is that workers develop a sense of collective identity and 
solidarity and it is this aim to which Thawat was to direct his efforts. 
As Therborn [1980:116] observes, any form of ideological mobilisation 
involves the following three stages, first, 'setting a common agenda for a mass of 
people...that is to say, summing up the dominant aspects of a crisis', second, 
'identifying the crucial target, the essence of evil' and third 'defining what is possible 
and how it is to be achieved'. From the available evidence it is possible to trace both 
the way in which Thawat was attempting to mobilise workers along ideological lines 
and how this process carried with it implict criticism and reformulation of Wajirawut's 
official nationalist discourse. 
In the first place it should be recognised that at the time of the 1923 strike 
industrial workers did not have a voice within social discourse. As we have seen when 
responding to the League of Nations request to initiate measures to protect labour, the 
Thai government had argued that workers in Thailand enjoyed a satisfactory standard 
of living, their wants were secured with a minimum of labour and that 'they have not 
yet raised any demands for a material change in their working conditions'. Such 
assertions are contradicted not only by the events of the strike itself but also by the 
numerous other examples of protests by workers which had occurred prior to 1923. 
Nevertheless, despite these struggles workers did not yet possess a 'public' voice. It is 
in this context, of struggling to have their voices recognised, that we may appreciate 
the profundity of Thawat's comments that 'we raise our voices, we speak up like 
workers f rom other countries but we are ridiculed by the reply 'you are only an 
employee, you don't need to have a voice'. In essence, the first problem Thawat faced 
was to argue that workers be allowed to air their grievances publicly. Having argued 
for this right, Thawat then moved on to delineate those particular people who were to 
form the subject of his discourse. Thawat emphasised that his views were directed 
toward the newly emerging class of wage-workers--'We are members of the labouring 
class we must look to our own group rather than to others' .After identifying the 
subjects of his discourse Thawat then outlined the 'essence of evil' which confonted 
workers, that is their shared conditions of slavery. Finally, Thawat identifies both the 
goal to which all workers must strive, that is, the aim to 'destroy slavery among 
workers and replace it with freedom' and the way in which this goal is to be achieved; 
through united and collective action 'we workers must help each other to recapture our 
f reedom so that it remains stable and fixed. Our freedom rests on unity...'. In 
developing the above views Thawat was encouraging industrial workers to develop a 
sense of collective identity, to recognise that they faced similar challenges and 
problems in their daily lifes and that they must act collectively and unitedly to 
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overcome these challenges. It is important to also note how these ideological appeals 
also entailed a reformulaton of dominant discourse. 
As Barme [1989:31] has noted, through the efforts of Wajirawut it was official 
or state nationalism which became established as the 'dominant form' in Thailand 
rather than the 'more popular type of mass nationalism that was developing in the 
neighbouring colonial states. Barme stresses, however, that in promoting nationalism, 
'it was a discourse that he [Wachirawut] could neither monoplise or totally control'. 
This is an observation which is clearly borne out by the alternate conception of 
nationalism contained in Thawat's discourse. For example, I have already noted that 
the terms civilisation and progress had becomes key elements within dominant 
ideologcal discourse. In Thawat's thought, however, these terms were subject to a 
process of redifinition. By claiming that the actions of the tramwaymen were 
appropriate for the times, Thawat argued that this was because 'our country has set 
itself on the path toward civilisation'. Here the meaning of the term civilisation is not 
restricted to refer to economic development as it was in dominant discourse but is 
being reformulated to encompass developments in the sphere of politics. For Thawat, 
civilised countries are defined as those states where people possess the right of 
freedom of association. From this point he then attempts to argue that as 'Siam has 
now entered a civilised era...it is appropriate that we be allowed to have a labour 
leader'. Here then, we find that Thawat is cleverly manipulating some of the key terms 
of dominant ideological discourse and bending these to promote the interests of 
workers. Another example of the way in which Thawat attempted to change existing 
ideological slogans and symbols and win these away from their 'acquired connotative 
chains of association', lies in his use of the concept of 'freedom'. For Thawat workers 
exist in a state of slavery and it is only through collective action that workers will be 
able to attain their freedom. Here the notion of freedom [khwampenthai ] is being 
given a new meaning. In official discourse, the idea of 'Thai' to mean free was being 
used as a key component in marking out that which distinguishes members of the Thai 
nation from the people of neighbouring nations who lived under the yoke of colonial 
rule. For Thawat, however, 'freedom' is not something which has already been 
achieved but remains a goal to be realised--'we workers must help each other to 
recapture our freedom so that it remains stable and fixed'. In short, while Thawat may 
have used terms and concepts drawn from the 'official nationalism' of Wajirawut, it 
would be incorrect to suggest that he was simply dominated by these ideas. Rather, 
through his attempt to instill a sense of class belonging among workers, he was 
developing an alternative and highly radical discourse in which dominant conceptions 
of the Thai social world were being reformulated. 
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In her assessment of the role played by Thawat and the Labour Group, 
Poonpanich [1988:53] has argued that they were unable to 'produce a comprehensive 
ideology with the explicit and long-term aims of advancing workers' interests'. Such a 
view must, however, be rejected for two reasons. First, such an assessment is based 
on an implicit comparison with an idealist historical projection of what a 'true' 
working class ideology should be, and second, it fails to appreciate the extent to which 
Thawat's discourse actually served to transform and rearrange existing ideological 
elements and how, in reworking dominant discourse, Thawat was forging the 
beginnings of a specific working class discourse. In other words, Thawat's discourse 
was not worked out as a coherent philosophy but rather was formulated as a response 
to the challenges which both the tramwaymen and other workers faced in daily 
struggle to survive [Cf. Metcalfe, 1988:135]. It is, however, important to appreciate 
the limitations of Thawat's ideas and it is this issue to which I now turn. 
In responding to the challenges faced by workers, Thawat adopted what could 
broadly be described as a labourist position, that is, 'an attitude which in theory 
(always) and in practice (mostly) emphasized the fundamental unity of capital and 
labour' [Saville,1988:14]. In developing his views Thawat was not advocating the 
overthrow of the wage-labour/capital relation but was rather arguing for the more 
equitable treatment of workers within this relation. Thus, he argued: 
We should follow the correct method, that is, when we are 
dissatisfied with the regulations or oppression of employers, 
we should all stop work. Having ceased working, we should 
all vote one of our members, who we think capable of 
discussing the issue with the employer, to be our leader. We 
should work out an agreement with the employer to the 
satisfaction of all concerned. When the employer has agreed 
and we think that the proposal is acceptable...our leader 
should make the contract by which we accept to work. The 
contract should be made so that both sides have a solid and 
stable base [Kammakon,27/1/1923]. 
Clearly then, Thawat is here working out a posidon that is unintentionally 
reinforcing the power of capital, for its emphasis lies on reforming conditons within 
exisdng relations rather than the transformation of these relations. For Thawat, the 
wage-labour/capital relation is simply accepted as a 'fact' of life' and the struggle 
which he advocates is premised on the belief that workers will be able to attain their 
freedom and dignity within capitalist reladons. While it can be argued that the adoption 
of these views placed limits on the potential successful realisation of workers's 
interests, it will be demonstrated that they did, however, contribute to the development 
of a powerful tradition within the Thai labour movement which has led to an 
improvement in the lives of industrial workers. 
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3.4 Summary 
In opposition to those who have ignored the role of human agency and tended 
to perceive classes as emerging on the historical stage already fully formed, E.P. 
Thompson [1978:147] has drawn attention to the fact that: 
. . .people f ind themselves in a society structured in 
determined ways.. . they experience exploitation.. . they 
identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to 
struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling 
they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this 
discovery as c lass-consciousness . Class and class 
consciousness are always the last, not the first stage of the 
historical process. 
Although largely ignored by previous scholars, the aim of this chapter has been 
to demonstrate that the 1923 tramwaymen's strike was, nevertheless, a highly 
significant historical event in that it represented one important moment within which 
one group of Thai workers were involved in this process of 'discovering themselves' 
as a class. It has been shown that dependence on wage was associated with conditions 
within which both the tramwaymen and other industrial workers faced a daily struggle 
to reproduce both themselves and their families. It has also be demonstrated that wage-
dependence entailed a confontation with a new set of work relations and, in the case of 
the tramwaymen, a despotic system of control where there existed a constant fear of 
being fined and dismissed through the arbitrary decision of a superior. We have also 
seen how the tramwaymen 'experienced' these conditions as 'unjust exploitation', 
being 'disadvantaged' and having their 'blood sucked', an experience in which their 
own specific sense of self-esteem and dignity was perceived to be under threat. It was, 
therefore, in response to this experience of exploitation and challenge to their moral 
worth that the men began to struggle, and it was during the course of this struggle that 
they were beginning to overcome divisions within their own ranks and forge a sense 
of unity of purpose and collective identity. Significantly, however, the men's struggle 
did not remain confined to the arena of production alone, it also served to condition 
wider economic, political and social debates. This is a point which was, in fact, 
recognised by a contemporary observer who wrote: 
Strikes by Thais are not new, they are not the product of 
'civilisation' or the 'new times' as some believe. However, 
previous strikes were limited to a particular place and only a 
few were involved and therefore no-one took much 
interest...If the strikes are small nobody goves them a second 
thought...But the strike by the tramwaymen is much more 
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ser ious than prev ious s tr ikes [Khrung thep Dai ly 
Mail,20/1/1923]. 
In considering the wider impact of the strike, some emphasis has been given to 
demonstrating that this struggle was but one example of a growing number of similar 
events which were presenting state officials with considerable problems. It has been 
argued that, the economic dislocations caused by strikes had resulted in pressure being 
exerted on state officials to institute measures to guard against these outbreaks of 
labour unrest. It has been shown that the state had responded to these pressures largely 
through the use of force. Nevertheless, it is suggested that by appealing to the Yomarat 
for assistance, the tramwaymen raised the question of precisely what role the state 
should play in regulating and managing relations within industry. The Yomarat, 
however, not only rejected the idea that the state should direcdy intervene in relations 
between labour and capital he also, as did the king, failed even to recognise the 
legitimacy of the men's claims, arguing that they were acting 'irresponsibly' and 
'irrationally'. 
Apart from highlighting the question of what role the state should play in 
regulating relations within industry, the strike also raised questions of fundamental 
political importance. It has been argued that, in seeking assistance from the Minister, 
the tramwaymen were implicity putting the system of absolutist rule to the test. The 
failure of the Minister to settle the matter in the men's favour and his seeming 
indifference to their plight, must have created some doubt in the minds of the men as to 
whether both the Minister, and the system of government which he represented, 
would, in fact, help them in their struggle for justice and dignity. The wider political 
implications of the strike must also be considered in light of the emergence of the 
Labour Group. As far as we know, the emergence of this group represents the first 
example in Thai history of an attempt to organise workers specifically along class 
lines. Some effort has been given to showing how, in his attempt to promote and 
foster a sense of collective identity and unity among workers, Thawat was developing 
a discourse which presented a radical challenge to some of the dominant ideas which 
were being officially promoted at the time. 
Finally, some mention should be made of how this long and violent struggle 
brought the problem of labour into public view. The fact the men worked in an 
important area of the economy meant that the strike and the consequent breakdown of 
tram services had an immediate and widespread public impact and the extensive press 
coverage given to the strike is a reflection of this.'' Many questions were raised and 
Even fifty years later, the popular author Yulisthian [1971:64-68] was still able to remember 
the excitement, interest and great controversy which the su-ike generated among the population 
in Bangkok. Equally significantly, in the draft of his controversial Economic, Plan Pridi 
Phanomyong, used the tramway strike as an example of the type of industrial of industrial 
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debated: why were there struggles between employers and employess? what were the 
causes of these disputes? who were this new class of workers? what role did they have 
in society? what responsibility did employers have toward their employees? what role 
should government officials play in settling these conflicts? what did the existence of 
these struggles bode for the future development of Thai society? These and many other 
questions were raised during the course of the strike. In subsequent chapters it will be 
demonstrated that, as the process of class formation developed further, these questions 
continued to become a more permanent part of public debate. 
confl ict and social discord which he claimed would be inevitable if the private ownership of 
manufacturing plants was a l lowed to cont inue in Thailand.[Pridi's plan, cited in 
Landon, 1968:284], 
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Chapter Four 
CLASS FORMATION: 
1923-1944 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the 1923 tramway strike was a highly 
significant historical event. In terms of scholarship, the strike is particularly important 
because for the first time contemporary archival and newspaper reports provide a firm 
empirical starting point from which it is possible to begin to provide an informed 
discussion of the process of working class formation as it was to develop in the Thai 
context. The purpose of the remaining chapters of this study is, however, to move 
away from a micro and synchronic examination of the process of class formation, and 
adopt a more macro and diachronic view. More specifically the principal aim is to trace 
the further development and growth of an organised labour movement and examine the 
role played by the state in shaping and constraining this development. In this chapter 
the focus is on the period 1923-1944. To facilitate the discussion this period is divided 
into three sub-periods; 1923-1932, 1932-1934 and 1934-1944. 
Period One 1923-1932 
4.1.1 The Thai Labour Movement 1923-1932 
Struggles over the establishment of a norm for the working day continued to erupt 
throughout the remaining years of absolutism. Those involved in such actions 
included; pawnshop clerks [1923], construction workers [1925], hotel workers 
[1926], labourers employed in the Bangkok waterworks [1926], port workers [1928], 
tramway workers [1928], women workers employed at the military arsenal [1929], 
weavers [1929], match factory workers [1929] and railway employees [1930].i While 
very litde is known about the immediate background to these disputes it is clear that the 
existence of these struggles convinced Thawat and his fellow organisers that the 
changing nature of Thai society required greater attention be given to improving the 
conditions of wage-labourers and it was toward the realisation of this goal that the 
Labour Group was to direct its efforts. 
1 See BTWM 12/3/1923, 26/3/1923, 23/7/1928. 6/5/1929/ 20/5/1929, 25/11/1929 and 
9/6/1930. See also, BT 15/7/1925,12/7/1926, 14/7/1926 and 9/12/1926. 
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The contributions which the Labour Group made toward promoting and 
advancing the interests of industrial workers during the last years of the absolute 
monarchy have been ignored by the majority of past writers. Indeed, the works which 
are usually cited as the main source of reference for the period make no mention of the 
existence of the Group [Thompson, 1947, Mabry,1979]. In recent years, however, 
two Thai scholars have begun the process of recovering the history of the activities of 
the Labour Group and it is appropriate to discuss some aspects of this recent work. 
In her short study, Kanchada Poonpanich [1988] has argued that the Labour 
Group provided the 'basic nutrients' for the development of the Thai labour 
movement. She argues that its contribution was threefold; first to draw public attention 
to the plight of workers, second, providing basic 'welfare services' and third, 
emphasising the need for organisation and solidarity. Each of these three contributions 
will be discussed. 
As indicated in the last chapter, one of the basic problems faced by industrial 
workers was that, despite the many attempts to redress their grievances, they were 
accorded little if any right to speak within public discourse. This denial of the right to 
be heard represented a major barrier for Thawat and his group and throughout the 
remaining years of absolutism they continually argued that industrial workers indeed 
possessed a basic right to speak and have their problems debated and discussed 
publicly. The Labour Group attempted to win public acceptance for the voice of labour 
in two ways. In the first place they argued that the problems which confronted 
workers also involved issues which were of fundamental public concern. For 
example, in February 1923 Thawat wrote: 
...some people ask why a newspaper called Labour does not 
concern itself only with labour issues but also speaks about 
wider social and political matters such as laws and 
regulations. It is claimed that such topics are not at all 
appropriate for labourers [Kammakon, 17/2/1923]. 
Thawat went on to justify the linking of labour issues with wider social issues 
by declaring that the problems which workers faced, such as their search for justice 
and equality in the workplace, were necessarily of interest to the general public for 
workers, he argued, were not the only ones who experienced unjust and inequitable 
treatment. The misuse of power, Thawat argued, threatened all those things which 
Thai respected most, namely their Nation Religion and King. To discuss and debate 
these issues was therefore essential not only for improving the conditions of workers 
but was fundamental for the future progress of the country. Additionally, it was 
argued that the discussion of various laws and regulations was necessary because one 
of the main disadvantages which workers faced in their relations with employers was 
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their ignorance of their rights and obligations under the law. Once again it was argued 
that this was an issue which not only concerned workers but was one which all the 
people [phonlamuang ] should be aware. In drawing attention to these matters Thawat 
emphasised then that the aim of the Labour Group was 'not only to benefit workers 
but also to be of use to all the people' [Kammakon, 17/2/1923]. In sum, one of the 
principal ways in which Thawat attempted to achieve recognition for the voice of 
labour was to argue that the various problems which workers faced were, to some 
extent at least, problems which were shared by all the people. 
Apart from attempting to link the interests of labour with wider public.interests, 
perhaps the most important way in which Thawat attempted to secure a voice for 
labour was through documenting the various hardships which confonted workers. In 
the pages of Kammakon and later the Pakka Thai [The Thai Pen] there were continual 
reports and articles on the problems faced by workers.^ Workers were encouraged to 
write to the papers and provide details of their opinions and grievances. In some cases 
this public airing of grievances secured government attention and intervention in 
disputes. For example, in the case of a dispute involving pawnshop employees who 
were protesting against the requirement that they work a seven day week, coverage of 
the conflict in Kammakon attracted the attention of the Police Commissioner who was 
apparently successful in ensuring that the workers be given one day off a week 
{Kammakon ,17/2/1923]. 
The second major contribition made by the Labour group was its provision of 
some basic welfare services for workers. In 1926 Thawat established an organisation 
called 'Place for the Masses' [Sathan Tuai Rat ]. Financed largely by Thawat, the 
stated aim of this organisation was to 'eliminate trouble and distress as well as care for 
the basic happiness of the people' [Poonpanich, 1988:44]. Offering its members death, 
unemployment and sickness benefits and free legal advice, the Place for the Masses 
was reported to have been 'very popular' among wage-labourers and the urban poor. 
According to members of Thawat's family, workers would visit the organisation on a 
daily basis in order to discuss their problems [Poonpanich, 1988:44-45]. Although the 
number of members is unknown, there is little doubt that the provision of concrete 
assistance to workers would have proved important both in developing organisational 
and administrative skills and demonstrating the practical advantages of collective action 
The Kammakon Newspaper was first published on 23 January 1923. Despite attempted 
interference [see, for example comments in the edition 28/4/1923 in which it was stated that 
the previous edition had not appeared due to the 'misuse of dark power'] the paper remained in 
publication until 21/6/1924 at which time the Chaiyapoom Press which published the paper 
was closed and faced libel charges [BTWM 9/6/1924. The Kammakon was briefly re-opened on 
the 26/6/1926 and its final issue was published on 17/7/1926. Thawat and his fellow 
organisers subsequently established the Paka Thai [The Thai Pen] which remained in 
publication for three years [Sangsit,1986:129. 
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and unity. This latter point leads on to a discussion of the third important contribution 
made by the Labour Group, that of actively encouraging a sense of collective identity 
and solidarity among workers. 
As shown in the last chapter the Labour Group sought to actively encourage 
and promote a sense of class belonging among workers. All workers, it was argued, 
shared a common situation and it was suggested that if they were to free themselves 
from exploitation and oppression it was imperative that they work toward overcoming 
their inclination to act individually and develop a sense of collective identity and 
solidarity. In 1924 Thawat published an article in Kammakon in which he stated; 
Currently all of us are still of high individuality. We still love 
to pursue life separately from each other. This does not 
match the basic principle of civilisation. So long as we, all 
Siamese workers, individually think of ourselves, don't even 
expect to escape from the immorality which the wicked 
employers use in oppressing us. Don't you ever think of the 
saying 'In union is there strength?' The union can generate 
our power which others will have to respect and fear. 
Nobody can dare treat us as a stupid laboring buffalo 
a n y m o r e [Kammakon 2 2 / 3 / 1 9 2 4 c i ted in 
Poonpanich,1988:47-48]. 
In the same article Thawat not only emphasised the need for a union but also 
sketched out a basic strategy through which workers could help each other to form 
such an organisation: 
...we labourers and workers should come and join together 
to build up a union according to different vocations such as 
tramway workers, motorcar workers, horse-cart workers, 
loading coolies. After that we should elect a person who is 
intelligent enough to be our leader. By this way, in times of 
crisis, we could help each other far better than before...to 
have a leader would bring us a lot of advantages. For 
example, we can make good contact with our fellow workers 
in a more convenient way. Furthermore, when there is a 
dispute between us and the employers, our leader can be our 
representative in negotiating with the employer [Kammakon 
22/3/1924 cited in Poonpanich,1988:48]. 
While Poonpanich has pointed to the contributions which the Labour Group 
made with respect to developing a sense of class among workers, providing basic 
welfare services and ensuring that the problem of labour received public attention, 
Sangsit [1986] has focused his attention on teasing out the wider political implications 
contained in the work of the Labour Group. Before discussing these contributions it is 
appropriate to comment briefly on the political debates which were taking place in 
Thailand during the latter half of the 1920's. 
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By the end of Wachirawut's reign, the reputation and prestige of the monarchy 
had been severely damaged. In 1925 Prince Damrong stated that King Prajadhipok 
[r. 1925-1932] received a 'deplorable inheritance...because the authority of the 
soverign had fallen much in respect and confidence, the treasury was on the verge of 
bankruptcy and the government was corrupted and the services more or less in 
confusion' [cited in Batson,1974:38]. King Prajadhipok was not unware of the 
situation and shortly after coming to power he noted that '...movements of opinion in 
this country give a sure sign that the days of Autocratic rule are numbered' 
[Batson, 1984:130]. In the attempt to alleviate a worsening economic situation the new 
administration initiated budget cuts and reduced the number of pubic employees by ten 
percent. These moves appeared to be effective and by 1926 the government accounts 
were no longer showing a deficit [Barme,1989:56]. Apart from these economic 
measures, Prajadiphok also took some halting steps toward political reform by 
establishing first a Supreme Council of State and later a Committee of the Privy 
Council [Batson, 1984:130-140. This gradualist approach to the implementation of 
political change, however, 'proved to be illusory as there was no tangible indications 
that Prajadiphok would relinquish his supra-legal status and grant his subjects a 
constitution' [Barme,1989:56]. It is under these conditions of a political system which 
was becoming 'an increasingly isolated and anachronistic relic of the past' 
[Batson, 1984:129], that the political implications of the work carried out by the 
Labour Group must be located. 
Sangsit [1986] has argued that the writings and activities of the Labour Group 
contributed to the critique of absolutism in three basic ways; first by challenging 
received notions of power and individual worth, second, by crticising the economic 
policies of absolutism and finally, questioning some of its basic ideological tenets. 
In his writings Thawat was highly critical of those officials who continued to 
exercise their authority on the basis of traditional notions of power. In a long article 
titled 'Power of the Lords' he argued that in former times the power of the royal family 
was underpinned by ideas pertaining to the supemamral rather than being derived from 
the law. Thawat went on to state that with the progress of mankind these traditional 
ideas of power had necessarily undergone certain transformations and that the power 
of royalty had been transferred to public servants and governments. Despite these 
changes he suggested that certain members of royalty and the nobility, nevertheless, 
continued to attempt to exercise traditional concepts of power over the people and 
workers. This he argued was not only in contravention of the wishes of the Thai 
monarchs themselves but represented a serious impediment to the progress of the 
country. [Kammakon 27/1/1923]. Over subsequent years Thawat continued with this 
criticism of those who refused to give up their traditional ideas of power, arguing that 
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this was a fundamental cause of corruption within Thai society. Two government 
officials were to come in for special attention namely, Police Commissioner Athikon 
Prakat and the Minister of the Interior Chaophraya Yomarat, both of whom who 
accused of unjustly using their power. Accusations against the Yomarat who had been 
so roundly criticised for his abandonment of the tramway workers, were made 
following the misappropriation of funds from the Siamese State museum. After 
accusing the Minister of corruption Thawat was subsequentiy arrested on libel charges 
and spent some time in prison where he was refused both bail and visitors 
[Sangsit,1986:79-80]. 
Apart from arguing for the development of greater equality between citizens 
and an end to corruption Thawat also wrote widely on economic matters. For example, 
he was particularly critical of the Treasury for charging high rental rates both in the city 
and in the countryside, accusing it of 'severely exploit ing' the people 
[Sangsit, 1986:80-81]. In an article published in 1931 Thawat also argued for the 
implementation of more sustained policies of agricultural and industrial development. 
The Thai elite were criticised for not investing their money in productive investments 
and living a life of ease to the detriment of the nation. He went on to argue that all 
wealthy Thais should join together and 'establish agricultural co-operatives and 
factories, thus producing jobs, goods and a greater circulation of money' [cited in 
Batson,1984:98]. 
The final contribution made by Thawat and the Labour Group concerns their 
efforts to encourage people to think about some of the basic ideological bases of 
absolutism. In an article published in 1925, for example, readers were invited to 
provide an answer to a number of questions such as; how should one love the Nation, 
Relegion and King?, how are the Nation, Religion and King related, can they be 
separated and if so, what would the consequences be? How are the government and 
the people related, can they ever be separated and, if so, for what reason? As Sangsit 
[1986:83] observes, the purpose of these question was to encourage people to think 
critically about dominant ideas and values. This attempt to encourage people to 
challenge received ideas represents an important aspect of Thawat's work. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the ideas of progress, civilisation and nation were reformulated 
by Thawat into an altemative nationalist discourse. This refashioning of ideas is also 
clearly indicated in an article published in 1926. Commenting on the then recently 
appointed Supreme Council of State, Thawat asked whether the time had arrived for 
Thailand to have a 'people's leader' [huana ratsadon ][Kammakon 17/7/1926], It was 
argued that if the nation was to 'progress and flourish' then 'it was necessary that 
people have direct access to an advisor'. Once again the concept of progress is being 
used to signify development in the political rather than simply the economic sphere. 
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The need for the development of a new political form was considered by Thawat not 
only to be essential for the progress of the country, it was also considered to be 
inevitable. At the conclusion of this article he wrote: 
Finally, we wish to leave the government with the following 
proverb. 'When something has reached a stage where it must 
change, change it must. Those who seek to resist [change] 
will be unable". Remember the world is changing quickly 
[Kammakon 17/7/1926].3 
In sum, from the above discussion we see that the contributions made by 
Thawat and the Labour Group in advancing the interests of labour during the last years 
of the absolute monarchy were considerable. A number of points have been noted with 
regard to the nature of these contributions; first considerable effort was made to ensure 
that the problems of workers became a concern of general pubHc debate, second, in the 
absence of state assistance some basic welfare services were offered to workers, third, 
a great deal of attention was given to the attempt to instil a sense of collective identity 
and unity among wage-labourers. Finally, the Labour Group attempted to deal with 
matters which touched upon wider political debates. Problems of corrupdon and the 
misuse of power, the future economic development of the country and questions over 
the continuation of absolutist rule were aU issues which were debated during the latter 
half of the 1920's. By entering into these debates Thawat and the Labour Group 
sought to offer their own specific input and in doing so expanded the range of issues 
which were held to be of direct concern to workers. In the above discussion the focus 
of attendon has been placed on tracing the hitherto largely neglected process of class 
formation as it was occurring among Thai industrial workers. It is now appropriate to 
comment briefly on the emergence of a labour movement among Chinese workers. 
4.1.2 The Chinese Labour Movement 
As Zeeponsekul [1987:35-38] has observed, many writers have argued that 
Chinese workers in Thailand lacked a sense of class belonging with speech group, 
religion and traditional practices being regarded 'as obstacles to the realisation of 
working class identity'. However, while it must be recognised that the existence of 
these ties certainly complicated the process of class formation, it is also necessary to 
recognise that there is clear evidence that does indicate some degree of class related 
organisation and struggle among Chinese workers. Thus, while Skinner [1957:138] 
This statement was contained in what appears to be the final edition oi Kammakon. Given lhat 
the paper had only reappeared one month earlier it seems reasonable to assume lhat the 
publication of this none too subtle warning was the reason which lay behind the permanent 
closure of the paper. 
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may be correct in suggesting that '[Hjorizontal class solidarity was largely absent from 
Chinese society' it was not totally absent. Indeed, as we have seen, the earliest 
evidence of strikes taking place among Chinese workers date back to the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. Given the existence of these struggles one may well agree 
with Zeeponsekul [1987:34] that it is possible to speak of an 'incipient form of class 
consciousness and action among urban Chinese workers albeit a consciousness which 
existed in an uneasy relation with other forms of group identity. This view is 
supported by developments which occurred during the latter half of the 1920's. 
In the first place it should be recognised that Chinese workers also continued to 
be involved in struggles over the establishment of a norm for the working day. For 
example, in 1929 a group of Chinese weavers were reported to have gone on strike in 
demand for a wage increase [BTWM, 20/5/1929]. There were reports of other similar 
struggles and it appears that by the late 1920's Chinese workers had managed to forge 
some form of co-operative organisation with the Bangkok Times reporting that 
Chinese labour was 'well organised' [BT 23/7/1927]. Organisation among wage-
labouring Chinese was particularly evident in a wave of boycotts which were directed 
against Japanese trading interests. Boycotts had taken place in 1919 and 1926 with the 
most serious incident taking place in 1928. This followed in the wake of the bloody 
battle which had occured between Japanese and Chinese Nationalist forces at Tsinan in 
May of that year. The boycott was led by a group called the 'Chinese National 
Association in Siam for Opposing the Japanese'. All Chinese businesses were urged to 
refrain from handling Japanese goods. At least two Chinese who had refused to 
comply with the associations demands were murdered with another person reported 
having had his fingers severed. [N.A. R 7 M 18/6]. Japanese residents asked for 
police protection and over two hundred Thai troops were ordered out to patrol the 
streets. In August Thai workers, under police protection, were employed to work on 
the docks and the boycott was f inal ly broken the fo l lowing month 
[Skinner, 1957:239]. According to an archival report, a meeting of the boycott society 
was attended by representatives from a labourers union [N.A. R 7 .18/6] which 
suggests that Chinese workers saw themselves as occupying a distinct place within the 
Chinese commnity and that their support for the boycott could not have been simply 
assumed but was rather the subject of negotiation. 
Apart from their participation in struggles for higher wages and trade boycotts, 
another significant development to have taken place within the ranks of Chinese 
workers during this period concerns the spread of communist ideas. As Batson 
[1984:165] has observed it was during the early years of the Seventh Reign that the 
activities of 'various Marxist, communist and 'Bolshivik' organisations first became a 
cause of serious concern to the government'. Wedel [1982:367ff] has stated that the 
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first attempt by communists to establish an organisational base in Thailand occurred 
during the 1920's when six members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were 
sent to Thailand to enlist support for the party. This initial process of organising was 
apparently co-ordinated through the South Seas General Labour Union which later 
became known as the South Seas Communist Party. The development of communist 
ideas received further impetus following the Nationalist (Kuomintang)-Communist 
split in 1927. Thousands of leftists fled China and many were reported to have 
emigrated to Thailand. In the same years it is claimed that 'Marxist orientated students' 
established the 'Association of Communist Youth'.[Zeeponsekul, 1987:41], Most 
students of this early emergence of communist thought in Thailand have stressed that, 
for the most part, the influence of communist ideas was restricted to non-Thai 
nationals, principally the Chinese and Vietnamese. Most of the 'marxist' analyses were 
written in Chinese and dealt with the discussion of events which were taking place in 
China, India and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless some documents did concentrate on 
the analysis of conditions within Thailand. For example a document dated 1st May 
1930 and signed by the 'Communist Workers Committee of Siam' carried with it a 
fourteen point program which called for the 'overthrow of the monarchy, the 
imperialists and the establishment of a democratic Siam' [Batson, 1974:64 fn. l3] . 
Another document dated the same year titled 'Draft Statement Analysing the 
Government and Economy of Siam' covered such topics as imperialist intrigue in 
Thaialnd noting how this had led to the ' impoverishment of the labouring 
classes'.[Batson,1974:66-71]. Although the impact which communist ideas was to 
have on Thai workers during this period remains a topic for future research it is worth 
noting that in January 1930, during a period of unrest within the state railways, a Thai 
was arrested for handing out pamphlets signed by the 'Labourers of Siam' which 
urged workers to strike [BTWM, 20/1/1930; 9/6/1930]. Two years later another Thai 
was reported to have been arrested for handing out Thai language communist 
propaganda [BTWM, 14/11/1932]. 
In the previous sections the purpose has been to focus attention on certain 
aspects of the process of class formation as it unfolded during the last years of the 
absolute monarchy. Specific emphasis has been given to showing that both Thai and 
Chinese workers were involved in class related organisation and struggle during this 
period. In the section which follows attention will be given to an examination of the 
way in which the state responded to these developments. 
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4.1.3 The State and Labour 1923-1932 
Struggles over the working day, workers particpation in trade boycotts, the 
activities of the Labour Group and the spread of 'communist' ideas among some 
sections of the Chinese workforce presented state officials with significant problems 
during the last years of the absolute monarchy. One of the principal ways in which the 
state dealt with these problems was through repression. As noted above, The 
Kammakon was closed and Thawat was arrested and spent a short time in prison 
following the publication of his views on corrupdon.^ Over the following years there 
were numerous other instances of workers being arrested and, in the case of Chinese 
workers, deported. In 1927 three Chinese who had recently arrived from Canton with 
the intention of establishing a fitters union were arrested and charged with engaging in 
'Bolshevik' propaganda [BTWM 7/5/1927]. Subsequently, the leader of a group of 
Chinese weavers was labelled a 'communist' and deported after leading a strike for 
higher wages [BTWM 25/5/1929, 13/1/1930]. In May 1930 sixty-six Chinese were 
arrested for planning a strike [BTWM 5/5/1930]. In the same month members of the 
police special branch arrested three Chinese who had been involved in the organisation 
of an unregistered seafaring men's union..The arrests had followed the discovery of 
pamphlets which had called upon members of the union to 'observe May Day...as 
their communist brothers were doing in foreign parts'. It was also reported that a 
former head of the union had been deported two years previously [BTWM 5/5/1930]. 
In October 1930 Chua Kiam Seng, reportedly the leading 'communist' in Thailand, 
was arrested after pamphlets had been seized which urged labourers, peasants, 
soldiers and 'all oppressed people' to act against the Thai government. At the same 
time another leaflet had been seized by the police. Signed by the 'Siamese Labourers' 
Party', the document called for solidarity among workers in order to oppose the great 
powers who had caused 'untold hardship and suffering [which was caused by 
influencing] capitalists to lower our pay; to add longer working hours and causing us 
to be without employment' [BTWM 20/10/1930]. These examples of repression were 
not limited only to Chinese 'bolshevik' agitators. An example of police being used to 
harass and intimidate Thai workers is that of the Min Sae Match Company which was 
granted the right to hire police to patrol their newly opened factory so as to 'keep order 
in the factory and to see that 'secret societies' do not carry out their activities' [BTWM 
25/11/1929]. 
As Sangsit [1986:129] notes, in an effort to circumvcnt state interference in the publication of 
their views, Thawat and other members of the Labour Group wrote under pseudonyms. Fictious 
names were also used on the official newspaper registration forms which had to be lodged with 
the government. See, for example, N.A R. 6. N 20/122. 
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These overtly repressive measures were backed up by the introduction of new 
laws. Batson [1984:141] has noted that 'for reasons which are not altogether apparent' 
there was a relative hiatus in coverage which the Bangkok press gave to political issues 
after 1927. The reasons for this are, however, not difficult to identify. In 1927 a 
comprehensive piece of legislation was introduced which, as a British Consular 
official noted, aimed to 'stifle' any critcism by the vernacular press [F.O 371/13264]. 
Attacks against freedom of the press had in fact been launched as early as 1924 when 
in June of that year the Chaiayapoom press, which published Kammakon was closed 
for libel. Another piece of repressive legislation was that which placed restrictions on 
the right to strike. In 1927 revisions were made to the Civil Code. Under the terms of 
the law a person could face execution or life imprisonment if found guilty of having 
attempted to: 
...urge any person through fear, threat or violence to become 
a member of any organisation or to become engaged in a 
strike or the withdrawal of employment or trade 
activities...or helping any organisation, or aiding in a 
strike...if such activities are deemed part of a wider plan to 
overthrow the government, or to change economic or 
poHtical policies [Sathian,1934:151-172]. 
Although these repressive measures proved effective in keeping a lid on labour 
discontent, there was a growing recognition that longer term solutions were required. 
In 1927 the King established a committee which comprised the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Justice, Commerce and the Interior. These senior ministers were assigned the 
specific task of examining what was now being termed the 'Labour Problem' [panha 
kammakon ]. The committee met for the first time on 15 February 1927 in order to 
discuss the ILO draft conventions for the protection of labour. Once again, however, 
the ministers reaffirmed earlier decisions that the adoption of the ILO draft conventions 
would be premature, arguing that the relative underdevelopment of industry, the cheap 
cost of living, the independence and conservatism of the workers and the generally 
easy conditions of life meant that 'there was still no need for labour legislation in 
Siam' [N.A. R 7 Ph 13/1]. 
While the official policy was to deny the need for the introduction of labour 
legislation, government officials were, however, beginning to recognise that there 
existed a need for the state to take some steps toward stablising relations within 
indutsry. The Minister of Commerce, for example, argued that there was a need for 
legislation which would give the government the power to inspect factories. He stated 
that 'numerous' industrial accidents had been reported some of which had occurred in 
enterprises in which the state was involved. It was claimed that in the case of private 
industrial establishments, accidents where workers had either been killed or severely 
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injured had been 'hushed up'. It was argued that such occurrences meant that 'we 
should think about protecting the lives and health of workers in order to benefit the 
country's economy' [N.A. R 7 ph 13/1]. Nevertheless, it was argued that some 
caution should be shown toward developing factory legislation, and that it should be 
restricted mainly toward clarifying the responsibility of the factory owners and to give 
government officials the power to insepect factories. It was stressed, however, that 
such legislation: 
...should definitely not be seen to represent an attempt by the 
government to help the side of the workers for this would 
serve to encourage them to establish trade unions or workers' 
organisations [N.A. R 7 Ph 13/1]. 
This response reveals a fundamental contradiction which existed within 
government policy at this time. On an official and public level, it was argued that 
labour legislation was simply not required, a situation which, it was argued, was the 
result of a unique set of economic and socio-cultural circumstances. Yet it is also clear 
that the government was beginning to realise that workers did in fact possess some 
legitimate grievances. Thus, state officials found themselves in something of a bind 
with regard to the introduction of measures to protect labour. While all members of the 
labour committee accepted that something must be done, it was emphasised repeatedly 
that whatever concrete steps were taken should not be seen to be offering workers 
special rights. This situation led, in turn, to a discussion over what the term 'protecting 
labour' \pongkan kammakon ] actually meant. Although this question of semantics 
appears to have remained unresolved, the committee did eventually manage to produce 
a series of draft laws, the final version of which were completed and submitted to the 
Prajadhipok in January 1931. Known as the Draft Factory Act, the document 
contained provisions which compelled factory owners to register their premises and 
provide full details of the type of work performed, the machinery used and the number 
of workers employed. Factories were to be kept clean and free from injurious materials 
and all accidents had to be reported to the government. The Act also gave government 
employees the power to enter premises for the purposes of inspection. At a meeting 
held in September 1931, however, it was decided that due to the general state of the 
economy and the cost of establishing an effective system for administering the Act, it 
would be inappropriate to proceed with the introducton of the legislation [N.A.R 7 Ph 
13/4]. 
In sum, the state responded to the growth of class related activities among 
workers largely through repression. The arrest, deportation and police harrassment of 
workers and the introduction of new laws which placed restrictions on freedom of the 
press and on the right to strike are examples of repressive measures. Archival 
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documents show that state officials were also beginning to recognise that some form of 
state regulation of industry was necessary. There was a reluctance to initiate such 
measures, however, for fear that it would encourage workers to form trade unions. 
4.1.4 The 1932 Coup 
On the 24 June 1932 a small conspiratorial group calling itself the People's 
Party [khana ratsadon ] removed the King in a swiftly executed coup thus bringing an 
end to the world's last surviving absolute monarchy. The significance of the coup, 
however, has been the subject of some debate within Thai historical studies. For 
example, it has been argued that: 
This group [the People's Party] was comprised of members 
from three bureaucratic groups; 23 of them in the army, 14 in 
the navy and 24 in the civilian bureaucracy. It executed the 
coup without any mass support and was essentially a 
counter-elite group against that of the princes and senior 
bureaucratic elites which ruled Siam under the absolute 
monarchical system. Thus, the coup merely brought about a 
significant shift in the alignment of power within the urban 
based elite groups without the radical changes in class 
relations that are normally associated with revolutions in 
Western history [Samudavanija, 1982:6]. 
This perception of significance of the events of June 1932 is untenable for two 
main reasons. First, in arguing that the coup represented merely a realignment of 
power within the urban based elite, Samudavanija fails to appreciate the longer term 
implications of the overthrow of the monarchy, that is, the defeat of sakdina economic 
and political principles with the logic of capitalism being more fully brought to bear on 
the operations of the state apparatus [Hewison, 1989:60,64]. As noted, the absolute 
state had played a leading role in securing some of the basic historical conditions for 
the emergence of the capitalist mode of production in Thailand. Yet the emergence of 
capitalism had brought with it numerous economic, political and social contradictions. 
In the economic sphere, the absolute monarchs had been rocked by a series of financial 
crises in 1913,1919 andl927 with the effects of the depression beginning to be felt 
from 1930 onwards. Export earnings had begun to decline in 1929-1930 with peasants 
being most immediately effected. With a drop in income and unable to repay loans, 
many peasants were forced off their land. Urban residents were also effected as prices 
and unemployment began to rise. While initiating budgetary and staff cuts, the 
government appeared unable to cope with the growing crisis with Prachadhipok 
admitting that he had no knowledge of economic matters and lamely asked that his 
mistakes be excused by the Thai people [Barme, 1989:57]. As well as facing questions 
86 
pertaining to its managment of the economy, the monarchy also had to face calls for 
political change. As we have seen, calls for political reform had been made since the 
last decades of the nineteenth century and had become most accute during Wajirawut's 
reign as the king's luxurious lifestyle had, by the mid 1920's, led the country to the 
brink of economic crisis. Although, Prachadhipok had initiated a number of reforms 
such as the appointment of a Supreme Council of State, he had nevertheless shied 
away from adopting measures which might have led to more fundamental changes to 
the political system. In short, as Hewison [1989:60] has indicated, the onset of 
depression had by 1932 'served to highlight the contradictions inherent in an economic 
and political system based on anachronistic principles and the stage was set for its 
overthrow'. 
Apart from failing to appreciate the longer term implications of the overthrow 
of the absolute monarchy, Samudavanija also fails to acknowedge the fact that within 
the complex array of political forces who were engaged in the struggle against 
absolutism were members of the industrial working class. As we have seen, from the 
1923 strike onwards it has been possible to trace the ways in which industrial 
workers, under Thawat's leadership, gradually came to perceive that their interests 
would not be advanced by a continuadon of absoludsm and, indeed, that the absolute 
state had actually contributed to the continuation of their oppression and exploitation 
by employers. In the attempt to advance workers' interests, Thawat struck up a 
reladonship with Pridi Phanomyong who, since his return from Europe, had been 
forging together a coalition of civilian bureaucrats and junior and senior military 
figures out of which the People's Party was formed [Barme, 1989:56]. Although we 
know little about the relationship between Thawat and Pridi it appears that they both 
felt that the future development of the country would best be served by the 
establishment of a parliamentary democracy. This became apparent when Thawat and 
members of the Labour Group as well as tramwayworkers acdvely participated in the 
events of June 1932. While numerous historians and political scientists have ignored 
the role played by labour in the change of government, their contributions were, 
however, not forgotten by Pridi who some fifty years later remembered: 
...at the time of Thawat's involvement [in organising the 
tramway workers] I was still a student in France and before I 
had returned the tramwaymen had struck. Thawat was the 
organiser. He had done a good job in establishing the 
workers. In both the change of government and during the 
Borawadet rebellion the tramway workers played not an 
inconsiderable part, the tramwaymen were well aware of 
themselves [cited in Sangsit,1986:89]. 
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Period Two 1932-1934 
42 1 The Labour Movement 1932-1934 
During the period immediately following the change in government there was 
an outpouring of grievances among workers. In August 1932, 6,000 rickshaw pullers 
struck for five days in the attempt to secure a reduction in the rents charged for their 
vehicles. In the same month women workers in a Thonburi textile factory protested 
over a reduction in their wages. In September the long running dispute within the 
tramway company erupted once again [see below] .This was followed over subsequent 
months by strikes involving cement workers, railway workers, construction labourers, 
workers employed at the militray arsenal and rice-mill workers. [BT 4/8/1932, 
28/9/1932, 1/10/1932 Lak Muang 2/10/1932, 5/10/1932, 18/10/1932, N.A R7-R8 
2k/20, R7-R8 2k/30 R7-R8 2k/60, BTWM 21/8/1933, 18/9/1933, 5/10/1933, 
21/12/1933, 20/12/1933, see also, information contained in Thompson [1947:239-
240], Mabry [1979:40], Damri and Carun [1986:30-31] and Hewison [1989:65]. It 
was during this period of heightened industrial protest that the first legally recognised 
working class organisation was formed in Thailand. 
The Thai Tramwaymen's Association (T.T.A.) was formed during the course 
of yet another strike within the Siam Electric Company. As we have seen, disputes 
within the company over wages, bonuses and the rules and regulations date back at 
least to the late 1890's. It appears that the company had been able to keep a lid on its 
employees protests through the latter half of the 1920's; however, in September 1932 
another disupute arose following the company's dismissal of four employees. The 
company was apparently well prepared for trouble as it had hired police to guard the 
workshops and had recruited former employees to ensure that tram services would be 
maintained [Lak Muang 2/10/1932]. Thawat formed a committee and attempted to 
negotiate a settlement with the company. The directors of the SEC refused to recognise 
the workers and claimed that, in fact, there was no real dispute and that Thawat and 
others were simply inciting the men to strike [BT 28/9/1932]. Thawat immediately 
asked that the government intervene in the dispute. He also approached the Police 
Commissioner and asked for permission to have the tramwaymen's association legally 
registered. Amidst growing public speculation the newly formed government made 
two important decisions. First, it gave the men permission to establish their own 
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association and second, it encouraged them to look to the government for assistance in 
future disputes [Thompson, 1947:240]. 
Amidst great pomp and ceremony the T.T.A. was officially opened in October 
1932. During the festivities a message from the Minister of Interior was read out in 
which he stated: 
The ideal of this society is to promote harmony in the ranks 
of Siamese nadonals. It is the first association of Siamese 
workers and hence all the members are asked to preserve the 
ideal stated above. Co-operadon is a very important thing in 
effecting success in an undertaking. Please remember that we 
are Siamese and have established a permanent associadon in 
Siam. We should behave ourselves well and with good 
intentions to our party, nation and country. We should not do 
anything unjust or against the public peace. 
In reply Thawat outlined what he saw to be the principal aims of the association 
as follows: 
This tramwaymen's association is the first labour association 
to come into lawful existence in Siam. Its aims lie in the 
training of the good moral character of the members; in 
exchanging knowledge; in promoting happiness, pleasure 
and health; in assisting aged and crippled members; and 
teaching members to exercise economy. The results to be 
expected from such ideals will also go to benefit the country 
at large. This association is one for those who have little and 
has been newly bom into this world with such tears and 
endeavours combined. There are many things to show unity 
of heart on the part of members who brought about the 
success of the enterprise by sheer sacrifice on their part. The 
wives of a good many tried to commit suicide but were 
dmely saved. Such a rash acdon on their part was brought 
about by worry and anxiety. Some of the wives ran away 
from their husbands when they thought they would not 
receive happiness should they condnue to live with them. 
There was an occasion when a tical was badly required to 
pay for something in regard to the association...There are 
many more instances of sacrifice on the part of the 
promoters. Their endeavours were crowned with success, 
and the government sancdoned their applicadon to have the 
association registered. They all thoroughly appreciate the 
kindness of the government in this respect [BT 17/10/1932]. 
Of the 1,000 workers employed by the SEC, 700 applied for membership of 
the T.T.A [LakMuang 12/10/1932].Thawat was elected president with Klin Thong 
and Chaeom Antrasen elected vice-president and secretary respectively. In addition, an 
administrative committee of twenty five members was also appointed.^ 
Another important figure present at the opening ceremony of the T.W.A. was Pnnce Sakol 
{Momchao Sakol Wanakon Warawan)[1888-1953]. Popularly known as the 'Red Pnnce', 
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Over subsequent months the T.T.A. played a leading role in representing 
workers' interests in both the industrial and wider political arenas. In the area of 
industry the association offered support and advice for workers who were involved in 
struggles for better wages and conditions. Most significantly, Thawat emphasised that 
the association was formed to represent all workers regardless of their ethnic 
background. This point requires further discussion. 
Past writers have generally simply accepted as fact that ethnic differences 
between Thai and Chinese workers impeded their mobilisation along class lines. As 
Skinner [1957:238-239] notes, strikes and other forms of protest were either 'solely 
Chinese matters, or else solely Thai'. Although it is true that ethnic barriers did serve 
to complicate the process of class formation, scholars have generally failed to reflect 
upon the ways in which first, the ethnic identities of 'Thai' and 'Chinese' were 
historically constructed and second, how the differences between Thai and Chinese 
were actively encouraged and promoted in ways which were precisely aimed toward 
limiting solidarity along class lines. These points require further clarification. 
Generally speaking, past writers have regarded 'Thai' and 'Chinese' ethnic 
identities to be innate rather than subject to historical transformation. As Stanzon 
[1985:2] has stressed, however, 'ethnicity is not a constant ascribed trait inherited 
from the past, but is rather the result of a process which continues to unfold constantly 
being reformulated by all the agents involved'. Some attention has already be given to 
the construction of a specifically Thai ethnic identity. As part of the development of a 
'selective tradition' we have briefly touched upon the role of Wajirawut in elaborating 
what it meant to be a member of the Thai nation. In essence, to be a Thai it was 
necessary to display loyalty to the King, Nation and Religion. All Thais, it was 
argued, possessed certain rights and duties, which if performed correcdy, would 
ensure that the Thai nation would survive and attain the status of other civilised and 
progressive nations. Significantly, as an aid in helping him define what it meant to be a 
Thai, Wajirawut sought to contrast certain specific characteristics of Thai identity with 
characteristics of people from other nations. In doing so he often sought to provide 
clear contrasts between Thai and Chinese. 
As Anderson [1983:94] has indicated the target of Wajirawut's nationalism 
was: 
...neither the United Kingdom which controlled 90% of 
Siam's trade, nor France, which had recently made off with 
Sakol was educated at Cambridge where he says bccame a socialist after joining the Fabian 
Society [Bangkok Post ,20/3/1950] , Over subsequent years, he held a number of senior 
positions within various government department and did much to promote the interests of 
labour [Bp 23/6/1953], 
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easterly segments of the old realm: it was the Chinese whom 
his father had so recently and blithely imported. 
Anderson [1983:94-95] suggests that there were three main reasons for 
Wajirawut's attack on the Chinese. First, as noted previously, just prior to his 
coronation in November 1910, the growing economic power of the Chinese had been 
abundantly clear with the outbreak of a general strike; second, with the fall of the 
Celestial Monarchy in Peking the following year, the Chinese 'appeared as harbingers 
of a populat republicanism profoundly threatening to the dynastic principle'; and third, 
through his British education, Wajirawut had 'imbibed the particular racism of the 
English ruling class'. However, it should be noted that the distinctions which 
Wajirawut was fostering between Thai and Chinese were not entirely new. For 
example, during the reign of Mongkut any Thai caught smoking opium was punished 
by having to wear a queue and pay the Chinese poll-tax 'on the theory that by picking 
up the Chinese vice he forfeited all claims to good standing as a Thai' 
[Skinner,1957:121]. Another example of the way in which distinctions between Thai 
and Chinese were manifest was in the process of registration. While all Thai males 
were tattooed, the Chinese, on the other hand, had to pay a head tax, the collection of 
which 'carried an aura of contempt and degradation'. Upon payment of the tax the 
Chinese immigrant was obliged to wear a sealed cord attached to the wrist which had 
to be shown to the police on request. Apparently any Chinese who did not display this 
seal was arrested and it was stated that 'there is nothing the Siamese policeman so 
much enjoys as leading some unfortunate Chinaman to pay the tax' 
[Skinner,1957:147-148]. As Skinner [1957:148] observes 'All in all the tiennial tax, 
in the details of its collection and enforcment, was hardly designed to develop mutual 
respect between Chinese and Thai'. 
Significantly, there also existed a class dimension to the treatment of the 
Chinese in Thailand. This is reflected in the fact that the leading members of the 
Chinese community were given the opportunity to participate 'at the court and in 
government administration to a surprising degree duirng the nineteenth century' 
[Skinner, 1957:148]. This is not the place to detail the various ways in which the Thai 
ruling class through intermarriage, co-operation in business ventures and enobling 
certain Chinese, managed to contain the challenge which the most powerful members 
in the Chinese community may have posed to their rule. Here it will merely suffice to 
point out that by the end of the nineteenth century the selective treatment of the 
immigrants had led to a distinction being made between two categories of Chinese in 
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Thailand, that of cek or lower class Chinese, and din or genetleman Chinese.^ It is 
important to recognise this distinction for it was the former category of Chinese against 
whom Wajirawut launched his most scathing attacks. In his infamous article 'Jews of 
the Orient' the King, writing under the pen name Asawaphahu, stated: 
For the sake of money the Chinese are willing to suffer 
starvation and every form of hardship, as anyone could see 
for himself. Anyone who takes the trouble to watch Chinese 
coolies at their meal could not fail to be amazed, for their fare 
would not tempt a hungry street cur. As for their lodgings, it 
is most amazing to find what a large number could pack into 
a tiny place. No other people on earth could live in such 
lodgings and not suffocate. There is really no wonder at all 
that Chinese coolies could easily monopolise all labour, for 
they are satisfied with ridiculously small pay and thrive on it 
because they have discovered the art of living on 
nothing...There is absolutely nothing the Chinese will not do 
for the sake of money. No labour is too mean or degrading 
for them to perform providing they get money for it. Where 
money is concerned, the Chinese are utterly without morals, 
without conscience, without mercy, without pity. They will 
cheat with a smile at their own cleverness, and rob and 
murder with utter callousness for the sake of getting a few 
more dollars. In the pursuit of money, the Chinese are 
fiendishly clever at devising schemes, be it fraud, robbery or 
piracy [Asawaphahu, 1985:79-80]. 
While this passage is interesting for the light it sheds on the conditions under 
which Chinese lived and worked, two points need to be noted. First, it should be 
recognise that the principal target of the king's attack is on the Chinese labouring 
classes and second, despite the crucial contributions which they were making to the 
development of the Thai economy, it is important to appreciate the way in which this 
category of Chinese are being depicted as being a threat to the Thai nation. It was this 
image then, of the immoral, dirty, money hungry, theiving, murderous, scheming and 
totally undesirable Chinese which was presented to the Thai audience. Clearly, this 
highly selective stereo-typical descripdon of 'Chinese'would have promoted feelings 
of great antipathy if not outright hatred between Chinese and Thai. Such divisions 
were further promoted when, for example. Thai workers were brought in to help break 
up the 1928 boycott of Japanese goods. 
In the above discussion it has been shown how the Thai state contributed to the 
development of an ideology of ethnicity and how ethnic differences were fostered and 
promoted in ways which were precisely aimed toward limiting solidarity along class 
lines. Having made this points we will now be in a postion to appreciate the 
In fact in 1919 a proposal was made to scpcrate Chinese cek from other passengers (including 
din ] on public transport. It was staled that cek are 'unseemly and have a host of bad habits 
[BTWM 8/9/1919], 
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significance of Thawat's commitment to struggle for the interests of all workers, an 
commitment which he put into practice during the course of the 1934 rice mill strike. 
In early January 1934 a major strike erupted among Chinese rice-mill coolies. 
Previously the men had been by paid by the mill owners after they had transported the 
paddy to the mill. This payment was known as tail or book money and represented a 
sum over and above the amount the men received in regular wages. The mill owners 
claimed that, due to a fall in trade, they could no longer pay the coolies the standard 
rate of three baht per kwien and promptly reduced the rate to 60 satangP The workers 
protested over the reduction but the mill owners remained firm. A strike ensued which 
led to the closure of mills all over the Chaophraya river. The police intervened and 
attempted to keep some of the mills in operation. The workers appealed to the T.T.A 
for assistance and Thawat immediately sent letters to Prime Minister Pahol and the 
Director General of Police questioning the legality of police interference. The police 
were subsequendy instructed to refrain from becoming further involved in the strike. 
[BTWM 3/2/1934]. The strike remained unresolved and continued through March and 
April, becoming increasingly violent as the millers hired gangsters to attack the striking 
workers. Eventually, the government moved to restore law and order [BTWM 
1/4/1934]. Seven of the strike leaders were arrested an subsequently deported and 
Thawat was charged for allowing the premises of the T.T.A to be used for meetings of 
the striking workers [F.O 371/19375]. Although ending in defeat, the strike 
represents the first clear example of an attempt by Thai and Chinese workers to 
overcome ethnic barriers in order to co-operate along class lines. 
Following the coup, the People's Party took a number of initial steps aimed 
toward the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in Thailand. Originally, the 
party nominated a National Assembly of seventy members who in turn chose Phraya 
Manopakon [hereafter Mano] as their leader. Mano appointed fourteen assembly 
members to act as an executive committee with a cabinet of seven also being appointed 
[Terweil, 1983:332-333]. A constitutional committee was also formed, and by 
December 1932 a draft constitution had been produced. Inidally, the assembly was to 
consist of half-elected and half-appointed members, and a fully elected representative 
government was to come into existence within ten years [Wyatt, 1984:246]. However, 
by eariy 1933 these halting steps toward the establishment of a parliamentary 
democracy were already under threat as the rift between the constitutionalist and the 
conservative pro-royalist forces began to widen.8 The differences between the two 
groups became further exacerbated in the wake of the presentation of Pridi's economic 
plan which advocated the nationalisation of the economy Faced with what they 
1 A kwien represents a weight of approximately 1 .OOOKgs. 
8 See, Barnie [1989:59-82] for a detailed account of the politics of this period. 
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perceived as an increasingly restive group of members, Mano, with the king's 
approval, prorogued the National Assembly in March 1933 [Terweil,1983:333]. 
Shortly after, the Assembly was dissolved and political parties were outlawed 
[Wyatt,1984:247]. In June 1933 the junior military faction within the People's Party 
staged another coup. However, the conservative forces were not to be thwarted and in 
October 1933 a full scale rebellion broke out which was only defeated after three 
weeks of intense fighting [Terweil,1983:334-335; Wyatt,1984:248; N.A. S. 0701, 
1/4]. 
Throughout this period of political turmoil the T.T.A. fully supported the pro-
constitutionalist forces. As noted, Thawat had forged particularly close links with 
Pridi's civilian faction of the People's Party. Pridi was described as the 'natural leader' 
of workers and when he left for Europe following the furore over his economic plan, 
large numbers of workers were reported to have seen him off [BTWM 25/9/1933; 
28/8/193]. Indeed it was Thawat's open support of Pridi which may have produced 
the spark which ignited the Borawadet revolt. Incensed over the king's critcism of 
Pridi's economic plan, Thawat and three others brought a libel action against the 
deposed monarch [BTWM 28/9/1933; 2/12/1933]. The action was reported to have 
'...greatly embittered the king [and] infuriated his followers' [F.O 371/18210:25].9 
The rebellion broke out a few weeks later on 11 October 1933 and workers were quick 
to demonstrate their support for the govemment. Apparently at a meeting held the day 
the revolt began, law students together with workers from the government aircraft 
factory, rail workers, docks workers, cement factory labourers, tramway workers and 
taxi drivers voted to pledge support for the govemment and offered to act as volunteer 
troops [N.A. S. 0701.1/4]. In all, it is claimed that 3,000 workers volunteered to fight 
the rebels [Sangsit,1986:130]. This support came at a crucial time for the govemment 
as it faced not only growing public concern over the intensity of the fighting but also 
charges that it supported 'communism' and that it intended to rid Thailand of its 
monarch. Prime Minister Pahol acknowledged the workers' support as follows: 
The government is extremely thankful that these volunteers 
of law students and workers have shown their clear support 
It was reported [BT 2/12/1933] that later Thawat had apologised to the king for his actions. It 
was stated that Thawat 'assured his Majesty that the idea of his taking up the leadership of the 
labourers was not based on any idea of selfish gain on his part His real intention was to exert 
himself to the utmost toward assisting the poor and needy to find employment...the constant 
anxiety of the poo to find rice and curry did not allow them any leisure to embark on political 
movements...It was possible that these poor folk might have displayed some anger on certain 
occasions but that was due to the feat that the limit of their endurance had been reached...Nai 
Thawat was further of the opinion that if assisyance couldbe rendered to farners it would be a 
popular policy. What the farmers really wanted was the removal of the middleman and to be 
placcd in direct relationship with the capitalists'. The king accepted Thawat's apology and all 
charges were subsequently withdrawn. 
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for the nation, the constitution and the government. The 
government will seek to ensure that their support is utilised 
as will benefit the nation [N.A. S. 0701 1/4]. 
Although some workers asked to become involved in the actual fighting, they 
were used primarily to help keep public order in Bangkok. Sun Kitcamnon, who was 
one of the leading members of the T.T.A., took up a position on one of the bridges 
which spanned the Chaophraya River where it was said he kept the local population 
informed of events and urged them to continue to support the government. He was 
later awarded the Constitutional Medal for services to the nation [Sangsit,1986:173]. 
4.2.2 The State and Labour 1932-1934 
The activities of industrial workers under the absolute monarchy, their 
involvement in the 1932 coup and their subsequent struggles in both the industrial and 
political arenas in the months immediately after the change in govemment meant that 
the voice of labour could no longer be simply ignored. The recognition that labour 
was, in fact, a social force which was and would become an increasingly important 
part of Thai society is reflected in the way in which state officials responded to 
workers' struggles during the period 1932-34. 
In the first place, the state took some further steps toward a greater involvement 
in regulating relations within industry. Three points require discussion; first, measures 
which were taken to relieve unemployment; second, moves which were adopted 
toward the promulgation of a law for the protection of labour; and finally, the 
establishment of a administrative mechanism which was to be used to setde disputes 
between labour and capital. 
As noted, unemployment had been growing steadily throughout the last years 
of the absolute monarchy. State officials had, however, failed to adopt any concrete 
measures to alleviate the problem. During the period immediately after the coup 
representatives from the unemployed made numerous appeals to govemment for 
assistance [BTWM 18/9/1933; 5/10/1933]. The newly formed government responded 
to these appeals by enacting legislation which led to the creation of Labour Bureaus. 
Established under the auspices of the Minister of the Interior, it was reported that by 
March 1934 almost 2,500 had registered of which 1,828 subsequently found 
employment [BTWM 21/3/1934]. The government also attempted to exert greater 
control over private labour bureaus. All private agencies and their records were to be 
opened to government inspection. In addition, attempts were made to ensure that 
contracts between employers and employees were made on the basis of free market 
principles, and the Act prohibited the etablishment of employment agencies in hotels. 
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coffee houses and other places where intoxicated workers may have been lured into 
signing long term contracts.[Sathian, ND 266-282], 
Another important development which marked a growing involvment of the 
state in regulating relations within industry concerned the renewed discussion over the 
need for labour legislation. As we have seen, there had been a growing recognition of 
the need for some form of legislation during the late 1920's. As part of its overall 
policy to encourage industrial development, the post-1932 government announced that 
'it intended to promulgate a labour law on the employment of labour with reference to 
hours of work and the health and safety of employees'. It was stated that due regard 
would be paid to both the interests of labour and capital [BTWM 21/9/1933]. 
Apparently a draft of the proposed legislation was sent to a newly formed labour 
committee, but there is no further mention of any steps being taken toward 
promulgation of the law until the later part of the 1930's [FO 371/19375]. 
The third important development to take place during the immediate post 1932 
period was that of the establishment within the Ministry of Economic Affairs of a 
permanent committee, the aim of which was to 'seek to bring about a reconciliation 
between employers and employees whenever trouble arises' [BTWM 30/4/1934]. The 
establishment of the committee followed in the wake of what was reportedly the first 
major strike to have taken place within the state railways. In January 1934, 800 men 
employed at the Makasan rail workshops presented the the railway authorities with a 
log of claims demanding wage increases, welfare payments, the provision of free 
transport to and from work as well as the removal of certain officials from their 
position [BTWM 20/1/1934; 25/1/1934]. By April the situation had reached a 
flashpoint and a strike was called. The rail workers seized signal boxes and rail 
carriages, closed the Yomarat bridge, attacked railway offices and held some officials. 
The strike only lasted half a day as Prime Minister Pahol quickly moved into settle the 
d i s p u t e . T h e strike served to highlight yet again the economic dislocation which 
could be caused by striking workers employed in key sectors of the economy, and the 
government acted quickly to establish a committee which would be given the task of 
mediating future disputes. Chaired by the Governor of Bangok, the disputes 
committee was made up of representatives from government, business and labour [FO 
371/19375]. As one commentator pointed out: 
One may well ask whether a biased body of politicians 
without any experience in practical administration are 
qualified to advise the government in future labour diputes. 
But important though this side of the question is, it is not the 
main point at issue. The important implication of the 
10 The leaders of this strike were Prayong Sulhisawang, Hai Suphaphongdon, Yuan Tolaklam and 
Hoi Cantaprasoet [Damri and Carun,198:32], 
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appointment is that the government accepts as a fact the 
existence of a genuine labour problem in Siam [BT 
2/5/1934]. 
The comment is an important one for it captures a significant shift in attitude 
from the policies and views expressed by the absolute monarchs to those which were 
beginning to be adopted by the post-1932 regime. As we have seen, during the period 
of the absolute monarchy, state officials continually denied that any labour problem 
existed. Although archival documents demonstrate that some state officials were 
gradually realising that issues such as health and safety in factories did in fact require 
some attention, the overall thrust of official policy was to push the entire issue of 
labour away from open pubic debate. This was a stance which the post-1932 regime 
rejected. The many struggles which had taken place within industry, labour's 
participation in the 1932 coup, and the Bowadet rebellion meant that their grievances 
could no longer be ignored. This recognition of labour representing a force in its own 
right was also amply demonstrated by the government allowing Thawat and his 
supporters to legally establish their own organisation. Again this represents a 
significant change from the days of the absolute monarchy where the entire thrust of 
state policy was designed to repress attempted organisation among workers. Within 
the new political environment, however, labour was granted the right to openly 
organise and, as the events of October 1933 demonstrate, the support of workers was 
eagerly sought after by the pro-constitutionalist elements within Thai politics. 
In sum, the 1932-34 period was an important time for labour. After being 
severely repressed under the absolute monarchy, the immediate post-1932 period 
provided workers with new hope as they particpated in struggles for better wages and 
conditions, attempted to overcome ethnic barriers, and struggled for the establishment 
of a parliamentary democracy. This period of open industrial and political militancy 
was, however short lived. As noted above, in his attempt to bridge ethnic differences, 
Thawat's involvement in the 1934 rice mill strike had ultimately led to his arrest on 
charges of violating the rules of the T.W.A. In May 1934 the association was officially 
dissolved [FO 371/19375]. Almost immediately another association was formed. The 
Association for Support of Labourers [Samakhom Anukun Kammakon ]. With 
membership drawn from tramway workers, rickshaw pullers, cargo boat coolies, rice 
mill workers and barbers, the aim of the new association was reportedly to have been 
to 'provide a broader base for the activities of the labour leaders than that which 
existed in the Tramway Worker's Association' [FO 371/19375]. This new 
organisation also became embroiled in the rice mill strike and, following the 
deportation of 7 of the strike leaders, the reputation of the association as being able to 
effectively represent the interests of workers was said to have been badly undermined. 
It too was dissolved shordy thereafter.[FO 371/19375]. 
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Period Three 1934-1944 
4.3 1 Labour Under Military Rule 1934-1944 
Following the brief period of intense industrial and political militancy which 
occurred during the period June 1932-June 1934, workers' struggles, for reasons to 
be discussed in more detail below, tended to disappear from public view for the 
remainder of the 1930's. Strikes, did, however, continue to take place [BT 29/9/1938, 
2/8/1939] and there were additional attempts made to co-ordinate struggles by labour. 
For example, following the demise of the T.W.A and the Labour Support Group, a 
group of Thai, Chinese, Sino-Thai and Vietnamese workers attempted to re-establish a 
labour organisation in 1935 [Damri and Carun,1986:33]. Moreover, in 1937, a group 
of transport workers attempted to sponsor their own candidate to run in elections for 
the National Assembly [BTWM 11/9/1937].!^ Nevertheless, as far as scholarship is 
concerned, the activities of workers during the 1930's and early 1940's remains 
largely a topic to be examined on the basis of future empirical research. In this section, 
however, the aim will be to discuss some important developments which took place 
during this period. First, the state's further entry into regulating relations within 
industry and second, the steps taken by the state which laid the foundations for 
changing the ethnic composition of the industrial workforce. 
4.3.2 The State and Industrial Relations 
While industrial conflict tended to recede from public view from the mid 
1930's onwards, some important developments did occur with regard to the state's 
growing involvment in regulating relations within industry. As we have seen, in the 
period immediately after the June 1932 coup, the state adopted measures to regulate 
The report stated that, 'In recent months there has been a growing up among the labouring 
population in Siam-particularly in Bangkok-a political consciousness which has found 
expression in the desire to be represented in the Assembly. And, for this purpose, there has 
sprung up what has been euphoniously termed the "Winged Wheel Group", comprising the 
drivers of public vehicles in Bangkok, who have collected funds from among themselves in 
order to support a candidate of their own choice, one to be sponsored by them at the 
forthcoming election. The surprise, however, does not lie in the fact of its occurrence, but 
rather in the awakening of labour to a sense of its own importance and responsibility, thus 
showing that in Siam, as elsewhere, the democratic principle has been well established [BTWM 
11/9/1937]. 
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employment , establish a formal mechanism to handle disputes between labour and 
capital as well as stating that it intended to promulgate a series of labour laws. Starting 
f rom the mid-1930's onwards there were renewed discussions over labour legislation. 
In 1936, in a speech to the National Assembly, the member from Nong Khai argued 
that there existed a pressing need for the promulgation of a law which would cover 
such areas as working hours, annual leave, the employment of women and children 
and the provision of compensation for sick or injured workers. He argued that this 
legislation was necessary in order to prevent: 
...capitalists holding money to be their god, or to be more 
precious than human life, or the welfare of human beings, [to 
prevent them from utilising] money as a means of indirect 
power brought to bear on labourers who are placed in a 
position of having to obey orders, because if they do not do 
so they will have nothing to subsist on. To force them to 
work outside the proper time or to put them to excessive 
work till their health becomes affected, such as sick people or 
p r e g n a n t w o m e n w h o shou ld be a l l o w e d to 
rest...if...labourers do not work they won't have anything to 
eat...because their employers do not pay them any allowance 
on days that they fail to attend to their duties, or perhaps they 
are discharged altogether and new hands are engaged as their 
substitutes...that being so they are obliged to work although 
sick, or about to give birth to a child. That is going against 
human nature and moreover when labourers unnecessarily 
over exert themselves in that manner such trends tend to 
endanger their offspring...The capitalist constitutes a strength 
in effecting progress of the country and if, through their 
assistance and kindness, the labourers under them are 
encouraged to consider their occupations as a veritable pillar 
of support, they will become strong of heart and render a 
h igher ra t ion of service to their employers . . . [The 
labourers] . . .consti tute a backbone to the capitalists in 
bringing economic wealth to them and when capitalists are 
rich in economic wealth such wealth is also derived by the 
country. Once the country is wealthy it may utilise its wealth 
in bringing about progress and advancement in other 
directions as well. It is up to the country, therefore, to 
promote the status and welfare of the labourers as much as 
possible so that the capitalists and the country may reap more 
benefi ts through the actions of the labourers [BTWM 
18/9/1936]. 
The proposed legislation called on the government to ensure a decent standard 
of living for workers, the provision of compensation and limiting the working week to 
fourty hours. In his response the Minister for Economic Affairs stated that, while he 
generally approved of the proposed legilsation, the government was not in a position 
to pass the Bill because 'it might not be right in Siam to enforce rights such as were 
adopted in some other country. If unsuitably applied, such things might generally 
affect the national economics' [BTWM 18/9/1936]. The Minister went on to add that 
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before any comprehesive labour legislation could be passed, it was necessary that the 
government have a more thorough knowledge of the present state of Thai industry and 
the various conditions of workers. He added that the government had, in fact, recently 
established a committee which would begin investigating these matters. A vote was 
prompdy taken and the proposed Bill was defeated by 45 votes to 7. 
The following year the government introduced its own Labour Bill which 
aimed to give it the authority to collect data on labour conditons which could be used 
for the development of future policies [Nikom,1983:20; Damri and Carun. 1986:28]. 
In introducing the Bill, the Minister of economic affairs stated that: 
...the Bill was merely intended to give the government 
authority to obtain statistics concerning the number of people 
employed as labourers all over the kingdom, their average 
earning capacity, the standard of living, housing conditions 
and other data which would be useful to the government in 
assisting labour to be raised to the same level and status as 
labour in other parts of the world. It was the government's 
intention to appoint a committee to make these investigations 
because employers would not provide such statistics, unless 
legally impelled to do so [BTWM 1/3/1937]. 
After some further debate the Bill was passed and by the middle of the same 
month it was reported that the government had set in motion the necessary machinery 
to obtain the required information [BTWM 19/3/1937]. Over the following years there 
were other attempts to have labour legislation passed in the National Assembly, 
however, on each occassion the proposed Bills were defeated [Damri and 
Carun, 1986:142; BTWM 10/1/1938]. In 1939 a Factory Act was finally promulgated 
[Democracy 17/11/1946] but due to the lack of adequate administrative support and 
staff to police the Act, workers continued to remain largely unprotected within 
industry. Although nothing substantial was achieved, these developments were 
significant in that they were indicative of a growing, albeit rather haphazard, state 
involvement in entering more directiy into industry and regulating relations between 
labour and capital. Apart from this growing involvement in industrial relations, another 
important development to have occurred during the later part of the 1930's relates to 
the steps which were taken to promote the greater participation of Thais within 
industry. In order to understand the background to these changes, it will be 
appropriate to comment briefly on developments which were taking place within the 
sphere of politics during these years. 
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4.33 Labour and Hypernationalism 
As Hewison [1989b:61] observes, the 1932 coup marked a 'curious period in 
the class history of Thailand' in that no single class or class fraction was able to 
achieve political dominance. As a result, the period from 1932 onwards was a time of 
'intense manouvering amongst political powerful groups and class fractions, as they 
attempted to further their own interests through the agency of the state, in the quest for 
dominance'. Girling [1981:106] has written that the Pahon years [1934-38] was a 
period of 'stabilisation'. Barme [1989:90] notes, however, the stability of Pahon's 
administration was based on 'control over the modem weapons of war such as tanks 
and machine guns rather than consent' Censorship was legalised, communism was 
banned and political parties were outlawed. These restrictive conditions had an 
immediate impact on labour. As noted, after the demise of the T.W. A and the Labour 
Support Group, another attempt to foster the development of an organised labour 
movement was made in 1935. All those involved were arrested and charged under the 
1933 Anti-Communist Act.^^ Henceforth, organised labour was forced underground 
[Damri and Carun,1986:33]. 
The severe constraints placed on open political activity were reinforced further 
with the rise to power of Phibun Songkhram [hereafter Phibun]. Coming to political 
prominence following the key role he played in crushing the Bowadet rebellion, 
Phibun had served as deputy commander-in-chief of the Thai army during the Pahon 
years. Assuming the position of Prime Minister in mid-December 1938 Phibun was to 
take Thai politics in new directions. With his admiration of the authoritarian regimes of 
Germany Japan and Italy widely known, Phibun initiated steps toward the creation of 
a similiar type of authoritarian order in Thailand in which the state was to become 
increasingly involved 'in all aspects areas of Siam's economic, social and cultural life' 
[Barme,1989:117 see also, Terweil,1980; Girling, 1981:106-107; Batson,1985:221-
25]. In the attempt to legitimise his rule, Phibun launched a massive program of 
'hypernationalism' [Barme,1989:117-156]]. Taking over and selectively redifining the 
official nationalist discourse first developed by Wajirawut, Phibun with the assistance 
Thailand's first anti-communist law came into force on 2 April 1933. Under the law 
communism was defined as 'Any doctrine which supports or promotes the nationalisation of 
land or industry or capital and labour'. Directed in the first instance against Pridi and those who 
supported his Economic Plan, the Act stated that 'Any person who is the head, or manager or 
official of any association, whether secret or otherwise, the purpose of which is to support or 
promote communists or communism will be decreed in breach of the law and will face a 
penalty of not more than 10 years imprisonment and a fine not exceeding 5,000 bahl. Any 
person who is a member of such an organisation will be decreed to be in breach of the law and 
will face a penalty of not more than 5 years imprisonment and a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht 
[Sathian, ND:9-11]. From 1933 to 1946 991 people were arrested under the terms of the law 
[BP 19/10/1946]. 
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of Luang Wichit Wathakan, sought to promote 'nation-building' and emphasise the 
'Thai-ness of Siam' [Batson,1985:227]. In the present context it would be impossible 
to give a detailed account of this period of massive ideological mobilisation. It will be 
appropriate, however, to examine some of the measures which the state adopted which 
aimed to oust the Chinese from their dominance over wage-labour. 
The dominance which the Chinese exercised over the Thai economy in general 
and over wage-labour positions in particular, had long posed problems for state 
officials. Although the absolute monarchs had been able to derive huge benefits from 
Chinese immigration, the growing hold which the immigrants came to exercise over 
the Thai ecoomy, combined with the development of Chinese nationalism, had led to a 
situation where the Chinese were perceived to represent a threat to the state. As noted, 
the danger which this economically powerful and increasingly ethnically aware 
community posed to the stability of the Thai political and social order was clearly 
revealed during the course of the 1910 general strike, an event which Skinner 
[1957:155] argues effectively launched the 'Chinese Problem' in Thailand. By the end 
of Wachirawut's reign the Chinese population in Thailand approximated ten percent of 
a total population of 8.3 million [Barme,1989:23] With an increasing number of 
Chinese women immigrating to Thailand, the further development of republican and 
communist ideas and a demonstrated willingness to implement trade boycotts the 
Chinese 'began to appear to Siamese eyes not only as transient profitees but as an 
increasingly unassimable bloc in the country' [Thompson,1947:227]. 
From the early 1920's onwards, state officials were urged to initiate measures 
which would eventually lead to a replacement of Chinese workers by Thais. For 
example, in 1923 the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail stated that: 
It has been proved repeatedly that in the saw mill or the rice 
mill here the Siamese workman has no chance of fair 
treatment. There is, in fact, a great lack of proper work for 
the Siamese workmen [BTWM^l 3/8/1923]. 
The following year the same paper suggested that the state should act to curb 
Chinese imigration 'in order to protect the national interest' [BTWM17/3/924]. At the 
beginning of the Seventh Reign one commentator, in outlining some of the furture 
policies which he thought the new monarch should adopt suggested that, 'an attempt 
must be made to encourage Thais into commerce and manual labour' [BTWM 
21/5/1925]. Renewed calls for the replacement of Chinese labour with Thai were made 
after the 1928 boycott of Japanese goods with the Bangkok Times insisting that: 
...real efforts [must] be made to stimulate the growth of a 
Siamese working class. Such a class would act and react on 
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the Chinese, who now hold a monopoly of the labour market 
[BT,28/5/1928] 
In an initial response to these appeals, the idea of establishing a Labour Bureau 
was canvassed. The object of this government instrumentality was to 'promote a 
gradually increasing particpation of Siamese nationals in all activities within the 
Kingdom' [NA R 7 Ph 13/1], However, it appears no definite steps were made to 
create such a bureau. The government did in fact promulgate an immigration law 
which gave it the authority to impose quotas and set immigration fees at levels which 
could discourage funher large scale immigration. However, as Batson [1984:85] notes 
'the law was only lightly applied and appeared to have only a limited impact'. As 
Batson [1985:85] further notes the 'only argument made against restricting Chinese 
immigration was the dependence of Siam's economy upon Chinese labour'. Given the 
fact that no effective measures were taken to limit immigration, it appears that this was 
an argument which held sway, at least, during the last years of the absolute monarchy. 
More concrete steps to restrict Chinese immigration and encourage Thais into 
wage labouring positions were adopted after the change in government. Not 
surprisingly, the first attempt to place restrictions on certain occupations followed in 
the wake of the 1934 rice mill strike. In 1935-36 a series of laws were passed 
requiring rice mills to employ a minimum of fifty percent Thai workers 
[Skinner,1957:219]. In 1937 immigration fees were raised to two hundred baht , a 
move which Thompson notes[1947:228] only stimulated a 'great increase in the 
number of Chinese smuggled into Siam'. More effective measures to oust Chinese 
from their grip over the economy came after Phibun became Prime Minister. 
As noted briefly above, during his first term as Prime Minister [1938-1944], 
launched an ambitious program to 'build the nation'. Integral to this program were the 
steps which the Prime Ministers and his advisors adopted to 'Thai-ify' the economy by 
placing restrictions on the actvities of Chinese and Western business interests. As 
Hewsion notes [1989:71]: 
Most restrictions, however, struck at the Chinses petty 
bourgeoisie, small traders and workers, leaving the larger 
capitalists relatively unscathed.Occupational restrictions did 
not severely restrict Chinese capital, but were designed to 
move Thai nationals into certain occupations. 
Between 1939 and 1942 a series of laws were passed which restricted certain 
jobs to Thai nationals. In April 1939 the Thai Vehicles Act required that taxi drivers be 
Thai. In the same year private and public industry was required to employ at least 
seventy five per cent Thai workers. In 1942 another twenty seven occupations were 
specifically reserved for Thais and through the Occupational and Professional 
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Assistance Act additional requirements were made to ensure that factories employed 
Thai labour [Thompson,1947:264]. 
First, they laid the foundations for a gradual transformation in the ethnic 
makeup of the Thai industrial working class, thus bringing workers more fully under 
the political and ideological control of the Thai s t a t e . 3^ Second, by offering Thais 
greater access to wage labouring positions the government was clearly attempting to 
win the support of the Thai working class. Finally, the emphasis given to nation 
building and the construction of Thai identity combined with anti-Chinese rhetoric, 
further promoted and fostered ethnic differences among industrial workers. As will 
discussed in the following chapter, the post-war labour movement placed great 
emphasis on the need to overcome the ethnic differences which had been encouraged 
during the 1938-1944 period. 
4.4 Summary 
Two quotations from the work of Virginia Thompson [1947:243] typify hitherto 
widely held academic perceptions of the historical importance of labour prior to the 
Second World War. 
Apart f rom white collar unemployment and a few anti-
Japanese boycotts, other types of labour problems were 
virtually unknown under the absolute monarchy. In general 
the people accepted whatever their superiors chose to deal out 
to them [Thompson 1947:239]. 
And, even during the period immediately after World War Two, Thai workers 
were: 
...only beginning to show an interest in the improvement of 
working conditions in their country and in their status as 
compared with that of workers in foreign lands. Generally 
speaking, labor in Siam remains almost wholly unorganised 
and without political representation or consciousness 
[Thompson, 1947:243] 
The data assembled in this chapter has demonstrated that these views cannot be 
sustained on empirical grounds. Some of the main points to be noted are as follows: 
(1) Struggles over the establishment of a norm for the working day continued 
to develop. Rather than simply accepting whatever their superiors chose to deal out to 
The occupational restrictions initiated during this period which laid the basis for a change in the 
ethnic composition of the industrial working class were buttressed further by restrictions placed 
on Chinese immigration after World War Two as well as additional occupational restriants 
placed on Chinese during the 1950's [Skinner,1957:177-178; Mabry, 1979:45], 
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them, both Thai and Chinese workers demonstrated a willingness and ability to 
challenge the authority of their employers in their attempt to secure higher wages and 
an improvement in their working conditions. 
(2) The process of co-ordinating and organising these struggles by industrial 
workers continued to develop under the leadership of Thawat and the labour group. 
On the industrial front, this small group of organisers remained committed to 
advancing the interests of workers by offering advice, support and welfare benefits. In 
die wider sphere of politics, it has been demonstrated this nascent labour movement 
joined with other social forces which were struggling for the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy in Thailand. The significance of labour's contributions to this 
struggle is demonstrated by workers' participation in both the 1932 coup and the 
Borawadet rebellion. 
(3) Except for a brief period between 1932 and 1934, the state responded to the 
development of the labour movement largely through repression. Arrest and 
imprisonment, deportation, restrictions of the right to strike, freedom of the press and 
freedom of association are examples of repressive measures which constrained the 
development of labour. Apart from drawing attention to this pattern of repression, 
some emphasis has been given to tracing the way in the state was gradually being 
drawn into regulating relations within industry. Based on a growing realisation that 
workers did, in fact, possess some legitimate grievances, state officials began the 
process of developing labour legislation. 
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Chapter Five 
CLASS FORMATION: 
1 9 4 4 - 1 9 5 7 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to show that industrial workers continued to make significant 
contributions to Thai, industrial, political and social life during the decade after World 
War Two. The further development of the labour movement and the various ways in 
which the state attempted to shape and constrain this development will be examined. 
For discussion purposes the 1944-1947 period will be divided into three sub-periods, 
1944-1947, 1947-1955 and 1955-1957. 
Period One 1944-1947 
5.1.1 The Labour Movement 1944-1947 
The war years had seen not only a growth in the size of the industrial working 
class, but also a dramatic lowering in the standard of their work and living conditions. 
As supplies from both Europe and the United States had been cut, there had been a 
shortage of many goods, prices had risen sharply and black markets had appeared in 
the wake of the government's attempt to institute rationing. Toward the end of the war 
allied air raids had damaged many factories, shops and buildings and power supplies 
had been cut for long periods. Urban residents were most severely effected as they 
faced food shortages, rampant inflation and a difficulty in obtaining vital commodities 
such as medical supplies [Batson,1985:229-230]. Apart from a lowering in the 
standard of living, workers faced what was described as 'appalling conditions in 
workshops and manufacturing plants' [BP 13/11/1946] with one I.L.O advisor 
claiming that overall 'labour conditions in Siam [were] far worse than those existing in 
Malaya, Ceylon and South Africa [Democracy 2/9/1946], Under these conditions of 
economic deterioration, social dislocation and harsh working conditions, there 
emerged a widespread eruption of struggles over the working day. In early 1945 Thai 
tobacco workers struck and demanded wage increases and better working conditions, 
and over the following eighteen months there was a spate of protests and 
demonstrations among rice mill workers, dock workers, railway workers and oil 
workers. Between 1946-47, 168 strikes were recorded with 109 reported to have 
taken place in 1947 alone [BP 21/6/1948]. This renewed radicalism and outpouring of 
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grievances among industrial workers was, in part, the product of renewed attempts to 
organise workers, a process which had been going on since the early 1940's. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, organised labour virtually disappeared 
from public view during the mid 1930's. While it appears that small and informal 
workers' organisations continued to exist at individual factories and manufacturing 
sites, the demise of the T.T.A and subsequently the Labour Support Group had 
signalled the end of attempts to mould these isolated labour groups into a organised 
labour movement. However, this situation began to change when in 1940, a group of 
students from some of Bangkok's leading schools began to organise a series of study 
and discussion sessions. Originally, this small group of students met to discuss 
domestic political issues as well as to keep abreast of events which were taking place 
in Asia and Europe. When, toward the end of 1941, a Japanese invasion of Thailand 
appeared to be imminent, the students decided to establish a number of 'labour 
associations' [samakhom kammakon ], the aim of which was to mobilise workers 
against the Japanese. A number of these associations were established at the Bangkok 
docks, in various tobacco factories, at the Makasan railway workshop, in breweries 
and the largest rice and saw mills. [Sangsit, 1986:147-155]. 
In 1942 Si Anuthai, one of the students from the original study group, 
established a Labourers' Welfare Association [Samakhom Songkhro Kammakon ] at 
the tobacco factory at Bangkhaen . The association aimed to provide assistance for sick 
or injured workers. Apparently, this became a model form of organisation and similar 
associations were established among water transport workers, rice mill workers and 
tramway and railway workers.[Sangsit,1986:147-155]. By the end of the war 23 of 
these associations had combined to form themselves into a larger body called the 
Workers Welfare Associaton of Bangkok (W.W.A.B.) [Samakhom Kamakon 
Songkhro Krungthep ]. After registering with the Office for National Culture in late 
1945, this new organisation expanded its activities and began organising other groups 
of rice and saw mill workers, dock and port labourers, railway workers and printers. 
In the middle of 1946 the W.W.A.B.changed its name and became known as the 
Association of United Trade Workers of Bangkok (A.U.T.W.B) [Samakhom 
Sahachiwa Kammakon Nakhon Krungthep ]. Aiming to improve wages and working 
conditions, this new association applied for and received permission for registration in 
November 1946. The A.U.T.W.B held its first major rally on 1 January 1946. In an 
article titled 'Striking Proof of Unity' a journalist from the Democracy newspaper 
described the scene as follows: 
Over ten thousand workers, men and women, attended a 
rally at the Pramane ground. The rally was held under the 
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auspices of the United Trade Unions of Bangkok.^ The 
hammer and sickle, signs of the communist party, were 
prominently displayed on flags in a sea of old Siamese and 
Chinese flags...As the hour drew near for the meeting, the 
crowd of workers became so great that even the road around 
the ground itself was filled...The president of the UTUB 
called for unity among all the workers to fight against 
capitalism. He warned them to be aware of inciters and 
instigators who would cause trouble and disagreement 
among them...Prince Sakol was then invited to address the 
crowd and was received with loud and enthusiastic applause. 
Even though he used rather classical language which was 
difficult for the workers to understand, they gave loud 
'chaiyos' all the time he was speaking...Prince Sakol stated 
that he feared the future path of labour might not be very 
smooth. He was of the opinion, however, that if they 
maintained their unity such as they had shown on this 
occasion there was not much to fear. He warned them against 
machinations which might cause disagreements and trouble 
amongst them. The mass rally ended in peace and order, with 
all the workers dispersing to their factories and working 
places amidst singing [Democracy 3/1/1947] 
A week later the Democracy followed up its account of the rally with an editorial 
which captured the growing sense of unity and solidarity which was taking place 
within the ranks of industrial workers at the time: 
There was a remarkable unity among all ranks of workers. 
No one who has the interest of this country at heart can feel 
anything but gratification at the spirit shown by the workers. 
There are of course many who cannot think of workers as a 
class without associating them with communism and the 
hammer and sickle. It is true communism has been identified 
with the workers of the world to some extent, but this is 
because it seeks to establish uniform conditions for all 
workers. Hence, its appeal to them. The political aspect of 
communism need not be feared, for after all workers only 
ask for what they should get by r ight-fair wages, a 
comfortable standard of living and adequate safeguards in 
their old age. The mass rally last week has shown that 
Bangkok's workers, and we can assume Siam's workers 
too, are primarily concerned in bettering their lot. It must be 
admitted that this country is lagging behind very much in the 
matter of assuring better conditions for workers. So far they 
have been inarticulate, but it is a good sign that they are 
approaching their problems in a realistic, and not a 
revolutionary manner. It would be wise for the government 
to take cognisance of this and on their own initiative to plan 
schemes for improving the lot of workers...There is far too 
wide a gap in this country between the working class and 
what we may term the leisured class of wealthy people. The 
This is a mistranslation. The term sahaphapraegngan [trade union] was not used until after the 
1956 Labour Act was promulgated. All workers groups prior to this were known as 
associations [samakhom]. 
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latter roll along in luxurious ease, entertain on a lavish scale 
and look down almost with contempt on their less fortunately 
placed brothers and sisters. The workers are the ones who 
feel the pinch at the present time most. It is they who have to 
work desperately hard to make ends meet. They are the ones 
who have to do much with little. It is high time that they too 
partook of whatever prosperity there is evident. It does not 
require political ideologies to prove this. It is pure common 
sense that the man who produces the goods...should get a 
fair share of the profits. And the workers of Bangkok have 
come out with a praiseworthy three point programme. They 
want improved conditions, they aim at Sino-Siamese amity 
and the progress of Siam. That is what all of us hope for. 
And it is a safe bet that Sino-Siamese amity can best be 
cemented between the workers of both communities. They 
have much in common. And they have hit the nail on the 
head when they say they want the prosperity of Siam. It is in 
their hands and we should recognise this fact. The more 
satisfied workers are, the better they will work and so 
guarantee the quickest possible return to normalcy. 
The stated aims of the AUTWB was to basically improve working conditions 
for all workers and, in particular, to forge greater co-operation between Thai and 
Chinese workers. In April 1947, the AUTWB hosted a conference at which 
representatives of workers from Bangkok, Thonburi and provincial centres met with a 
view to establish a national labour federation. As a result of these deliberations there 
emerged the Association of United Trade Workers of Thailand [Samakhom Sahachiwa 
Kammakon Haeng Prathet Thai ] which has become commonly known simply as the 
Central Labour Union (CLU). The CLU, the first labour organisation in Thai history 
which aimed to represent workers interests on a national scale, immediately began to 
organise celebrations for Labour Day and on 1 May 1947 over seventy thousand were 
reported to have attended the festivities: 
Nai Thenthai Apichatbutr, chairman of the rally organising 
committee, opened the rally with a brief address on the need 
for a more ethical social evolution in which the doctrine of 
communism, he said, should play a leading role. Karmail 
Singh of the Bangkok Labour Union spoke on behalf of the 
1,000 union members present urging unity between the 
various elements. Only through united action, he said, could 
labour succeed in raising its standard of living...Spokesrnen 
for the Sino-Thai labour association and of Indonesian 
labourers also spoke briefly, emphasising the need for labour 
to unite in the common cause of raising the standard of 
living. The various unions carried banners and the Central 
Labour Union flag, almost a duplicate of the communist flag, 
were displayed around the ground [BP 2/5/1947] 
The stated aims of the CLU were: (1) to cooperate with progressive social 
forces and promote labour organisations, (2) to provide educational and welfare 
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assistance to workers, (3) to assist in the settlement of labour disputes, (4) to effect 
mutual cooperation and aid among member organisations and (5) to act as a 
representative for workers generally [Mabry,1979:43], Over the following years the 
CLU provided assistance to both Thai and Chinese workers in their struggles against 
employers and made numerous appeals to government to enact a comprehensive law 
which would give workers, the right to strike, to establish trade unions as well as fix 
limits on wages levels, working hours and periods of leave etc. Some further 
comments on the contributions of the CLU will made below. At this point, however, it 
will be appropriate to discuss the ideological orientaion of this organisation for as 
indicated in the quotation cited above, there existed a belief within the leadership of the 
C L U that the ideas of 'communism' should play a 'leading role' in the future evolution 
of Thai society. 
Previous discussions of the rise to prominence of the CLU have noted simply 
that it was initially sponsored by Pridi's Sahachip Party, that originally the majority of 
its members were Thai and that Chinese workers later came to form the largest 
proportion of its membership. It has also been stated that the organisation became 
'communist' dominated, a fact which appears to be supported by its affiliation with the 
World Federation of Trade Unions in February 1949 [Skinner,1957:286-287,323; 
Mabry, 1979:43] . Underpinning these views lies a strong suggestion that the leftist 
orientation of the CLU was somewhat alien to the mainstream labour movement of the 
time and its 'communism' was really a product of the actions of Chinese agents who 
infiltrated and eventually won control of the union [Mabry, 1979:43]. Certainly, some 
sections o f the CLU did hold an ideological position which was, for example, in 
marked constrast to that which was advanced by Thawat and the Labour Group. 
However, rather than seeing this move to the left as the product of the work of 'alien' 
infiltrators, it should rather be seen in the light of the influence of a new generation of 
Thai labour leaders who were developing new modes of class struggle in response to 
the challenges which workers faced during the post-war years. 
As shown in the last chapter, the organised labour movement in Thailand was, 
at least until the mid 1930's, largely dominated by the ideology of Thawat and the 
Labour Group. It has been argued that in attempting to advance the interests of 
industrial workers, Thawat and his associates advocated what has been termed a 
labourist mode of class struggle-that workers could win their struggle for freedom 
and realise their interests within the existing relations of production. The labourist 
mode of class continued to be advocated during the post war years by activists such as 
Pakop Tolaklam [1928-] whose father had been one of the leaders of the 1934 railway 
strike. After returning to work at the railways after the war, Prakop became involved 
in the Association of Makasan Workers which was then led by Wisit Suphatra. After 
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the latter left his position as head of the railway workers, Prakop was elected president 
of the of association. Reportedly an excellent public speaker, Prakop played a leading 
role in struggling for an improvement of wages and conditions within the 
railways.over subsequent years. An ardent nationalist, Prakop opposed the more 
radical elements within the CLU and later joined and became active in the government 
sponsored Thai Labour Union (TLA) [Sangsit,1986198-210]. Another example, of a 
'labourist' leader is that of Sang Phatanothai [1915-]. A former teacher who had 
become well known for his involvment in nationalist plays which were aired over the 
radio during the war, Sang played a leading role in the formation of the TLU. Sent to 
Oxford to study labour relations, he opposed the development of 'communism' within 
the ranks of workers and argued that the TLA by providing assistance to its members 
would be able to effect a degree of co-operation between labour and capital 
[Sangsit,1986:212-223]. While leaders such as Prakop and Sang contributed further to 
the development of labourism, other elements within this new generation of labour 
leaders began to formulate alternative and more radical solutions to workers' 
problems. The emergence of this radical wing within the Thai labour movement needs 
to be seen in the light of the broader developments which were taking place in Thai 
political thought during this period. 
It has been noted that the 'communist' ideologies which were circulating in 
Thailand during the late 1920's remained largely confined to the Chinese and 
Vietnamese communities. In 1933 an Anti-Communist Act was passed which 
proscribed 'communism', deeming it and anyone who held such ideas to be enemies 
of the Thai nation. After the war this virulent anti-communist stance was eased. In 
1946, in retum for the Soviet Union's acceptance of Thailand into the United Nations, 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), formed in 1942, was legalised and the Anti-
Communist Act withdrawn [Insor,1965:90; Reynolds,1987:25]. As Reynolds 
[1987:25] has observed: 
With the CPT operating legally and openly and with the 
momentum of liberal and democratic expectations generated 
during the Pridi years (1946-47) only somewhat diminished, 
there was a distinctly Left orientation in Bangkok public 
discourse for a decade or so after World War II. 
It was during this decade that there developed an enormous interest in Marxist 
thought, international Communism and the rights of workers. Apart from the 
publication of Mahachon [The Masses] the official paper of the CPT, the period 
witnessed the production and dissemination of some of the classic works of Thai leftist 
literature by authors such as Udom Sisuwan , Supha Sirianond, Samak Burawat and 
Jit Phoumisak. As Reynolds [1987] has shown, this resurgent leftist discourse which 
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employed the concepts of class, class struggle, exploitation and modes of production, 
became part of a 'radical and distinctly non-militaristic nationalism for Thailand which 
directly challenged some of the main ideas upon which the legitimacy of the Thai state 
was based [Reynolds, 1987:26]. It was the development of these alternate bodies of 
thought which provided Thai labour leaders with new perspectives for meeting the 
challenges faced by the workers they represented. 
A good example of a labour leaders who was to employ marxist concepts in his 
analysis of the problems faced by workers is that of Damri Ruansutham who was 
elected as the first President of the Workers' Welfare Association of Bangkok, and 
later became involved in the Association of United Trade Workers of Bangkok as well 
as the Samlo Association [Samakhom Trairak ]. In his book co-authored with Carun 
Lasaa, another radical leader who played an active role in organising railway workers, 
[1986], Damri brings a markedly different interpretation to the problems facing labour 
than that which was advanced by the adherents of labourism. Basic to his analysis are 
the concepts of capitalism, class exploitation and class struggle. While providing some 
very useful empirical data on the development of the labour movement during the pre-
1957 period, the signifcance of the work lies in the emphasis which is given to 
analysing the problems of workers in systemic terms. This analysis stands in marked 
constrast to views which were developed by Thawat, for example, who perceived the 
exploitation and oppression of workers as the product of the personal corruption of 
individual employers. Damri's main criticism, however, is directed at the system of 
capitalism itself rather than against the individuals who occupy places within the 
system. For Damri, it is both the existence of capitalist relations of production and a 
state which promotes and defends these relations which is the key to understanding the 
source of the problems faced by workers. Thus, unlike Thawat who argued that 
workers could struggle for their freedom and self respect within capitalist relations, the 
basic inference which can be drawn from Damri's work is that these goals will only be 
realised in the overthrow of these relations. Although offering a very different 
interpretation to the problems of labour than that which was offered by the adherents 
of labourism, Damri and others in the CLU who were contributing to the development 
of a radical mode of class struggle, did argue, however, that, at least in the short term, 
it was necessary that labour and capital should forge some degree of co-operation. As 
Sangsit [1986:20] notes: 
The leaders of the CLU did not think that capitalism which 
developed in Thailand was identical to that which had 
developed in the West. They felt that Thai capitalism could 
not develop because of the actions and constraints imposed 
by foreign capital. Capitalists in Thailand were themselves 
exploited by foreigners and similarly labourers in Thailand 
were exploited by foreign capital. For this reason it was felt 
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that labour must join forces with the Thai bourgeoisie 
opposing foreign capital. In this way local capitalism would 
be allowed to develop and expand, but at the same time this 
capitalism would not be pure but wouldbe capitalism based 
on a new plan which was set toward the achievment of a 
future socialism. So for the leaders of the CLU, while 
accepting that in the long term the interests of capital and 
labour were opposed, in the short term it came to be accepted 
that capital and labour could work together in order to 
promote and advance the interests of the nation. 
Whatever the substantive merits of this analysis may have been, it is significant 
to note how this radical analysis of workers problems was becoming part of the 
development of an alternative nationalist discourse which stood in marked constrast to 
the official nationalist dicourse which had been, and would continue to be, promoted 
by Thai military leaders. 
In the preceeding pages the aim has been to provide an account of the rise of an 
organised labour movement during the immediate post war years. Some emphasis has 
been given to showing that, within this resurgence of organised labour, it is possible 
to discern the beginnings of a radical mode of class struggle which stands in marked 
contrast to the labourism which had been advocated by Thawat and his successors. It 
has been argued that, rather than representing an alien ideology, the development of a 
radical wing within the Thai labour movement must be seen in the context of the rise of 
leftist discourse within Thai society during the period. While not displacing the 
dominant labourist mode of class struggle, the circulation of marxist thought allowed 
some labour leaders to bring new perspectives onto the analysis of the problems which 
confronted workers. By 1947, therefore, the industrial working class had emerged as 
an important force within Thai society. Increasingly well organised the labour 
movement under the general leadership of the CLU demonstrated a clear ability to be 
able to successfully struggle for the interests of labour in both the sphere of industry 
and in the wider sphere of politics. As an indication of the success of this frantic 
process of organising workers along class lines, it was estimated that by early 1949 
membership of the CLU stood at sixty thousand and was affiliated with over sixty 
labour associations [BP 8/2/1949]. Also indicative of the success and political strength 
of the labour movement are the measures which the military regime implemented to 
destroy and undermine the power of labour following their return to power in 1947. 
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Period Two 1947-1955 
5.2.1 Labour Under Military Rule 1947-1955 
The flowering of labour organisation and activity described above was 
facilitated by the open political environment which existed during the years 1944-47. 
Succesive civilian regimes, badly divided between conservatives and pro Pridi forces 
had, however, failed to forge a sufficient degree of stability which would have 
permitted them to continue their rule and create the conditions for the establishment of 
a permanent system of parliamentary democracy in Thailand. Pridi's implication in the 
mysterious gunshot death of King Ananda in June 1946, growing economic problems, 
reported widespread corruption among government officials, the rising power of 
labour and other leftist forces provided the perfect opportunity for the military to the 
centre of the political stage. In 1947 the military seized state power and after a brief 
interim period, Phibun became Prime Minister for a second time in April 1948. 
After assuming office Phibun announced he would pursue a pro-Western and 
Anti-Communist policy [Bumrungsuk,1985:29], a stance which was to have a 
dramatic impact on the further development of the labour movement. Over the 
following seven years the thrust of Phibun's policy toward labour was directed toward 
smashing the power of the CLU. This aim was largely achieved in three ways: first; 
through a strategy of 'corporatism', second, through outright repression and third, by 
fostering and promoting ethnic differences among workers. Each of these three 
measures will be discussed briefly. 
Initially, at least, the attack on the organised labour movement was pursued 
through the adoption of a strategy of corporatism. As Munck [1988:128] explains: 
The strategy of 'corporatism' entails a systematic role for the 
state in the regulation of labour relations. This may involve 
the state taking a direct role in actually creating trade unions 
and subsequently maintaining them under tutelage, through 
finacial dependency...[I]t amounts to a carefully managed, 
ritualized class struggle which dampens the more exuberant 
expressions of that process. Corporatism is often associated 
with authoritarianism and dictatorship. 
In May 1948 Phibun took the first steps toward adopting a corporatist strategy 
when he established the Thai Labour Association [Samakhom Kammakon Haeng 
Phratet Thai ]. Commonly known as the Thai Labour Union (TLU), membership was 
restricted to Thai nationals and the stated aims of the organisation were to raise living 
standards for workers, to facilitate and encourage the development of skills and to 
'strive for better employer-employee relations without combatting the principle of 
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private enterprise' [BP 19/4/1948]. The union waived all subscription fees and was 
fully financed by the government. By May 1949 it claimed to have a membership of 
thirty thousand. It was this government sponsoring of unions such as the T L A and 
subsequent labour associations [see below] that has led writers such as Mabry and 
Fogg to express some doubt whether is possible to speak of the development of a 
'real' labour movement during the 1946-58 period. Two points need to be made with 
regard to this views. First, they lack an appreciation of the ways in which the 
promotion of government labour organisations were designed to check and constrain 
the growth in the power of labour by precisely attempting to 'dampen the more 
exuberant' expressions of class struggle which had been advocated by the left wing of 
the CLU. The second point which Mabry fails to appreciate is the extent to which 
workers were able to use these govenment sponsored unions and turn them to their 
own advantage. This point requires further comment. 
Initially the T L U was led by Chai Wirotsi who was a brother-in-law of 
Phibun's wife. However, this avowedly right wing and anti-communist leader was 
soon opposed by more progressive elements within the union who were more intent 
on promoting the interests of workers within the structure of choices which were 
available to them. According to Damn and Carun [1986:160], the progressive elements 
within the T L C were eventually able to wrestle control away from Wirotsi, a task made 
aU the easier following his involment in the sale of rice in Malaya which had originally 
been marked for distribution to labour groups in southern Thailand. Although the 
union was later to be led by Sang Phatanothai, who also maintained close links with 
the Premier, members were still able to use the organisation's resources to provide 
genuine assistance to workers during periods of injury, illness and childbirth [Damri 
and Carun,1986:160.] . 
Although partially successful at drawing away some groups of workers CLU 
control, the strategy of corporatism was soon to be supplemented by the adoption of 
more repressive measures. The first hints of what was to become a concerted policy of 
outright repression of the CLU, came in 1948, when four o f its representatives were 
arrested as they attempted to negotiate a strike settlement. Although representing 
workers' interests across a range of industries, the CLU had been particularly active in 
attempting to improve conditions within the rice milling industry. Like many workers 
at the time, rice mill labourers worked under atrocious conditions. A normal working 
day consisted of a twelve hour shift. They were given no days off except for Chinese 
New Year, and there were no benefits for sick or injured workers. Working conditions 
were harsh, mills were badly ventilated, and the air was thick with dust from the 
milled rice. Many workers were reported to have suffered from lung disease, and it is 
claimed that on average at least two workers died each year from lung related ilnesses 
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[Sangsit,1986:179-187], From late 1945 onwards, under direction of the CLU, rice 
mill workers had been in engaged in numerous struggles aimed toward improving their 
pay and working conditons. In late 1947 workers employed by private rice millers 
presented a list of grievances to their employers and after two weeks of conflict 
managed to win substantial pay increases, monthly rations of rice, extra payment for 
overtime, some basic health services and a guarantee that no worker would be 
dismissed without the case being first examined by a specially formed committee made 
up of both workers and managment. [Sangsit,1986:179-187; Damri and 
Carun, 1986:56-57] Shortly after, rice mill workers employed in state controlled mills 
presented similar demands to management, and it was during these negotiations that 
the four CLU representatives were arrested, imprisoned for a number of months and 
subsequently convicted of 'secret society' activity and fined 500 baht each [BP 
8/2/1949]. 
After the arrest of the CLU representatives Phibun stepped up his policy of 
outright repression of the union movement. Between July and December 1948, 53 
'communist' and 'alien' left wing political and labour leaders were reported to have 
been deported by the govemment. These actions had followed in the wake of a raid on 
CLU headquarters in July 1948 where police had seized union documents [BP 
3/12/1948]. Despite this harrassment, the CLU continued to support workers, and in 
early 1949 the union officially announced that it had been admitted membership of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions. In making public the union's admission to the 
WFTU, Tienthai Apichatbut stated that the union hoped to send a delegate to the Asian 
trade union conference which was scheduled to take place in Peking. However, he 
stated that this would depend on the government giving authorisation for union 
members to travel to the communist controlled zone [BP 8/2/1949]. The CLU's 
continued association with a left wing politics sparked a more concerted strategy by the 
government to undermine the organisation. In mid-1949 the Thai police were reported 
to have initiated a survey on 'How Communism Affects Labour' [BP 22/7/1949]. It 
was reported that the police were paying special attention to the spread of communism 
in order to prevent the possible infiltration of communist ideas into the TLU. Apart 
from stating that the professions, addresses and political affiliations of Chinese 
workers were now being compiled the report continued: 
A campaign to combat the infiltration of communist doctrine 
into the ranks of Thai labour was opened yesterday at a 
meeting of the new 25 man executive council of the Thai 
Labour Union held at the orpnisation's headquarters near 
Khao Din Park. The campaign is being conducted at the 
behest of Premier Phibun...who called TLU leaders to his 
office at Government House last Monday. Chairman of the 
unions anti-communist movement is Major-General Swadsi 
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Swasdiklart, the assisstant communications Minister. [The] 
spokesman is Lieut. Colonel Sawang Thapasut secretary of 
the Ministry of Defence. At yesterday's meeting the Premier 
directed that only by education of workers in the way of 
democratic methods and providing adequate amenities could 
communism be effectively combatted...Committee men and 
union members were asked to be on the alert to expose those 
attempting to organise or propogandise Thai workmen in 
communist doctrine or methods. The committee directed the 
various members to conduct semi-monthly meetings at which 
the importance of loyalty to Nation, Religion, King would be 
emphasised. Union leaders were instructed to report on the 
health condition of members and preliminary plans were 
made for the founding of a hospital relief fund for members. 
Members of the TLU include railway, bus, rice mill and port 
workers [BP 22/7/1949]. 
This drive to rid the labour movement from the grip of 'communist doctrine' 
should be seen as part of what Reynolds [1987:29] has termed the development of an 
'anti' communist discursive pratice' which occurred in Thailand in the late 1940's and 
early 1950's. The development of this anti-communist discourse emerged out of a 
combination of factors, most notably the growing economic and strategic interests of 
the United States in the Southeast Asian region which with the growth of the Cold War 
and the Communist victory in China had led to Thailand's being seen as occupying a 
central position in America's strategy for the containment of communism. With the 
prospect of receiving increasing economic and military aid from the U.S. , Phibun 
was, as noted above, 'quick to voice his anti-communism in order to stengthen his 
position by winning American support' [Reynolds,1987:25] . The growing anti-
communist stance provided the perfect excuse for initiating further repressive measures 
against labour. 
Despite this increasingly repressive political climate, industrial workers 
continued to struggle for better wages and conditions, and from 1949 to 1952 samlo 
drivers, tramway workers, railway workers, rice and saw mill labourers, and oil 
workers were all involved in strike action [Damri and Carun,1986:68-125]. Some of 
these disputes attracted considerable public attention. For example, in 1949 tramway 
workers employed by the Thai Electric Corporation went out on strike and demanded 
that they be paid for shares they held in the company. Management refused and 
organised police tanks to be stationed outside the company workshops to threaten the 
men. The Company also attempted to bring in 'blackleg' labour but the attempt failed 
as the new recruits were unable to operate the machinery and there was a loss of power 
generation for 24 hours. Backed throughout by the CLU, the men eventually won after 
the company agreed to their demands. In 1951 the tramway workers struck again and 
demanded sickness benefits, overtime payments, permission to establish a union and 
the right to celebrate May Day. By this time the tramways had become a state 
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enterprise and, following the intervention of Police Chief Phao Sriyanon, all the men's 
demands were met [Damri and Carun,1986:68-71]. 
By 1952, however, the state was to adopt even tougher measures against 
labour, measures which were presaged by the events of what has become known as 
the 'Makasan Revolt'. Since the end of the war the Makasan rail workshops had been 
a hotbed of labour organisation and activity with the first strike having taken place in 
1946. Over two thousand workers went out and demanded that the railway authorities 
provide accommodation, free transport to and from work, annual holidays and that an 
election be held so that the men could elect a representative from each of the main 
workshops. The railway authorities granted all the demands [Damri and 
Carun,1986:52]. Rail workers struck again in 1950 and presented a list of seven 
demands to the government which covered issues such as overtime and compensation 
payments as well as provisions for sick leave. All demands were met. At the end of the 
same year the railwaymen went out again in protest over a new set of regulations 
which had been issued by the Department of Railways. As part of an attempt to restrict 
labour's organisational activities within the workshop complex, all workers had first to 
seek their a superior's permission before going to the toilet. If permission was granted 
the worker's name would then be logged in a special book which was kept by a 
official who subsequently became known as the 'shit clerk'. Every aftemooon another 
official would come and examine the names of those who had been to the toilet. As 
Damri and Carun [1986:92-93] point out the reason for the introduction of these 
bizarre rules stemmed from the fact that the toilet area was often used as a meeting 
place for rail workers and was colloquially known as the 'toilet assembly' 
[sphanasiiam ]. Another new regulation against which the men objected was that all 
employees had to wear uniforms displaying their bureaucratic ranking. This, it was 
argued, encouraged class differences among the men. The railwaymen went out on 
strike, and apart from calling for an end to the enforcement of trivial regulations, 
demanded wage increases, better safety regulations , better accommodation, and the 
more prompt payment of wages. [Damri and Carun, 1986:92-94]. 
By 1952 the rail workers had thus accumulated considerable experience in 
fighting for better wage and conditions and in March of that year they struck once 
again. Divisions had, however, arisen within the ranks as supporters of the CLU 
argued that because of the uncertain political climate no strike should be called. 
Sections under the leadership of Prakop Tolaklam argued, however, that certain 
actions taken by the rail authorities threatened living standards and that workers should 
respond immediately.[Sangsit,1986:202-203]. Those in favour of strike action 
prevailed and leaders demanded a wage increase of 500 baht per month and an 
increase in various welfare payments. On the second day of the strike, however, they 
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added to these claims by demanding that two railway officials be removed from their 
positions. As Damri and Carun [1986:103] note, this last demand served to step up the 
seriousness of the situation as the Department of Railways had recendy become a state 
enterprise and the dismissal of officials was a matter which brought the government 
into the dispute. The government refused to accept the demands and argued that, the 
act of striking was in serious breach of the law and constituted a 'revolt' [kabot.]. 
Government officials demanded that the men return to work. The men refused to 
follow the government's direction and the strike leaders called for unity within the 
ranks. As the strike entered its third day the police began arresdng the strike leaders. 
The arrest of their leaders sparked a renewed sense of unity among the railway 
workers and they continued with their work stoppage for another five days. 
Eventually, the government acceded to the men's demands and moved the two officials 
to other posts. Charges of inciting rebellion which had been levelled against the strike 
leaders were eventually dismissed. [Damri and Carun,1986:103-125]. 
While the government had backed down, the arrest of the strike leaders 
presaged a renewed phase in the repression of CLU which reached a peak at the end of 
1952. On the 10th November police and military officers carried out widespread 
arrests of writers, journalists and labour activists who had been involved in the 'Peace 
Movement'. As Reynolds [1987:27] observes the 'Peace Movement' was: 
...bom out of genuine disarmament concerns at the dawn of 
the nuclear age, organized in France in February-March 
1948, and quickly exploited by the U.S.S.R. through the 
Cominform. Peace conferences were held in a number of 
world capitals, and following the 1950 meeting in 
Stockholm, organizers claimed they had collected 500 million 
signatures on behalf of the Stockholm Appeal. 
The Peace Movement in Thailand had first earned the ire of the government 
when it had begun collecting clothes, blankets, food, medicine and money to be 
donated to alleviate the impoverished condidons of people in the Northeast. 
[Damri,1986:99-100]. The movement had subsequently objected to the Thai 
government's decision to provide material support for American troops fighting in 
Korea. As Reynolds [1987:27] notes, 'The decision provoked sharp criticism in the 
Thai press and touched a responsive nerve in a Thai public unhappy with such 
interference in the affairs of another Asian state'. Among the labour leaders arrested 
during the November raid was Sun Kitcamnong who, three decades earlier, had been 
awarded the constitutional medal for his support of the government during the 
Bowaradet rebellion. He spent the next five years in prison [Sangsit,1986:176-177], 
Three days after the arrests an Anti-Comunist Law was promulgated. According to the 
Law there were three kinds of communist acts: 
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...1) overthrowing the democratic system of government 
headed by the king; 2) altering the country's economic 
system by nationalizing private property or private means of 
production without fair compensation; 3) creating instability, 
disunity, or hatred among the people, and taking part in acts 
of terrorism or sabotage [Reynolds,1987:28] 
As Reynolds [1987:28] points out, the last of the three represented a 'catch-all' 
and in e f f ec t it prevented the CLU f rom fur ther openly supporting 
workers.[Damri,986:124-134], This direct repression of labour was backed up by 
another attempt to build a government sponsored labour organisation. In 1954 the Free 
Labour Association of Thailand (F.L.A.T.) (Samakhom Seri Raengngan Haeng 
PhratetThai ] was established under the patronage of Police Chief Phao Sriyanon .The 
specific aim of this association is clearly revealed in a letter which Phao wrote to 
Phibun. The letter referred to the various activities of the CLU which, with its links to 
international communist organisations, was said to have 'instigated' a number of 
strikes during the 1948-1950 period. It was claimed that after the massive wave of 
arrests which had been carried out on 10 November 1952 the organisational had been 
disbanded. However, following its demise there had been attempts to form workers 
into a new organisation. Thus: 
The police department was of the opinion that if it didn't 
attempt to lure (cakcungcitcai) these workers to pursue the 
correct path other groups would have fulfilled this task...it 
was for this reason that the association was established 
[N.A. S.R. 0201 k.k.]. 
The Free Labour Association of Thailand was fully financed by the government 
and received an inidal payment of two milion baht and subsequent payments of one 
million baht per annum [N.A. S.R.0201 k.k.]. The first president of the association 
was Luen Buasuwan, a wealthy Chinese merchant who was closely connected to 
Army general Chin Chunhawan. The majority of the association's members were 
Chinese rice mill, water transport and dock workers who had previously formed a 
major basis of support for the CLU [Pasuknirunt, 1959:68]. Not all applications for 
membership were made willingly, however. All leaders of major labour groups were 
'invited' to join and if they refused they were ordered to present themselves at the 
headquaters of the police Special Branch where once again they were 'requested' to fill 
out the relevant applications forms [Damri, 1986:126]. 
Apart from the adoption of corporatist and other more directly repressive 
measures, Phibun's administration attempted to break up the power of the CLU by 
fostering ethnic differences among workers. As noted, after the war, it was a 
fundamental policy of the CLU and other labour organisations that ethnic barriers had 
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to be overcome and that workers should co-operate more fully along class lines. In 
response to this development Phibun placed great emphasis on promoting once again a 
sense of nationalism among Thai workers. Membership of the Thai Labour Union was 
restricted Thai nationals. To Thais, Chinese workers were portrayed as representing a 
threat to Thai identity and workers were warned to be on the look out for Chinese 
communist agitators. The success of the policy of re-opening and promoting ethnic 
hostilities within the ranks of industrial workers, is demonstrated by the views of 
influential labour leaders such as Sang Phatonthai and Prakop Tolaklam both of whom 
criticised the CLU for protecting the interests of Chinese workers who were perceived 
to be taking jobs away from Thais. [Sangsit,1986:208]. 
In the preceeding pages the government responses to the growth in the power 
of labour has been discussed. It has been shown that both through a strategy of 
corporatism and through the adoption of more violent and repressive means the 
government sought to 1) destroy the more radical elements within the Thai labour 
movement and 2) cultivate the labourist mode of class struggle and (3) foster ethnic 
divisions and differences among workers. By the mid 1950's, however, a number of 
factors combined which led to a resurgence of labour organisation and struggle and it 
is to a discussion of this period to which I now turn. 
Period Three 1955-1957 
5.3.1 Labour Reorganizes 
Faced with increasing criticism over the policy of state-led industrialisation and 
occupying an increasingly precarious position between his two great rivals Police 
Chief Phao Sriyanon and Army General Sarit Thanarat, Phibun returned from a tour of 
America and Europe in 1955 and declared that his aim was to 'restore democracy' to 
Thailand [Insor,1965:77]. Political parties were to be legalised, press censorship 
abolished and general elections were called. Significandy, Phibun turned to Thai 
workers for support and in 1956 established the Labour Party [phakkammakon ]. 
Although initially established as a basis of support for the Premier, 'democratic 
elements' were able to capture the leadership of the organisation and turn it more fully 
toward representing workers' interests' [Sangsit,1986:205]. The committment by the 
party to pursue a line independent from the government is reflected in four of its 
policies; (1) that a labour law should be promulgated and that workers be involved in 
the development of labour legilsation, (2) that the government should trade with all 
nations, (3) that all nations should have the opportunity to be part of the United 
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Nations and play a role in the search for world peace and (4) the government should 
release all political prisoners [Sangsit, 1986:206], 
Another labour organisation which attempted to pursue an independent political 
line was the Sixteen Labour Units [Kammakon Siphok Nuay ]. Organised among 
workers who had previously been associated with first the CLU and later the Thai 
National Trade Union Congress ^ the stated aim of the Sixteen Labour Units was to 
establish a firmer base for labour activities which was seperate from the recently 
formed Labour Party. The strength of the Sixteen Labour Units was derived from 
organisations among samlo drivers, the federation of petty traders, railway workers, 
rice and saw mill workers, tramway workers, water transport and tobacco workers, 
textile and communication employees and the federation of women workers 
[Damri,1986:13-141]. In late April 1956 the Sixteen Labour Units asked for 
permission to celebrate May Day. Initially the govemment refused and claimed that to 
support May Day was tantamount to supporting communism. However, on 30 April 
the police invited workers' representatives to discuss the issue. The workers stated that 
they intended to march and the police had no option but to permit the celebration to go 
ahead. However a number of conditons were set; first that the march would be 
peaceful, that there would be no mention of politics and, in particular, there would be 
no criticism of friendly nations, finally the police insisted that the name May Day be 
changed to National Workers Day. The workers agreed to these conditions and the 
govemment declared that it would contribute 5 baht per worker to help pay for the 
celebrations. As these negotiations had not ended until 9.30 p.m. on the day before the 
march was scheduled to take place, workers spent the remainder of the night travelling 
around the industrial areas of Bangkok with loud hailers informing everybody of the 
time and place of the march. The following day the march opened with a play which 
criticised the United States and called on the Thai government to pursue an 
international policy which aimed toward the establishment of world peace. Moreover, 
during the course of the march posters were displayed which opposed SEATO and 
called for the removal of the American presence in Thailand [Damri and 
Carun,1986:144-151]. 
Apart from the process of reorganisation which was taking place among 
industrial workers, another significant development which occurred was the renewed 
interest which state officials displayed toward the promulgation of industrial and 
labour legislation. 
In 1950 the Thai Labour Union had become affiliated with the IntemaUonal Conference of Free 
Trade Unions. The following year it was reorganised and renamed as the Thai National Trade 
Union Confederation. 
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5.3.2 Labour Legislation 
One of the most significant steps taken by Phibun during the 1955-57 was the 
renewed interest given toward the promulgation of a comprehensive labour law. As we 
have seen, the debates over the role which government should play in regulating 
conditions within industry continued to be conducted through the latter half of the 
1930's. However, apart from the 1939 Factory Act which was never enforced, very 
little actual progress was made. During the immediate post-war years the government 
was to come under increasing pressure to renew its efforts to develop labour 
legislation. 
The outpouring of grievances by labour during the immediate post war years 
sparked an intensive debate within the Thai press, with the government being urged to 
take more concrete steps toward regulating relations within industry. For example, in 
November 1946 The Democracy Newspaper carried a long article titled 'Satisfied 
Labour'. Commenting on official announcements that the government would begin to 
enforce the 1939 Factory Act, the newspaper stated: 
The trend in the world today is to better the lot of the 
ordinary labourer. This is the surest way of safeguarding 
against strikes...Labour is just feeling its power today and 
strikes must not be viewed too seriously, though they 
certainly cause a great deal of inconvenience and some 
damage. In the main, however, it is the employer who is 
entirely without consideration, for it is his labourers who 
suffer the most as a result of strikes. It should be the aim of 
every country to satisfy its labour, [in order that] strikes will 
not even be considered as a means of gaining its ends. 
There is the inherent danger that if labour in this country is 
not organised along the proper lines it will form fertile soil 
for the growth of certain kinds of social manifestations which 
are to be deplored. The cry 'Workers of the World Unite' is a 
praiseworthy one provided it is meant to rally labourers of all 
countries to a common effort in the interests of peace and 
prosperity. It can, and in some cases is, deliberately used as 
a slogan for a class war. 
The Factory Act which it is intended to enforce again in Siam 
should be revised in the light of the prevailing situation. 
Many of the points of this Act, which might have been 
considered enlightening eight years ago, today would be 
considered absolutely necessary. Safety measures must be 
provided in factories. That is only natural for we are not 
living in the dark ages. There can be no longer justification 
for the 'sweated labour'. And the government owes it to 
labour to see that conditions in factories are healthy. There is 
nothing new in that. 
We think that the government should go further than that. On 
its own initiative it should study labour conditions here and 
work out measures that will assure a contented and happy 
class of workers. In this way it would be cutting the grass 
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from under the feet of those who would propose to use 
labour as a bargaining level to secure concessions for their 
own benefit. 
Government should lay down laws governing the 
employment of children, medical attention for labourers and 
definite periods of annual leave. It should ensure that they 
have healthy living apartments and plenty of recreational 
facilities. This is being done in most progressive countries of 
the world today. Labour is destined to play an ever 
increasing role in the world of tomorrow. 
Trade Unions should be encouraged and every effort should 
be made to see that they are guided by men who really are 
interested in bettering the lot of labour. Latest developments 
in other countries should also be studied with a view to their 
possible application here. It is entirely unnecessary to import 
lock stock and barrel labour laws of other countries into 
Siam. We should evolve a labour code that is peculiarly 
suited to our labour. The sooner this is done the better, as 
satisfied labour is the surest guarantee of a quick return to 
prosperity and a stable social system. 
Over the following eighteen months the government was continually reminded 
that it was obligated to enter into the industrial arena and develop a comprehensive 
system of regulations which would govern the relations between labour and capital. 
For example, in early 1947, The Democracy argued that labour legislation was now a 
'necessity'. The comments were made following a long strike by workers employed at 
the Shell Oil refinery. On 17 January 1947 workers assembled outside the fuel depot 
and refused to commence work. The company sent an official to investigate, and the 
men demanded wage rises, a later starting time, pay on official holidays, the provision 
of clothing, the right to purchase paraffin at reduced prices and an undertaking by the 
company that the foreman would be consulted before any worker was dismissed. At 9 
a.m. the general manager arrived and instructed the men to return to work, promising 
that their demands would be forwarded to the company's head office in Singapore. 
Not satisfied, the men refused to resume their duties. Later in the day the numbers on 
strike swelled even further when workers in the company's transport section came out 
in support. The following day the dispute widened as workers in the company's 
refuelling section also withdrew their labour. Represenatives from the recently formed 
CLU approached the men and offered union assistance. Company officials met with 
the men during the afternoon of the 18th and accepted four of the demands. They 
argued, however, that the issues of wage rises and pay on official holidays had to be 
forwarded to head office in Singapore. The strike was reported to have paralysed 
landing and refuelling facilities, and despite company threats to dismiss all the men, 
they refused to back down. . Meanwhile, rice mill workers brought clothing and food 
to the strikers. By the 22nd the dispute was reported to have been settled after the 
company had agreed to meet all the men's demands [Democracy 18/1/1947, 
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19/1/1947, 20/1/1947, 22/1/1947], On the implicatons of the strike the Democarcy 
[21/1/1947] stated: 
[The strike],..is symptomatic of the changing times and 
changing mood of the workers of all races and classes. Any 
government and employer who does not assess the true 
significance of these straws in the wind is inviting trouble. 
There is great need in this country for well designed labour 
legislanon. Such legislation should be carefully drawn to 
strike a just balance between the employer and his 
employees. The world agrees with the general principle that 
the workers, however humble his status, is no longer a pawn 
in the economy of the country. He is entitled to his rights and 
priviledges. The more contented workers are, the less likely 
are they to resort to a stoppage of work to force a decision. 
Labour legislation which is just should cut the ground from 
under the feet of labour agitators who seek to further their 
own ends by using labourers as their tools. Among the 
benefits that workers are entitled to are adequate wages, 
medical facilities, holidays with pay, regular working hours 
and freedom from persecution by unreasonable employers. 
These are some of the problems which are common to 
workers everywhere. But labourers in Siam should, in 
addition, have their problems viewed against the economic 
background of the country at the present moment. For 
example, cloth is extremely difficult to purchase. So is rice. 
It is the duty of employers of large labour forces, if they 
want—, to supply their employees at a reasonable cost with 
these essential commodities. We feel sure that the 
government will not put any obstacles in the way of any 
concern which seeks to benefit its employees in this respect. 
The oil strike may be viewed as a test case. It was conducted 
quite orderly and though we do not necessarily agree with all 
the demands put forward by the workers, we appreciate the 
perfectly legitimate way in which demands were made. 
Strikes are evil. They do harm both to the strikers and the 
employers. But they are manifestations of the workers' 
resurgence of spirit. The latter consider it a weapon against 
employers. It would be a good thing if employers of large 
labour forces reviewed their treatment of their employees 
taking into consideration the present condition, we feel sure 
that if sympathy is shown to the labourers, they will 
respond. And it would be a fatal mistake to try to repress 
strikes, because in the U,S, it has already been amply 
demonstrated that such action encourages an epidemic of 
them. 
Apart from coming under pressure from the press, the CLU had also launched 
a campaign aimed to urge government officials to initiate measures to protect labour. In 
July 1947 two members of parliament, Dusit Boontham and Prasoet Subsunthon, 
presented a Bill to parliament which lay down the basis for industrial relations 
legislation. Workers were to be given the right to join unions, negotiate with 
employers and to strike. In case of the breakdown of negotiations, disputes were to be 
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settled by a labour committee which would be appointed under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Interior. In addition the Bill stated that no children under the age of fifteen 
should be employed, maximum working hours were to be set at eight per day, night 
work was to be paid at double rates, and work after midnight was to be paid at triple 
rates. May Day, government holidays and Sundays were to be observed. Provisions 
were also made for female employees who, after working for more than six months, 
would be entitled to 3 months maternity leave. Also, every factory employing more 
than 30 workers was to provide a nurse, with workers employed in mines, rice mills 
and in forests to be given a free annual medical check. The Ministry of Interior was to 
appoint a labour board which would consist of two representatives from labour, 
employers and government, and would act as an arbitor in case of deadlocks over 
wage negotiations [BP 14/7/1947]. 
In response to these appeals from labour and the press the govemment formed 
a committee within the Department of Public Welfare which was instructed to produce 
a draft Labour Law by the end of 1948. The Chairman of the committee was later to 
remember that the: 
...drafting of the labour law at that time was due to the fact 
that there were many disputes between workers and 
employers which on some occasions had led to strikes...for 
this reason it was necessary to have a law dealing with these 
matters so that the problem could be solved. Another reason 
is that, as Thailand was a member of the I .L.O it was 
appropriate that a labour law be promulgated which would be 
in keeping with the principles of that international body 
[Fun,1980:1] 
As an additional indication of the government's intention to became far more 
involved in regulating the relations between labour and capital within industry, it 
offered the first scholarships for academics to travel abroad and study social welfare 
and labour economics [Chandravithun,1983:Preface]. Originally, two laws were 
drafted, one which dealt with labour protection and other concerned with the formation 
of trade unions [Fun,1980:2]. The Labour Committee continued to carry out its work 
until 1954, and eventually in January 1955 a decision was made to establish yet 
another committee which would examine the proposed law and make its final 
recommendations. In February the govemment called on representatives from business 
and labour groups to examine the proposed legislation. Discussion within labour ranks 
took place over the following months, and in June 1956, at a meeting attended by over 
four thousand workers, the draft law was accepted [Pasuknirunt,1959:3; Fun,1980:8], 
In September the draft Bill was presented to the National Assembly and was passed by 
112 votes to 3. Following a second and third reading, the Bill was finally passed on 
2 0 September 1956 and was to become effective as from 1 January 1957. In a 
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statement which stands in marked contrast to the views expressed by state officials 
during the period of the absolute monarchy who had denied that workers needed or 
desired a voice within Thai society, Phibun wrote: 
The government's purpose in issuing a labour law emerges 
from its recognition of the importance of all workers, as first 
members of society who are thus possessed of the right to 
receive protection from the state and also from their position 
and important role in production. The importance of workers 
will become increasingly clear as the country enters into the 
industrial phase. The government has long recognised the 
importance of workers as members of society as witnessed 
from the United Nations Law and the internal law on human 
rights, rights which are considered basic for all human 
beings, In addition the I.L.O., of which we have long been 
members, have held similar principles. That is, world peace, 
is rehant on social justice, the recognition of equal individual 
rights without thought of dividing or splitting people into 
employers and employees [Fun, 1980:Introduction]. 
The law provided for the comprehensive regulation of relations within 
industry. It regulated wages, contained provisions for a 48 hour week and employers 
were held liable and had to pay compensation to workers injured on the job. Minimum 
health and safety standards were set, work standards and overtime and holiday 
payments were prescribed. For the first time in Thai history, workers were also 
accorded the legal right to strike and establish labour unions and labour federations. 
The legislation laid down clear guidlines for the settlement of conflicts between labour 
and capital. All disputes which could not be settled at the enterprise level were to come 
before a Labour Relations Committee. If, after twenty days, negotiations still remained 
deadlocked, both parties were given the right to strike or close down the business 
provided that seven days notice be given in advance [Phiphat ,1977:1-27] . 
Commenting on the impact of the Act, Mabry [1979:48] has written: 
The reluctance of Thais to challenge authority made collective 
bargaining an alien procedure, and the inexperience of labour 
leaders made grievance administration unlikely; hence there 
were few union victories or accomplishments to bind the 
workers to a continuing organisation and for which they 
were willing to make unusual sacrifices. 
Although the provisions of the law were complex and, at first, not widely 
understood, Mabry's rather patronising assessement of workers' inability to exploit 
the choices made available to them under the terms of the Act, is difficult to sustain. 
Within the first six months of the law coming into effect the Labour Relations 
committee handled 37 disputes [N.A. S.R. 0201-kk/9] . Some of the complaints 
received included such matters as workers being dismissed unfairly without proper 
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compensation payments being made, employers failure to pay overtime rates, workers 
being unfairly treated because of poor health, and numerous instances of employers 
who simply refused to follow the provisions of the law [N.A. S.R. 0201-kk/9]. 
Indeed, it was employers' instransigence, rather than the ignorance of workers, which 
contributed to the confusion which prevented the successful implementation of the 
grievance machinery. It was stated that rather than following set procedures, 
employers often simply chose to close their businesses as a way of handling workers' 
objections. In the attempt to overcome such problems, the Department of Public 
Welfare organised a series of seminars at Thammasat University which aimed to 
educate both workers and employers as to their rights and obligations under the law 
[N.A. SR 0201-kk/9]. 
Now formally protected by the law, workers were in a position to renew their 
efforts to establish trade unions. In 1957, 136 unions and 2 Labour Federations 
registered under the terms of the law [Satithi, 1957:65]. These labour organisations 
had, within the first year, a combined membership of over 16,000 workers employed 
in the areas of mining, manufacturing, printing, chemicals, construction, electricity 
and water works, communications and services. [Satithi,1957:79-81]. 
Although it had taken workers decades of struggle before they were able to 
force the state to both protect them from the arbitrary decision of employers and permit 
them to legally strike and form trade unions, these rights were to last less than a year. 
On 16 September 1957 Phibun's administration was overthrown in a coup organised 
by Sarit Thanarat. The coup and Sarit's subsequent formal assumption of power in 
October 1958 marked a turning point in modern Thai history. Implementing an 
economic policy which was based on minimum government interference and gave free 
reign to both domestic and foreign capital, combined with the imposition of a vicious 
authoritarian political order, the Sarit years were to be subsequently referred to as the 
'dark ages' [yukmut ]. In abolishing the Labour Act, it was stated that it contained 
provisions which were: 
...innapropriate. They provided the opportunity for those 
who would use them as a tool to promote conflict between 
employers and employees and destroy the understanding and 
co-operation which exists between them. In addition, they 
also provide communist instigators with the opportunity to 
lead employees in innapropriate directions...All of these 
things contribute to the destruction of industry and commerce 
and endanger the development of the economy and the 
progress of the country. For these reasons the revolutionary 
group deems it appropriate that the law be abrogated 
[Revolutionary Order 19, 31 October 1958, cited in Lae, 
1983:1]. 
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The abrogation of the Labour Act was soon followed by a wave of arrests and 
subsequent imprisonment of labour leaders, intellectuals, journalists and politicians. 
Henceforth, the 'labour movement was thrust into a period of darkness, as the form of 
struggle went from one of openness to struggle underground' [Damri and 
Carun,1986:170]. It was not until the early 1970's that workers were able to pursue 
openly their industrial, political and social struggles. 
5.4 Summary 
Previous scholars have experienced some difficulty in coming to terms with the 
development of the labour movement in Thailand during the decade after World War 
Two. Seemingly out of nowhere, the period witnessed a flourishing of activity among 
industrial workers as they struggled for better wages and condidons, the rapid growth 
of various labour organisations and the promulgation and implementation of industrial 
and labour legislation. Fogg [1953:368], for example, responded to these 
developments by arguing that while labour organisations took on the 'forms' they did 
not, however, take on the 'substance of trade unionism in the Westerm hemisphere'. 
Some years later Mabry [1979:48] also displayed some difficulty in coming to terms 
with the developments which occurred during this period. In answer to the question of 
why did a labour movement arise, he was led to ask if one 'really did develop'.[My 
emphasis]. This chapter has demonstrated the inadequacy of these views. Basically it 
has shown that developments which occurred during he period represented a 
continuation of the processes which have been described in earlier chapters. Struggles 
over the working day, the co-ordination of these struggles into an organised labour 
movement which sought to represent the interests of workers in both the industrial and 
political spheres were not new. Nor was the state's involvment in the mediation of the 
wage-labour/capital relation as it was forced to attempt to ensure that workers struggles 
and organisation did not threaten the process of capital accumulation. 
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Chapter Six 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In the introductory chapter of this study criticism was levelled against those writers 
who have attempted to assess the historical significance of the actions of Thai 
industrial workers in terms of a pre-classificatory model or historical projection. This 
approach, it was argued, is theoretically unacceptable for the way in which it removes 
the role played by human agency in history. Once the search for a real, pure or proper 
working class is abandoned and replaced with a theoretically informed discussion 
which seeks to analyse the various forms working class development and struggle 
actually take in any given society, it becomes apparent that the contributions which 
Thai workers were making to the historical development of their society during the 
pre-1957 period were rather more significant than previous writers have been prepared 
to acknowledge. 
Although a great deal of research remains to be completed, this study has 
demonstrated empirically that industrial workers played a substantial and significant 
role in contributing to and shaping the flow of socio-historical change in Thailand 
during the period leading up to 1957. In chapter three, it was shown that the 
development of capitalist relations of production were accompanied by the emergence 
of a new social class of producers who, for their social survival, were dependent on 
the receipt of a regular wage. This thesis has concentrated on that particular fraction of 
this new wage-labouring class employed by industrial capital. It has been argued that, 
although small in numerical terms, industrial workers nevertheless came to occupy a 
strategically vital position within the Thai economy, and through the exercise of their 
labour-power in producing both use and exchange values, they made significant and 
lasting contributions to the development of industry during this period. 
Particular emphasis, however, has been given to demonstrating that their 
position within capitalist relations of production had a profound structuring influence 
over the lives of industrial workers. This argument has been directed specifically 
against those perspectives which have ignored the effects of class structure and implied 
that traditional culture, dominant ideology and ethnicity were the most important 
factors in shaping the role played by labour during the pre-1957 period. In 
contradistinction to such views, this study has shown first, how dependence on a 
wage profoundly and unfavourably shaped the lives of industrial workers. While a 
more detailed social history of the period remains to be written, it is clear that wage-
labourers faced a daily battle to survive as they attempted to cope with inadequate 
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housing, a lack of appropriate medical services and, at times shortages of food and 
other basic goods. We have also seen how reliance on the receipt of a regular wage 
demanded that workers cope with labouring in factories which were both unhealthy 
and unsafe, how they were confronted with the problems of insecure employment, 
low wages, lack of appropriate rest periods, overtime work for which they were 
unpaid and how they were treated as mere factors of production. While drawing 
attention to some of the social and work conditions associated with wage-dependence, 
the study has demonstrated, however, that although dependence on a wage imposed 
conditions which industrial workers were unable to alter either individually or 
cooperatively, its centrality to their lives ensured that it remained a principal focus for 
their industrial and wider political and social activities.[Cf. Metcalfe,1988:16-17]. It 
was through their response to these social and work conditions that workers helped to 
shape and direct the flow of socio-historical change in significant ways. Within the 
arena of industry, this study has described the ways in which, from the last decades of 
the nineteenth century onwards, wage-labourers were involved in literally hundreds of 
struggles over the establishment of a norm for the working day. Through their struggle 
for better wages, safer and healthier working conditions, in their quest for security of 
employment, higher bonuses, the provision of welfare and medical services, in their 
appeals to be treated as human beings rather than as mere factors of production and 
through their forging of new solidarities and forms of organisations, industrial 
workers did help shape and redirect the course of Thai industrial development during 
these years. 
The contributions which industrial workers made to the development of their 
society were not, however, confined to the sphere of industry alone. The study has 
traced how, as part of their overall response to their wage dependence and in their 
effort to achieve a better life for themselves and their families. Thai workers expanded 
their struggles into the wider political and social arenas. Using the events of 1923 as a 
point of departure, we have seen how struggles by wage labourers gradually 
conditioned the wider process of political change in Thailand. It was shown how, 
during the course of the 1923 strike, workers sought protection and help from the state 
as they struggled for their freedom and self-respect. However, both during the events 
of 1923 and over subsequent years, the absolute monarchy continued to ignore the 
voice and appeals of workers. Under the leadership of the Labour Group, workers 
gradually came to see that the continuation of absolutism was inimical to the realisation 
of their class interests. I have shown how Thawat and the Labour Group, in their 
attempt to provide the basic nutrients for the development of a labour movement, 
joined with other forces struggling for political change - the end of absolutism and the 
establishment of parliamentary democracy in Thailand. Crucially, it has been shown 
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that when the time arrived for concrete political action, Thai workers were actually 
involved in the 1932 coup which brought to an end the period of absolutist rule in 
Thailand. Although a more detailed account remains to be written, some attempt has 
been made to trace how workers and their organisations continually struggled, during 
later periods of military rule, for the establishment of a more open and democratic 
political system in Thailand. These struggles were most clearly apparent during the 
brief periods of 1932-34, 1944-47 and 1955-57 when open political activity was 
permitted. 
Alongside this political struggle. Thai workers and their leaders entered into the 
ideological debates as to what exists, what was good, and what was possible for the 
fu ture development of their society. Against writers who have argued for the 
persistence of traditional culture and the unbroken nature of dominant ideology, we 
have seen that, along with Thailand's incorporation into a world system of production 
and exchange combined with a domestic based process of capital accumulation, there 
emerged a profound questioning of received conceptions of what the world was like 
and what was good and desirable for the future of Thai society. Some emphasis has 
been given to showing that, rather than simply 'internalising' official nationalist 
discourse. Thai workers and their representaives subjected this discourse to a process 
of critical transformation out of which developed a very different political theory to that 
which was held by the Thai ruling classes. For example, I have shown how Thawat, 
in attempting to encourage and promote a specific working class identity, transformed 
the concepts of nation, progress and civilisation. In the post-war period some 
comments were also made with regard to the way in which, with the development of a 
radical mode of class struggle, dominant interpretations of Thai history were called 
into question. This radical discourse became part of a rather different nationalist 
discourse f rom that which was espoused by Thai military leaders. In short, through 
their contributions to the development of Thai industry and their participation in wider 
political and ideological debates, industrial workers played a significant role in helping 
to shape the direction of social change in Thailand during the pre-1957 period. 
This study has also been concerned with examining the way in which working 
class struggles were shaped by the actions of the Thai state. Drawing on recent work 
in Thai history, it has been shown that the state played a leading role in the 
development of a specific form of Thai capitalism during this period. At a structural 
level, the state played a crucial role in ensuring that a pool of free labour actually 
became available within Thai society. Emphasis has been given to demonstrating that 
the development of the wage-labour/capital relation carried with it numerous 
contradictions and that, as an integral part of their role in maintaining the conditions for 
the rise of capitalism, state officials were obliged to mediate the relations between 
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labour and capital. One way in which this process of mediation was achieved was 
through repression. It has been argued that state repression is absolutely crucial for 
understanding the various forms which working class struggles actually took during 
this period. This study has shown how, in attempting to ensure that the working class 
both submit and contribute to the functioning of the Thai social order, the state 
consistently repressed workers and their organisations. Through arrests, 
imprisonment, threat, terror, deportation, surveillance, police attacks, and through 
restrictions on the right to openly organise and the right to strike, the state placed 
enormous limits and constraints on the forms which working class struggles could 
take. 
The repression which was directed against workers and their organisations also 
entailed symbolic violence. As we have seen past authors have constantly argued that 
no real working class problem existed during the pre-1957 period. In arguing for such 
views writers have simply reproduced some of the arguments which were often used 
by Thai authorities during these years, arguments which also played a part in shaping 
the choices available to workers. This study has also shown how, in their attempt to 
repress workers the absolute state launched a discourse which denied that workers 
needed or desired a voice. Over subsequent years this discourse continued to rear its 
head as Thai workers were depicted as being unique, satisfied with their living and 
working conditions and generally uninterested in calls for change. It was this 
ideological image of being traditional, conservative and satisfied that Thai workers had 
to inidally struggle in the attempt to be permitted to air their grievances publicly. The 
limitations on the right to speak were reinforced through the anri-communist discourse 
which began under the absolute monarchy and continued throughout the 1930's, 
1940's and 1950's. It has been shown how workers and their leaders were branded as 
'communist' an accusation which effectively removed them from participating in social 
discourse. It is also important to note the the way in which the state attempted to limit 
solidarity along class lines by actively promoting ethnic differences. Through an 
ideology of ethnicity, Thai workers were presented with images of Chinese as posing 
a threat to their sources of livelihood and their identity as Thai. 
This study, in addition to examining the use of repression, has also attempted 
to trace the ways in which the state attempted to displace conflicts between wage-
labour and capital into some sort of institutionalised framework within which workers' 
protests could be managed and contained. In this context attention was placed on 
tracing the development of industrial relations legislation. Again taking the events of 
1923 as a point of departure we have seen how initially state officials adopted the 
position that it was beyond their responsibility to become directly involved in 
regulating relations between employer and employee. This laissez-faire attitude 
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remained in force until the overthrow of absolutism in 1932. In the post-1932 period, 
however, it was shown that, as part of the policy to promote industrial development, 
the state took some initial, albeit haphazard, steps toward a growing involvement in 
industrial relations, a process which culminated in the promulgation of the 1956 
Labour Act. While the Act was in force for only a short period, it did establish the first 
stable framework within which the wage-labour/capital relation was to be regulated. 
Thus it was through a combination of outright repression and displacement that 
the state acted to constrain, shape, and limit the form which the development of the 
labour movement actually took during this period. Nevertheless, it should be stressed 
that despite these constraints industrial workers demonstrated both a willingness and 
ability to continue to struggle. This is a point which touches on some of the 
fundamental methodological questions which were raised in the introduction to this 
study. It was argued that underlying previous work was a vision of workers as 
passive victims of history rather than as conscious and purposeful human beings who 
were makers of their own history. While it is important to analyse the objective 
constraints placed on social life and recognise how, for instance, both wage-
dependence and the actions of the Thai state served to limit a range of possible and 
desired actions, these objective constraints did not exist apart from the historical 
process, but were subject to a continual process of being formed, reformed and, as the 
1932 coup illustrates, occasionally transformed by the actions of industrial workers. In 
short, this study has shown that industrial workers in Thailand made significant and 
lasting contributions to the processes of economic, political and social change during 
the pre-1957 period. While these historical contributions may not have conformed to 
the abstract theoretical projections envisaged by past writers, it was nevertheless the 
history that workers made themselves. As Metcalfe [1988:214] writes '...history 
should not be trimmed to fit abstract formulae that claim a privileged understanding of 
its meaning...in history people commit themselves, drawing their own portrait and 
there is nothing but that portrait'. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Over the last three decades capitalist relations of production have continued to 
develop and transform the structure of Thai society. The social scientific analysis of 
these enormous and profound changes and the implications they carry for the future 
historical development of labour have only just begun and there exists enormous 
potential for future research. Some of the questions which might be usefully addressed 
include how the capitalist class structure has changed over the last thirty years and 
what impact these changes have had on the process of class formation; and within 
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industry, what the systems of control currently being employed by capital are. This is 
a topic which has only been touched on in this study. In chapter three some discussion 
was given to showing how the despotic regime of control placed enormous constraints 
on the development of the tramwaymen's struggle. It might reasonably be asked what 
other systems of control are now in use. How do these systems change both over time 
and between the different fractions of the capitalist class? What impact do these 
different systems of control have with regard to the development of struggles at the 
point of production? Moreover, what role has the state played in both the further 
development of capitalism and in the development of new systems of control? More 
broadly, attention must be given to the growth of both the industrial and poUtical wing 
of the labour movement during this period. What are the policies of this movement and 
how has its development been shaped both by capital and the state? What is the 
relationship between labourism and the radical modes of class struggle within the 
labour movement? What role will workers play in the future political development of 
their country? How has labour contributed to and how will they continue to shape the 
future development of a party system in Thailand? How might the ideas of workers 
and their leaders serve to condition the wider process of ideological debate in 
Thailand? The list of questions could easily be extended. Attempts to answer these 
questions, however, can no longer be approached through the imposition of a pre-
classificatory framework or historical projection but can only be approached via a 
concept of research which seeks to provide a theoretically informed discussion of the 
various forms which capitalist development and working class struggle actually take, a 
task which can only be achieved on the basis of rigorous and sustained empirical 
research. 
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